VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1449/01 2962011
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222011Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2295
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0028
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0091
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0252

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001449 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA WELCOMES AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S 
CONSULTATIONS ON IRAN AND SYRIA; WILL WAIT FOR BRAZIL ON 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL QUESTIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Argentine Vice Foreign Minister Victorio 
Taccetti welcomed Ambassador Schulte's October 16 
consultations in Argentina, confirming Argentina's 
predisposition to cooperate with the U.S. internationally and 
at the IAEA.  In the meeting with VFM Taccetti and at a lunch 
hosted by the Director for Nuclear Issues Ambassador Elsa 
Kelly, Schulte thanked the Government of Argentina (GOA) for 
its support on Iran, for voting at the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) to facilitate the U.S.-India civilian nuclear 
agreement, and for its responsible management of nuclear 
technology.  He described U.S. and IAEA concerns about 
Syria's clandestine program, requested Argentine support for 
inclusion of the NPT Additional Protocol (AP) as part of a 
criteria-based approach to restricting the export of nuclear 
technology, and described U.S. support for a nuclear fuel 
bank arrangement to ease nuclear fuel supply concerns among 
countries not possessing enrichment capabilities.  Ambassador 
Kelly was generally receptive to the U.S. views.  She noted 
Argentina's general readiness to conclude the NPT Additional 
Protocol but repeated that the GOA would go forward on the 
issue only with Brazil due to bilateral arrangements between 
the countries.  Although she raised concerns about use of a 
country's AP status as a criterion for restricting its import 
of nuclear technologies, she intimated that Argentina 
probably would be able to support some NSG agreement 
establishing criteria-based restrictions on the transfer of 
these technologies.  She noted upcoming consultations with 
Brazil and thought that the two sides would discuss the NSG 
initiative.  Ambassador Kelly was supportive of the fuel bank 
concept, following up with specific questions about different 
international proposals and the costs. Both Kelly and VFM 
Taccetti restated their concerns about the India civilian 
nuclear arrangement, which they had supported only with 
reservations and at ours and India's request; she thought the 
deal would ultimately weaken the NPT.  Ambassador Schulte 
gave newspaper and television interviews during the visit. 
He also led a positive and detailed discussion of 
non-proliferation issues at an Argentine think tank.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) U.S. Ambassador to International Organizations in 
Vienna Greg Schulte engaged a range of public officials and 
non-government interlocutors during a one-day visit to Buenos 
Aires October 16.  He was received at the Foreign Ministry by 
Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti and hosted at lunch 
by Ambassador Elsa Kelly, the MFA Director for International 
Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs (DIGAN).  Ambassador 
Wayne participated in the meeting with VFM Taccetti.  DCM, 
EST Counselor and Pol-Mil Officer joined the lunch given by 
Ambassador Kelly; she included a number of MFA officials 
along with officials from the Argentine Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority and the National Commission on Atomic Energy 
(CNEA); two officials had experience in international 
inspections.  Amb. Schulte gave interviews with leading daily 
newspapers La Nacion (published) and Clarin (pending) as well 
as a taped interview with a national network, America TV.  He 
concluded the visit with a roundtable discussion of 
non-proliferation issues at the leading international affairs 
think tank in Argentina, the Argentine Council on 
International Relations (CARI). 
 
Seeking Sustained Argentine Support on Iran, Syria and North 
Korea 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the meeting with Taccetti and the working lunch, 
Ambassador Schulte thanked Argentina for its consistent 
support on issues including Iran.  He noted the excellent 
collegial support he had received first from Ambassador 
Kelly, when posted to Vienna, and from her successor 
Ambassador Curia.  On Iran, Schulte described U.S. support 
for the P5 plus one dual-track approach, with the offer of 
negotiations, predicated on Iran's abandonment of enrichment, 
coupled with ongoing sanctions.  He conceded our frustration 
that international efforts had not yet persuaded Iran to 
change course but said that the increasing unanimity in the 
international community against Iran's enrichment program had 
generated evident debate in Iran about the costs of these 
efforts.  Iran's enrichment effort had become more effective, 
with an estimate of 4000 centrifuges in operation and 
increasing levels of enrichment.  Our concern over Iran was 
profound given the conclusive evidence of a weaponization 
program (probably shelved in 2003, Schulte noted, but never 
disavowed) and the major effort at enrichment.  We estimated 
that Iran would have sufficient quantities of enriched 
Uranium to pursue weaponization between 2010 and 2015, 
 
 
Schulte said.  He described the Iranian justification of 
processing for civilian nuclear fuel as patently bogus, given 
that Iran's one power generating reactor at Bushehr would be 
supplied by Russia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Schulte underscored the importance of a firm 
international line on Iran, emphasizing that strong 
statements from a country like Argentina were probably more 
important than U.S. declarations on Iran.  He noted that he 
and his Russian colleague had worked closely to coordinate 
substantively identical statements on Iran even after the 
Georgia crisis so as to convince Iran that there was no 
opening to exploit between Moscow and Washington.  In 
response to Taccetti's question about Russian and Chinese 
motivations, Schulte explained his convictions that both were 
sincere in wanting to avoid a nuclear armed Iran, with each 
having real interests at stake in the Gulf that would be 
compromised by a regional nuclear arms race and by other 
dangers that would attend Iranian acquisition of nuclear 
weapons capability. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte provided detailed information to 
Taccetti and at the working lunch on IAEA findings regarding 
the destroyed nuclear facility in Syria.  He praised the good 
work of IAEA inspectors even without Syrian cooperation. 
Syria, Schulte said, could now follow one of two paths: the 
path of Libya in coming clean and working its way back into 
the international system, or the course taken by Iran of 
denial and obfuscation.  It was a great concern that Syria 
appeared to be leaning in the wrong direction.  Syria too 
needed to hear consistent messages from countries around the 
world, and we counted on Argentina to sustain its principled 
approach to such issues as Syria was brought before the IAEA. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Schulte also briefly described the to-and-fro of 
North Korean positions with the six-party talks, speculating 
that, whatever the leadership situation there, the Government 
appeared bent on extracting the maximum amount of concessions 
possible with the deal.  He described the goal of having 
North Korea eventually reenter the NPT as a non-nuclear 
weapons state and said we might call on Argentina for support 
in this process. 
 
Argentina and the Additional Protocol 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Schulte described the U.S. objectives at the late 
November NSG meeting in developing effective, criteria-based 
restrictions on the spread of nuclear enrichment technology 
to states not currently possessing the capability (he noted 
that Argentina and Brazil were recognized by the United 
States as enrichment capable).  We had initially pushed for a 
complete prohibition on the export of this technology, 
Schulte noted, but the U.S. had listened to objections and 
developed an alternative.  Among the criteria we hoped to 
utilize was whether the intended recipient country had signed 
the NPT Additional Protocol (AP).  Ambassador Schulte was 
careful to describe our efforts to recognize in doing so that 
neither Brazil nor Argentina had signed the AP.  While our 
goal was that both countries would sign, in the interim we 
were content to draft an export restriction regime that 
required the recipient countries to have the AP but not 
Argentina or Brazil, given their special status. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kelly, although ultimately quite pragmatic in her 
approach to this issue, pushed back initially, arguing that 
the IAEA and not the NSG was the appropriate mechanism 
through which to add restrictions on the export of nuclear 
technology.  This was so particularly given the NPT's 
affirmative statement regarding the diffusion of nuclear 
technology for peaceful uses to developing countries in 
Article 4, she argued.  Moreover, many developing countries 
would find the provisions of the AP quite onerous, 
particularly those that were in the early stages of exploring 
and developing nuclear power.  The chief for Nuclear Affairs 
and Institutional Communication at Argentina's Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority, Elena Maceiras, asked whether some 
developing countries might be asked to implement appropriate 
elements rather than the full scope of the AP, or, 
alternatively, utilize other safeguards.  Raual Racana, 
President of the Regulatory Authority, said that Argentina 
itself would be hardpressed to implement in the AP even 
though it had no political objections of its own the concept 
(he noted in particular the challenges of locating archived 
documents regarding the country's nuclear programs).  Kelly 
pushed further, saying that some suspected U.S. motives in 
 
 
trying to restrict nuclear capable countries from engaging in 
legitimate trade with developing nations interested in 
nuclear power.  She suggested that perhaps the criteria would 
apply only to non-NSG members (Ambassador Schulte responded 
that we envisioned the criteria based standards applying to 
transfers to any countries other than the recognized current 
technology holders).  Kelly also noted that Argentina had no 
political objection to signing the AP itself (though the 
question had not been put to the President), but underscored 
Argentina's position that its bilateral mechanism, the 
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (ABACC), made it impossible for Argentina 
to move forward without Brazil. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte acknowledged Kelly's concerns and 
pressed for a criteria-based regime to address our countries' 
shared concerns about proliferation.  He emphasized again our 
readiness to work with Brazil and Argentina to reach an 
agreement at the NSG that would acknowledge and not restrict 
Argentina and Brazil as non-signatories of the AP.  Told that 
Brazil seemed to be taking a pragmatic approach toward 
resolving this question, Kelly moved away from her strong 
position, speculating that an upcoming consultative visit to 
Argentina by Brazilian Counselor Santiago Mourao might 
facilitate efforts by the two countries to identify a 
suitable way forward to support the U.S. objectives, at least 
in terms of some NSG criteria for technology transfers (the 
AP being the harder piece for both).  When Ambassador Schulte 
later raised with VFM Taccetti the criteria-based export 
control approach at the NSG, Kelly spoke positively about the 
prospects for finding some mechanisms. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Kelly added in the working lunch that she had 
lobbied the Brazilians to sign the AP and did not understand 
their objections.  A member of her team speculated that it 
might have something to do with the Brazilian military's 
involvement in the program, or speculation that Brazil wanted 
to hide the original source of its enrichment technology. 
 
Fuel Banks 
---------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Schulte took the opportunity to describe USG 
support for the concept of a nuclear fuel bank as a mechanism 
to give assurances to countries seeking to utilize nuclear 
power that the market would provide the necessary low 
enriched uranium.  He noted both Russian and IAEA proposals 
as viable, with the objective of creating at least two 
reactor loads available to countries in good standing with 
the IAEA.  He described ongoing efforts to raise funds for an 
effort spearheaded by the private Nuclear Threat Initiative 
(NTI) to finance an effort, noting the USG contribution of 
USD 50 million to the effort (one-half of the required 
total).  If it worked, Schulte said, the fuel bank would 
never have to be utilized, providing only an additional layer 
of assurance to the market.  Schulte also noted that Iran was 
particularly vehement in objecting to this idea because it 
undermined its case for developing its enrichment capability 
- proving already its utility.  Kelly was receptive to the 
idea, noting that she had been briefed on the ideas 
previously and found them compelling. 
 
U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Vice Foreign Minister Taccetti received Ambassador 
Schulte's presentations on Iran, Syria, and the NSG questions 
with interest and support, intervening to underscore 
Argentina's interest in cooperating with the United States on 
these issues before complaining about U.S. and Indian 
pressure to facilitate the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear 
agreement at the NSG.  India, he said, had been much less 
subtle, primarily emphasizing its imports from Argentina and 
arguing that Argentina should give its support to an 
important partner.  Taccetti said that in accepting the NSG 
proposal Argentina had recognized many practical and 
political considerations, including India's status as a 
partner to the U.S. in a dangerous region, its democracy, and 
its rapidly growing energy needs.  Schulte, who had opened by 
thanking Taccetti for Argentina's support of the agreement, 
acknowledged Taccetti's concern about the principles of NPT 
adherence but shared his confidence that, in five to ten 
years, we would look back on the agreement as a clear 
positive.  While we would have preferred to bring India in to 
the NPT, Schulte said, that had clearly not been viable. 
Instead, he said, the agreement had brought India as close as 
 
 
possible to the safeguards and rules of the global 
non-proliferation regime, a net positive for the principles 
of non-proliferation. 
 
Press and Public Outreach 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte conducted three press interviews 
during his visit, with leading newspapers "La Nacion" and 
"Clarin," and with broadly available television network 
America TV.  The "La Nacion" interview was published on 
October 19 (translation to be faxed to USMISSION UNVIE). 
Schulte effectively parried efforts in all three interviews 
to paint the Iran issues as a conflict between Iran and the 
United States, emphasizing Argentina's consistent support, 
its agreement with U.S. concerns, and the unanimity 
internationally that Iran stop enrichment activities.  He 
noted that only Venezuela and Syria had supported the Iranian 
position.  Pressed whether China and Russia had been 
supportive, Schulte acknowledged that the two countries might 
not have moved as quickly toward sanctions as we would have 
liked but that both countries were firm on the issue and had 
compelling and evident interests in preventing Iranian 
development of a nuclear weapon.  Schulte shared the 
2010-2015 estimate of when Iran might have sufficient 
enriched Uranium to deploy a weapon if it developed the 
capacity. 
 
¶14. (SBU) All three journalists asked about potential policy 
change toward Iran under a new U.S. Administration. 
Ambassador Schulte emphasized that he could only speak for 
the policies of President Bush but shared that, based on his 
careful observation of both leading candidates for the 
Presidency, U.S. policy would remain at least as firm.  Both 
had addressed the importance of supporting the IAEA and of 
insisting that Iran stop enrichment.  Asked about the impact 
of the global financial crisis, Schulte insisted it would 
have no discernible effect on international unanimity on the 
question of Iranian enrichment; he added that the 
accompanying drop in the price of petroleum was magnifying 
the effect of economic sanctions (and probably far outdoing 
them), creating costs for Tehran that could severely limit 
the Iranian governments effort to sustain support at home for 
its policies. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte concluded his Argentina program 
with a useful roundtable discussion organized by the 
Argentine Council on International Relations (CARI).  The 
event was attended by approximately 25 Argentines, many with 
expertise in the non-proliferation area.  Questions focused 
on Iran and on the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal.  One 
questioner asked a probing question about the future of the 
IAEA given its purported resource needs and the challenges it 
was facing as it moved away from its more purely technical 
mandate of years past.  Schulte agreed that the IAEA had 
become more political, citing as an example the contentious 
political debates sparked by the question of a Middle East 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.  The Ambassador's availability and 
candor were clearly appreciated by the audience. 
 
Comment: An Excellent Investment 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The visit by Ambassador Schulte was highly useful 
to our efforts to maintain and build Argentine support for 
key non-proliferation objectives.  His cordial and frank 
explication of several key non-proliferation challenges and 
the U.S. perspective will pay continuing dividends as an 
investment with the GOA.  Argentina is typically in a good 
position on these issues, but some are difficult for 
Argentina either on principle or in practice, and explaining 
USG approaches in this fashion may be crucial to bringing 
them around.  Placing Ambassador Schulte in front of local 
academics/diplomats and the press was also quite useful. 
Most importantly, it both dispels some of the less charitable 
views of U.S. policies on Iran, non-proliferation, and it 
builds Argentine ownership as a partner in these efforts. 
 
 
¶17. (U) Ambassador Schulte provided input to this cable but 
did not review the text. 
WAYNE