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Viewing cable 08KABUL2744, Khost Governor Highlights Challenges to Governance and

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL2744 2008-10-12 09:58 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4404
RR RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2744/01 2860958
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 120958Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5794
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002744 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS CAMP, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
 
SUBJECT:  Khost Governor Highlights Challenges to Governance and 
Development 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Khost Governor Arsala Jamal cited corruption and 
limited human capital as the primary obstacles to good governance in 
Khost and Afghanistan.  While donor projects positively impact 
private investment, lack of electricity hamper investors.  Jamal 
feared growing Taliban intimidation will lead to low turnout during 
the upcoming voter registration drive.  Jamal criticized the PTS 
program for its lack of direction, but expressed the opinion that 
Jalaluddin Haqqani eventually would be reconciled and return to 
Afghanistan.  Finally, Jamal indicated his tenure as governor is 
nearing its end.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Corruption and Limited Human Capital Hamper Good Governance 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a September 26 meeting with USG and COMISAF officials, 
Governor Jamal singled out limited human capital as the greatest 
hindrance to developing good governance, both in Khost Province and 
nationwide.  Qualified individuals possessing at least a minimum 
level of skills and competence are needed, particularly at the 
critical district level.  Jamal highlighted his two critical 
criteria for district administrators:  "one, he is a good guy and 
two, he is a fighter," meaning someone who is willing to get out in 
the district and follow through to accomplish things. 
 
3. (SBU) Jamal commented positively on the impact of the Independent 
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), noting that the institution 
is improving linkages between Kabul and the provinces, but that it 
may be expanding into areas beyond its mandate that might result in 
a loss of focus.  He also specified the lack of a discretionary 
governor's operating budget as an impediment to extending governance 
and GIRoA influence into outlying districts. 
 
4. (SBU) Referring to the IDLG draft Sub-national Governance policy, 
Jamal offered that creating new, parallel consultative bodies and 
shuras (i.e., community councils) could lead to competition where 
existing bodies function.  For example, the Community Development 
Councils within the National Solidarity Program have been successful 
in Khost.  He also noted the importance of continuing to support and 
use traditional forms of governance; e.g., turning to elders for 
dispute resolution. 
 
5. (SBU) Jamal said that corruption at the district administrator 
level remains problematic; however, he stressed the importance of 
Afghan government officials being able to deliver projects and 
services (even if in most cases, the actual funding originated with 
the PRT).  Jamal stated "if people do not come to you, you are not 
the government." 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Public Projects' Impact on Private Investment 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Khost has the potential to be another Helmand or Mazer, 
according to Jamal.  Relative to other Afghan provinces, Khost 
enjoys a good climate, a more educated populace, nearby markets and 
ties to Pakistan, access to capital from remittances from overseas 
Khosties estimated at USD 10-12 million per month, and an 
entrepreneurial spirit (which derived in part from the small 
land-holdings and high cost of land in Khost, requiring investors to 
look beyond traditional land investments).  Jamal underscored the 
importance of road-building, noting it spurs other construction 
projects and increases people's confidence in the government. 
However, the greatest hindrance to productive investment is not 
publicly-funded projects crowding out private investors, but rather 
the lack of reliable and sufficient electricity.  Additionally, 
Jamal highlighted the dearth of NGOs operating in the province and 
expressed support for Coalition efforts to encourage greater 
humanitarian and development agency presence throughout Khost. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Looking Ahead to Voter Registration 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Jamal indicated that "officially" Khost is ready for voter 
 
KABUL 00002744  002 OF 002 
 
 
registration, but noted that there are problems in some areas of the 
province.  He said that growing Taliban influence, particularly in 
Spera, Sabari, and Tani districts, would likely dampen turnout. 
Interestingly, he did not expect the Taliban to resort to overt 
force, but rather threats, intimidation, night letters, etc. to 
prevent people from registering.  Jamal believed people do not 
support the Taliban or want them back in power, but since the people 
believe the government could not protect them, they would acquiesce 
to Taliban demands. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
PTS Program Lacks Direction; Haqqani to Return? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8. (SBU) Jamal criticized the Strengthening Peace (PTS) program for 
its lack of an overall strategy to deal with PTS participants. 
There exists no social reintegration program or any strategy to use 
returnees for public diplomacy purposes to encourage others to take 
part in the program.  Jamal expressed the opinion that Jalaluddin 
Haqqani eventually would be rehabilitated and return to Afghanistan. 
 Jamal said Haqqani has been seen in the past as a moderate, able to 
unite the mujahedeen and enjoying good relations in Kabul 
(especially with Burhanuddin Rabbani).  Jamal said Haqqani "runs 
everything in these three (southeastern) provinces, and if he came 
back, these provinces would be like Panjshir in three years." 
 
------------------------------- 
End of Jamal's Term as Governor 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Jamal confirmed that his two-year appointment as governor 
was coming to an end and that he had begun making plans to return to 
Canada soon.  We know of no potential successor at this time; Jamal 
has been an effective administrator and his departure could 
negatively impact governance in the province. 
 
WOOD