VZCZCXRO3675
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1398/01 2981605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241605Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2719
INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5896
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0679
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8618
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2956
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6782
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0275
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0127

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001398 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ENRG MNUC PARM UN BR
SUBJECT:  Ambassador Schulte Visit to Brasilia - Nuclear Issues 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  During an October 13 visit to Brasilia, 
Ambassador Gregory Schulte discussed Iran, Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) issues and Brazil's nuclear program.  Brazil wants to play a 
 
constructive role with the UN on nuclear issues, particularly with 
Iran.  Completing an Additional Protocol and joining a NSG consensus 
to limit the spread of enrichment technology will require difficult 
political decisions, though at a technical level they are 
acceptable.  Brazil is committed to developing its own nuclear power 
industry and has planned an extensive program of reactor 
construction.  Further, the GOB intends to develop its capacity to 
become self-sufficient in supplying fuel for its reactors.  The GOB 
sees no technical problem with joining the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership, although this will again require a political decision 
that will depend on completion of a government nuclear policy 
review.  END SUMMARY. 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Schulte urged Brazilian support for UN efforts to promote 
Iranian compliance with UN resolutions by suspending enrichment 
activities and implementing IAEA safeguards.  He pointed out that 
Iran's only "peaceful" nuclear reactor was a Russian design that 
could only use Russian fuel packages.  Therefore, there was no 
possible use for enriched uranium for power generation.  Brazilian 
Ministry for External Relations (MRE) Director for Disarmament and 
Sensitive Technologies Santiago Mourao said that the Brazilian 
Embassy in Tehran was reporting seeing signs of differences 
developing among the Iranians, with one group interested in a 
sharply scaled back enrichment program, while retaining the 
technology.  Also, he passed on their assessment that financial 
sanctions were taking a real toll in Iran.  Mourao cautioned that 
Iran may be stringing the international community along in 
responding to the IAEA in order to see who will win the U.S. 
elections and the policies they will take.  Presidential Advisor 
Marcel Biato reported that President Lula would like to visit Tehran 
to "tell them to their face" what Iran should do to comply with UN 
requirements.  He believed that Brazil could play an important role 
by doing so.  MRE Undersecretary Everton Vargas told Schulte that 
Brazil has "internalized" the UN process regarding Iran and urge a 
diplomatic approach to gaining Iranian compliance. 
 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS AND NSG 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Ambassador Schulte sought Brazilian views on the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) efforts to limit enrichment technology and the 
prospects for Brazil signing an IAEA Additional Protocol.  Brazil 
has resisted such a protocol over concerns about the intrusiveness 
of IAEA inspections.  Mourao's office has done a technical 
assessment and concluded that Brazil could comply with an Additional 
Protocol.  He added, what was needed was a political decision, and 
there, the issue would turn on Vice Minister Guimaraes' views.  He 
noted that the Argentines had taken the reverse approach and had the 
political decision to proceed (once Brazil did), and were now doing 
the technical level of assessment.  The Ministry of External 
Relations is doing a review of how it wants to handle this issue. 
Biato characterized this review as seeking "balance" between strong 
nonproliferation standards and access to peaceful nuclear power. 
The lack of an additional protocol has been a stumbling block to 
Brazil's support for a NSG rule on transfer of enrichment 
technology.  Mourao stated that Brazil could support language that 
would grandfather Brazil's technology in the proposed NSG rule on 
transferring enrichment technology.  Vargas also said that Brazil 
wanted to find a way forward that did not depend on an immediate 
requirement to sign an Additional Protocol, a decision he did not 
think Brazil ready to make.  Mourao was anxious to know progress on 
concerns from Canada and South Korea, which, if resolved would 
isolate Brazil in opposition, a situation Brazil would strongly 
prefer to avoid.  Mourao said that the proposed International 
Nuclear Fuel Bank sounded like an interesting idea from a technical 
perspective, but which countries' fuel would be purchased for the 
bank would be a critical point.  Vargas was more cautious, saying 
that the concept was good, but cautioning against the "proliferation 
of ideas." 
 
BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR PLANS 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Mourao thought that Brazil would complete the Angra 3 
reactor and then build 4 to 6 more reactors, which would mean up to 
nine reactors by 2014.  At the same time, Argentina, Chile and 
others are planning to build more reactors, which could bring the 
 
BRASILIA 00001398  002 OF 002 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  During an October 13 visit to Brasilia, 
Ambassador Gregory Schulte discussed Iran, Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) issues and Brazil's nuclear program.  Brazil wants to play a 
constructive role with the UN on nuclear issues, particularly with 
Iran.  Completing an Additional Protocol and joining a NSG consensus 
to limit the spread of enrichment technology will require difficult 
political decisions, though at a technical level they are 
acceptable.  Brazil is committed to developing its own nuclear power 
industry and has planned an extensive program of reactor 
construction.  Further, the GOB intends to develop its capacity to 
become self-sufficient in supplying fuel for its reactors.  The GOB 
sees no technical problem with joining the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership, although this will again require a political decision 
that will depend on completion of a government nuclear policy 
review.  END SUMMARY. 
IRAN 
---- 
 
region up to 15-20 reactors by 2030.  Mourao said that this quantity 
of reactors would be sufficient to justify a regional enrichment 
program.  This could be done through expanding the Argentina-Brazil 
Commission for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC) or possibly through some other regional organ.  Initially, 
Mourao explained, the GOB wanted to have the ability to produce 60% 
of the fuel needed for Angra I and II.  Currently, the Brazilian 
uranium is made into yellowcake in Canada and then turned in HF6 by 
Urenco (European) and the rods were prepared in Brazil by INB. 
Subsequently, President Lula made a decision that Brazil should seek 
to be self-sufficient in enriching and processing fuel for not just 
Angra I and II but its future reactors too. 
 
GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Mourao said that he saw no technical problems with 
joining GNEP.  He noted that he had fruitful discussions with Energy 
Department Deputy Assistant Secretary Ed McGinnis in Vienna in 
September.  Almost all the questions had been resolved and from a 
technical viewpoint, GNEP looked like a decent idea.  Brazil is 
following various aspects of GNEP, such as Generation IV, added 
Mourao.  What remains is taking a political decision to join, which 
is part of the overall review of Brazil's international nuclear 
"face." 
 
SOBEL