VZCZCXRO9463
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3364/01 2941104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201104Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0022
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003364 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EFIN EINV IZ
SUBJECT: US-IRAQ DIALOGUE ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A PROGRESS 
REPORT 
 
REF: A)BAGHDAD 0643, B)BAGHDAD 1061, C. BAGHDAD 3067, 
D)BAGHDAD 3097 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY / INTRODUCTION: In preparation for the early 
November U.S.-Iraq Dialogue on Business and Investment Climate, this 
cable looks back at the February 2008 Dialogue on Economic 
Cooperation (DEC); reviews what was agreed then; and takes stock of 
what has been achieved in the interim.  At the February DEC, the USG 
and GOI agreed that: 
 
 -- the GOI needed to fully implement the 2006 National Investment 
Law (NIL); create the legal protections for investors; and stand up 
the National (NIC) and Provincial Investment Commissions (PIC); 
 
 -- progress on an OPIC International Investor Agreement (IAA) and a 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was a necessary 
prerequisite to attracting U.S. investment; 
 
-- the GOI needed to create an action plan for bank restructuring as 
a means of encouraging private banking; 
 
-- the GOI should create a national energy strategy and seek 
investment in the oil and gas sectors; 
 
-- the GOI would move toward reform of the Public Distribution 
System (PDS) and fold it into a social safety net program; and 
 
-- the GOI would improve budget execution. 
 
Seven months later, the GOI has made decent progress on some DEC 
agenda items, but little or no progress on many others.  In 
particular, there has been little improvement in the investment 
climate, and relatively little new investment, despite the security 
gains.  The Embassy therefore views the planned November 1 dialogue 
on business and investment as a critical opportunity for us to press 
the GOI to take urgent action in this area.  This can help set the 
stage for a large-scale DEC in spring 2009.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Status Report: Seven Months After the DEC 
----------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S.-Iraq Dialogue on Economic Cooperation (DEC) is a 
bilateral forum aimed at improving Iraq's trade and investment 
regime, helping Iraq attract badly needed foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and fostering bilateral business.  The most recent DEC took 
place in Baghdad in February 2008.  At that time the DEC identified 
several important action items for both the GOI and the USG.  Below 
we list those action items and offer an assessment of the progress 
made. 
 
Investment Law Implementation 
----------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The 2006 National Investment Law (NIL) is a well-drafted 
law that provides the basis for a modern legal structure to protect 
foreign and domestic firms.  It offers special incentives to certain 
types of investments (in the health care, education, scientific and 
tourism sectors), and is not designed to limit or restrict others. 
While the NIL is good, the GOI has failed to issue the required 
implementing regulations.  Of greatest concern is the lack of 
procedures to govern the registration of foreign firms in Iraq. 
Nearly five months ago, the Ministry of Trade (MOT) suspended all 
new registrations while an internal working group compiled the new 
procedures.  While we have not yet seen it, we understand that the 
working group's draft provides for rather heavy-handed government 
control over foreign companies and, more alarmingly, may contain 
Arab League Boycott (ALB) language.  Clearly, if such provisions 
make it into the final draft, these regulations would discourage, 
rather than attract, U.S. firms.  And in the meantime, some 30 
foreign firms, including six US companies, have had their 
registrations held in limbo for more than four months while the 
regulations -- regardless of what they contain -- languish in the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
Investment Commissions: Some Progress 
------------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) The bright spot on the investment front has been the 
formation of the National and Provincial Investment Commissions (NIC 
/ PIC).  Since the DEC, the GOI has boosted staffing of the NIC, and 
regional authorities have formed PICs in all of Iraq's provinces 
barring Baghdad (although we understand Baghdad is close).  PRT 
reporting indicates that in general PIC members appear eager to 
bring investment to the regions, although their potential capacity 
to do so varies widely.  On the national level, NIC 
Chairman-Designate Ahmed Ridha has actively courted foreign and 
domestic investors, pushed ministries to promulgate 
investor-friendly legislation, and helped establish the PICs. 
However, the fact that the Council of Representatives (COR) has not 
confirmed Ridha -- and that the Council of Ministers (COM) has not 
pushed -- leaves an important part of the NIC set-up unfinished. 
Once confirmed, Ridha will gain "junior minister" status in the COM, 
 
BAGHDAD 00003364  002 OF 003 
 
 
a position that we hope will increase his effectiveness in promoting 
investment and moving implementing regulations for the NIL forward. 
On the negative side, the PICs and the NIC still do not have clear 
implementing regulations for their activities, and the longer they 
delay the greater the potential for problems and disputes.  For 
example, the NIC has begun offering incentives and guarantees to 
potential investors that might not ultimately have the force or 
protection of law.  In addition, the NIC and all PICs face serious 
capacity problems; we have launched a three-tranche training 
program, but capacity building will remain a long-term need. 
 
TIFA and IIA: No Progress 
------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) The GOI has made no progress in these areas.  A letter from 
USTR was sufficient from the U.S. side to begin the TIFA 
negotiations, but on the Iraqi side it requires parliamentary 
ratification.  As for the IIA, the GOI has not made procedural 
notifications to OPIC that have been pending since July 2005, 
despite another formal Embassy request in June 2008. 
 
Bank Restructuring Moves Forward 
-------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The restructuring of the Iraqi state-owned banks (Rafidain 
and Rasheed) is moving forward according to the MOU signed in 
December 2006.  We anticipate that the banks will achieve their 
benchmarks as outlined in the action plan by the end of 2008, 
including an operational audit and the strategic restructuring plan 
-- the two highest MOU priorities.  Ernst & Young (E&Y) has already 
circulated a draft of its financial and operational audit for 
Rafidain and Rasheed, and this will be finalized as soon as E&Y 
receives the banks' responses.  As for the restructuring, Rafidain 
and Rasheed are preparing their Strategic Operational Restructuring 
Plan, which we expect by the end of 2008. 
 
Energy/Petroleum: No Hydrocarbon Law or Energy Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶7. (SBU) In July, PM al-Maliki directed the PM Advisory Commission 
to form a "High Committee," chaired by the PM or DPM, to prepare a 
National Energy Strategy.  The High Committee membership would 
include the relevant line ministries -- Oil, Electricity, Water, 
Planning, and Finance.  (Comment: Although the Ministers of Oil and 
Electricity reportedly agreed to the approach, we are unsure about 
the level of GOI commitment.)  The World Bank plans to approach GOI 
leadership to encourage a strong, high-level commitment to 
development of a strategy.  Without such a strategy, the GOI cannot 
make the best judgments regarding, inter alia, how to spend oil 
revenues to implement regulatory reform, rebuild its electric power 
infrastructure, and develop its petroleum sector further. 
Electricity Minister Karim has expressed interest in developing his 
ministry's concept regarding an energy strategy.  Both the 
Electricity and Oil Ministries have developed rudimentary investment 
plans for the future. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Various GOI officials have indicated that the hydrocarbons 
legislation will not be considered until the GOI is ready to tackle 
the broader questions on relations with the Kurdish Regional 
Government, including the status of Kirkuk.  Even in the absence of 
hydrocarbons legislation, however, Oil Minister Shahristani has been 
moving forward on commercial arrangements with foreign oil 
companies.  On August 27, the Oil Ministry announced that the Iraqi 
Cabinet had approved a $3 billion Technical Service Contract (TSC) 
with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to partner with 
the Ministry of Oil's North Oil Company to develop the Ahdab 
oilfield in Wasit Province.  The CNPC contract was quickly followed 
with a September 7, 2008 announcement of Cabinet approval and the 
September 22 signing of a Heads of Agreement between Shell and South 
Gas Company.  The Ministry of Oil earlier approved 35 companies to 
bid in the first licensing round for oil and gas contracts, expected 
later this year.  Shahristani presented the proposed contracts for 
the first licensing round at an October 13 conference in London. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Iraq has formally committed to joining the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and issued a declaration 
on this in advance of the spring meeting of the International 
Compact for Iraq in Stockholm.  EITI officials visited Baghdad in 
early October for discussions on next steps; both sides said they 
are satisfied with the pace of progress. 
 
Budget Execution: Some Progress over 2007 
----------------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) The GOI has continued to step up the pace of its budget 
execution despite facing serious capacity deficiencies and systemic 
obstacles.  The most recent comprehensive spending data cover the 
first half of the year.  Through June the GOI had spent $19.1 
billion, or 38 percent of $49.9 billion originally budgeted for 
¶2008.  This represents an 84 percent increase over the $10.4 billion 
the GOI spent in the first half of 2007.  Of total expenditure 
through June 2008, $2.5 billion had been spent or committed for 
capital projects.  This represents 28 percent of the original 2008 
capital budget of $13.0 billion.  These figures do not include the 
$22.3 billion in the supplemental budget passed by the Council of 
 
BAGHDAD 00003364  003 OF 003 
 
 
Representatives in August.  Yet the lack of capacity at all levels 
of the Iraqi government, coupled with deficiencies in key 
infrastructure, including in the banking/finance system and 
communications, and outmoded centrally controlled processes all 
continue to hamper efficient budget execution.  The Embassy 
established an internal Public Finance Management Action Group 
(PFMAG) in June 2008 and is assisting the GOI to make progress 
identifying and addressing key budget bottlenecks. 
 
PDS Reform: Political Sensitivity Halts Progress 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶11. (SBU) At the DEC, the GOI reaffirmed commitments it made to the 
International Compact for Iraq (ICI) to press forward with PDS 
reform.  However, proposed reforms are extremely sensitive, and the 
initial steps -- beginning with means testing of all beneficiaries 
which was scheduled to begin in November -- has been delayed, 
perhaps by as much as a year.  The Ministry of Trade has created a 
reasonable "road map" to remove the wealthiest Iraqis from the 
beneficiary rolls and -- over the long term -- to monetize the 
system and fold it into a social safety net.  However, a special 
Prime Ministerial advisory group recently proposed an entirely 
different reform plan.  This rival plan reflects the deep concerns 
Iraqi politicians attach to PDS reform, and will further slow the 
process. 
 
The Road Ahead 
-------------- 
¶12. (SBU) We do not want the November 1 session to devolve into the 
U.S. side overwhelming the Iraqis with the laundry list of 
unfinished business from the February DEC.  However, the GOI has 
shown little if any commitment to improving its investment climate 
(with the possible exception of standing-up the NIC and the PICs), 
and we need to use the Dialogue to focus GOI efforts on this area. 
GOI leaders believe the Dialogue and similar high-profile visits 
will, of themselves, lead to significant new foreign investment. 
Our goal for this Dialogue is to make clear that it is essential for 
the GOI to move beyond the conference room and create the 
environment that will make new investment possible. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The GOI remains committed to the DEC process.  We should 
aim for a full-scale DEC in the spring, once appointments of senior 
USG economic officials are complete.  We expect the GOI will want to 
include a significant business/investment component to such an 
event.  The November 1 session should be framed in the context of 
the DEC.  And we should make explicit to the GOI our hope that they 
will take concrete steps to improve the investment climate in the 
months leading up to a spring DEC. 
CROCKER