VZCZCXRO3219
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1210/01 2981012
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241012Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8660
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 5240
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 001210 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR ADMIRAL WILLARD, COMPACFLT COMMANDER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL WILLARD, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC 
FLEET 
 
HANOI 00001210  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Hanoi looks forward to welcoming you to Vietnam. 
Your visit is well timed to follow up on the recent U.S.-Vietnam 
defense dialogue and to highlight a broad area of bilateral defense 
and security cooperation that has now begun to gather momentum in 
the wake of Vietnamese Prime Minister Dung's June visit to 
Washington.  Vietnam's economic successes have translated into 
greater international clout, reflected in its current seat as a 
non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.  GVN leaders 
understand that the United States plays a direct role in creating 
the conditions for their nation's success and are committed to 
advancing the bilateral relationship. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's 
realization that the United States is an important force in 
maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even "small" 
countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and freedom of 
action.  As such, Vietnam's leaders speak positively and 
optimistically about the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences 
over human rights remain, however, and lingering fears that the 
United States supports the overthrow of the current regime continue 
to complicate the relationship.  China also looms as a factor 
coloring Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the security realm. 
The Ministry of Defense is one of the ministries most suspicious of 
the United States and of our deepening bilateral ties. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, but 
reflect the overall positive shift in the relationship.  We conduct 
professional military exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) and PAVN officers are regular observers at annual Cobra Gold 
and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises and 
routinely attend U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored multilateral 
conferences and courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies.  In FY08, IMET expanded mil-mil contacts through a 
U.S. mobile training team visit for military medical techniques 
training.  The GVN also continues to send well-qualified candidates 
to English language training and English language instructor 
training to the Defense Language Institute.  These are constructive 
steps, but reaching our full potential for closer cooperation in 
defense activities, including multilateral peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance at U.S. military 
schools, is attainable, but will require persistence and patience. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One operational issue affecting our ability to charge ahead 
with mil-mil programs is the GVN's refusal to grant a visa to our 
incoming Defense Attache, Colonel Patrick Reardon.  In June, the GVN 
acknowledged Colonel Reardon's renunciation of his Vietnamese 
citizenship, but ongoing debate between and within the Ministries of 
Defense, Public Security and Foreign Affairs appear to have stymied 
issuance of his visa or accreditation despite multiple high level 
entreaties from the Embassy.  Reinforcing the message with your 
interlocutors that future development of our bilateral relationship 
depends on having an accredited defense attache would be helpful. 
 
Defense and Security Talks 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The first-ever U.S.-Vietnam Political-Defense 
Dialogue, held on October 6 in Hanoi, covered a broad range of 
issues including common concerns over the role of China in the South 
China Sea, Vietnamese participation in peacekeeping, and cooperation 
in Search and Rescue, ship visits, and POW/MIA searches.  The GVN 
raised concern about the Vietnam Human Rights Act recently put 
forward by Senator Boxer as "not consistent" with our current level 
of cooperation. 
 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Vietnam's current seat on the UN Security Council has given 
significant impetus to increased engagement in international 
peacekeeping missions, especially those organized under UN auspices. 
 The Joint Statement from PM Dung's June visit to Washington 
highlights Vietnam's agreement to participate in GPOI.  Nonetheless, 
in order to fully engage in future peacekeeping operations the GVN 
will have to do much more to meet significant challenges: the lack 
of interoperability, the paucity of English language speakers in the 
military, and complications due to funding issues.  Their 
participation in the GPOI is an important step in this direction. 
 
¶7. (SBU) A Program Design & Development team from PACOM is expected 
 
HANOI 00001210  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
to visit Hanoi to begin crafting a GPOI training plan tailored to 
Vietnam's current capabilities and priorities in February 2009 (date 
not yet shared with the GVN).  While Vietnam's plans to send 
observers to the 2009 GPOI exercise, Garuda Shield, in Indonesia, we 
should press Vietnam to do more than observe, as they have done for 
the last two GPOI exercises.  We are encouraging the GVN to send 
staff officers to actively participate in the command post exercise 
portion of the event and officers to observe/participate alongside 
trainers in the field training exercise.  This would be a step up 
from observation, albeit a small one, and likely to be in the realm 
of the possible for the GVN. 
 
Expanding U.S. Naval Ship Visits 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made six port visits to 
Vietnam, including most recently an October 2008 visit by the USS 
Mustin at Da Nang port.  In June 2008, Vietnam participated in the 
Pacific Partnership mission of the USNS Mercy.  While we have 
regularized our SOP for regular ship visits over recent years, the 
GVN remains firm in limiting the frequency of port visits by U.S. 
Navy vessels to one a year, pleading lack of capacity to handle 
more.  This restriction is also frequently cited as being consistent 
with GVN laws that regulate visits by foreign warships; however, 
some other nations conduct more frequent port visits. 
 
¶9. (SBU) While it may be unproductive to demand more frequent port 
calls, we still seek to persuade the GVN to permit more frequent 
access for limited, technical calls (i.e., for refueling and 
replenishment).  The MOD is also reluctant to take on negotiation of 
an Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), stating that it 
requires more time to study this agreement because of "disparities" 
in our two defense systems.  Progress on each of these efforts would 
support our overall goal of increasing routine access for U.S. naval 
vessels at Vietnam's ports, while maintaining the pace of military 
contacts at a level comfortable for the GVN. 
 
¶10. (SBU) We also hope to reverse the PAVN leadership's reluctance 
to participate in distinguished visitor fly-outs to U.S. Navy 
vessels transiting the South China Sea.  To date, these have been 
rebuffed due to concerns over the "appearance of Vietnam's 
participation in joint exercises with the United States." 
 
Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) The MOD has expressed a strong desire to begin 
preparations for a joint Search and Rescue exercise, but notes that 
information sharing and U.S. observance of Vietnamese SAR exercises 
were necessary first steps.  Vietnam also seeks information sharing 
on storm, earthquake and tsunami prediction, as well as a study on 
the impact of rising sea levels.  The Pacific Angel program could 
also provide medical cooperation similar to Pacific Partnership, but 
using aircraft vice ships for transport. 
 
Counterterrorism 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about the threat of global 
terrorism and has participated with us in modest cooperative 
activities.  The USG funds Vietnamese participation in 
counterterrorism-related training at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on counterterrorism 
themes.  Vietnam has signed eight out of thirteen UN terrorism 
conventions. 
 
A Word on the Economy 
--------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Vietnam's "doi moi" (renovation) program of economic 
reform, begun in 1986, has set the country on a successful market 
economy path, with an average growth rate of 7.5 percent over the 
past decade.  The GVN focuses on exports and foreign direct 
investment in its drive to achieve middle-income status by 2010. 
The United States is currently Vietnam's largest export market and 
third largest overall trade partner.  U.S. investors tell us the key 
challenges they face in Vietnam are underdeveloped infrastructure, a 
shortage of skilled workers and managers, and the considerable level 
of state participation in the economy.  For its part, the GVN is 
grappling with issues of corruption, improving the legal 
environment, and implementing its WTO commitments.  Vietnam's 
current turmoil is rooted in high inflation (27.9 percent 
year-on-year September), the large current account deficit, and 
inefficient allocation of resources, which is particularly obvious 
in the disproportionate amount of state resources devoted to 
 
HANOI 00001210  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
powerful State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
 
Human Rights Challenges 
----------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Serious deficiencies related to human rights in Vietnam 
include lack of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of the press.  One of our key objectives is to end the use of 
catch-all "national security" provisions for the prosecution of 
peaceful dissent.  We continue to call for the release of all 
prisoners of conscience, but where we see individuals expressing 
their political opinions, many of our government interlocutors see 
"lawbreakers" trying to destabilize the regime.  The recent arrests 
and sackings of Vietnamese reporters and editors in the wake of a 
corruption scandal reveal the on-going battle within the GVN over 
the role of freedom of the press.  The continued existence of groups 
in the United States that advocate regime change complicates human 
rights engagement by providing ammunition to hard-liners who want to 
stoke the fading paranoia that we are indeed still "the enemy." 
Reassuring the GVN that the USG does not support separatist groups 
can assist in building a better human rights dialogue based on 
mutual trust. 
 
The China Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) While Vietnam's engagement with the United States will 
continue to broaden, China necessarily constitutes Vietnam's most 
important strategic preoccupation.  This is not to say that Vietnam 
is "choosing" China over the United States; Vietnam's leadership is 
sophisticated enough to realize that relations with China and the 
United States do not represent a zero sum game; it is possible to 
have good relations with both.  Each relationship also creates 
challenges, however.  While China constitutes a vital and necessary 
commercial partner and former ally, it is also perceived as a 
significant and frustrating constraint to Vietnam's freedom on 
action. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Chinese bullying of foreign companies in an attempt to 
compel them to cease oil and gas exploration efforts in the South 
China Sea serves to remind Vietnamese officials that while the 
Vietnamese may not approve of all U.S. policies, the same is 
certainly true of Chinese actions.  While progress has been made in 
settling the land border, there is no commonality of views on 
sovereignty issues regarding the South China Sea, known as the "East 
Sea" to the Vietnamese.  Hanoi is also "riding the tiger" with 
regard to managing the deep negative views toward China of many 
Vietnamese.  China is widely disliked and distrusted as a former 
colonial master, and Beijing's actions in the Spratlys and Paracels 
threaten to inflame those passions.  Should Hanoi allow 
unconstrained protests against the Chinese, however, it would appear 
weak in the face of calls to action that it could not satisfy, as 
well as risking Beijing's anger. 
 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The GVN recognizes the strategic importance of the United 
States in the region and the world, but is not shy about criticizing 
U.S. actions it perceives as outside the multilateral system.  The 
GVN routinely chafes over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's record of 
human rights and religious freedom.  Nonetheless, Vietnam's leaders 
are also pragmatic and recognize that Vietnam's own continued 
economic well-being, growth and security are, in large measure, 
inexorably tied to its relationship with the United States. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Vietnam has begun to explore opportunities within regional 
organizations to increase joint efforts against terrorism, 
narcotics, maritime piracy and other issues of shared concern. 
Vietnam has also recently begun joint sea patrols with other 
neighbors in the Gulf of Thailand and has established hotlines to 
help facilitate coordination along sea boundaries.  Nevertheless, 
for historic and foreign policy reasons, the GVN is generally 
reluctant to speak out against its "traditional friends" such as 
North Korea and Iran when they engage in behavior that the rest of 
the international community condemns. 
 
What You Can Expect 
-------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms generally 
supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship.  As noted above, 
lingering suspicions still exist among conservatives in leadership 
about the development of closer ties with the United States, but the 
overall tenor is one of support and interest at a measured pace that 
 
HANOI 00001210  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
will not upset the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance 
among its other regional partners.  Your visit will continue to help 
translate those good feelings into measurable accomplishments in the 
defense and security relationship. 
 
¶20. (SBU) We look forward to your visit and stand ready to do 
everything we can to make your time in Vietnam as productive as 
possible. 
 
MICHALAK