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PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3198/01 2771521
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031521Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9773
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003198 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: CHRISTIANS IN THE KURDISTAN REGION 
 
FOR USG ONLY. NOT FOR INTERNET DISRIBUTION. 
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Long-term Christian residents of the Kurdistan 
Region enjoy unique material and political advantages, but this has 
failed to stem the tide of emigration in search of better economic 
conditions.  Christians do not feel that they suffer discrimination 
as a result of religious and ethnic identification and believe that 
Kurdish leaders value their presence.  Nonetheless, Christians face 
(as do other residents) a limited job market and competition through 
patronage systems for government jobs.  Christians appear ambivalent 
on the question of autonomous or self-governing regions.  Most 
express the hope that they be granted the same rights as all Iraqi 
citizens, and enjoy equal protection under the law.  For Christian 
IDPs from other regions of Iraq, the relative sanctuary of the 
region provides small comfort as they look back on a country they 
see divided between Sunni and Shi'a.  For some Christian IDPs, the 
Kurdistan Region is just the last stop before leaving for good.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The following discussion of the situation of Christians in 
the Kurdistan Region draws on interviews with Chaldean church 
leaders, leaders of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), 
Kurdistan Regional Government authorities, long-time Christian 
residents of the KRG and recently arrived Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs).  Most of the Christians in the Kurdistan Region 
speak Aramaic, describe themselves as ethnic Assyrians and belong to 
the Catholic Chaldean Church.  A conference in 2003 agreed that the 
group as a whole would be called "Chaldo-Assyrian." 
 
Christians in Kurdistan 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.   (SBU) The Christian community in the Kurdistan Region (KR) 
historically has counted fewer members than the communities in Mosul 
and Baghdad (an estimated 40,000 prior to 2003 of an estimated total 
of 1 million Christians in Iraq as a whole).  This was exacerbated 
by the forced departure of Christian communities from their homes in 
Dohuk province during Saddam Hussein's "de-villagization" campaigns 
in the 1960s and 70s that purposefully destroyed northern villages 
and moved residents to "model towns."  (Most of these families ended 
up migrating to Baghdad.)  Despite these depredations, Christians in 
the KR will generally volunteer that the secular Ba'athist regime at 
least provided a predictable framework within which they were able 
to live and work.  By contrast, they believe that an explicitly 
Islamic state fundamentally challenges prospects for co-existence no 
matter how many protections are written into the constitution.  The 
avowedly secular nature of the ruling parties in the Kurdistan 
Region provides some comfort to the Christian communities, although 
there continues to be mistrust on both sides resulting from 
perceived Christian association with the Ba'athist regime.  The 
religious orientation of the central Iraqi government, however, 
looms large in Christian perceptions of future prospects in Iraq, 
particularly for those who are IDPs. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) From 1992, Christians have had a quota of five seats in 
the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA).  Many members of the 
Christian community eschew politics.  They view the Christian 
parliamentarians as "chosen by the Kurdistan government - not the 
people" and do not see them as independently representing the 
Christian community.  The dominant political party is the Assyrian 
Democratic Movement (ADM) which has two seats in the KNA and two 
seats in the Baghdad Council of Representatives.  There are two 
Christian Ministers in the KRG:  Finance and Civil Society.  Finance 
Minister Sarkis is dual-hatted as the KRG's official intermediary 
with the Christian community and provided a generous budget 
allocation for his activities, which includes support for IDPs. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Most Christians in the Kurdistan region live in Dohuk, 
with smaller numbers in Erbil and even fewer in Sulaymaniya.  The 
Ainkawa township of Erbil (where the RRT is located and where many, 
but not all Christians live) has been designated by the KRG as an 
area where Christians enjoy certain rights (such as the right to own 
property) which other groups are denied.  The Government has gone to 
considerable lengths to enforce this, to the point of buying out 
non-Christian landowners.  Non-Christians (of which there are a few) 
may rent only.  Ainkawa has a special administrative status:  it 
does not fall under the authority of the Governor of Erbil or other 
municipal authorities, but has been overseen directly by the Council 
of Ministries since 2005 - a point of pride for Kurdish officials, 
who describe this as one of a number of special protections for the 
community.  Some Christians are uncomfortable with the fact that 
some Muslims use Ainkawa as a "duty-free zone" for drinking and 
liaisons, but this other face of the neighborhood is not readily 
apparent.  There is little to no nightlife in the well-to-do and 
tidy suburb.   While an effort to build a mosque in Ainkawa was 
thwarted by the Ainkawa Mayor, no such reverse discrimination is 
practiced - there are a number of churches outside of Ainkawa in 
mixed Christian/Muslim neighborhoods. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003198  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Ministry of Education funds Aramaic-language public 
schools (elementary and high school) where the students are taught 
in Aramaic, Arabic and Kurdish.  The majority of these are in Dohuk 
(over thirty elementary schools and eight secondary schools) and 
supply appears to meet demand.   These schools have been operational 
since the late 1980s and are overseen by a special division within 
the Ministry staffed by Christians.  At the University level, some 
complaints were voiced about Christians being edged out by other 
groups (in particular, card-carrying members of the KDP) for 
scholarships and other opportunities for higher education.  The need 
to be a party member was underscored. 
 
¶7.   (SBU) Christians generally attain higher levels of education 
than other groups in the region and are well represented in 
professions such as education, medicine, pharmacology, etc. 
However, as one contact stated bluntly "after graduation there are 
no jobs.  They stay at home."   Government jobs are not seen as 
desirable, although many Christians do work for the government. 
With the exception of work in the security forces, there is no 
perceived discrimination against Christians (indeed, their higher 
levels of education and a reputation for hard work are an advantage 
in this respect).  The paucity of Christians in the Security Forces 
is variously ascribed to Christian reluctance or Sunni Kurd 
unwillingness to place Christians in positions of authority over 
Muslims.  There are, however, Christian officers in the Ainkawa 
office of the Asayeesh (the KRG's security/intelligence force). 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Immigration to Western Europe, Canada, Australia and the 
United States draws away young Christians seeking better economic 
opportunities.  This is a source of deep concern to the Christian 
community, which sees its numbers dwindling despite an average 
family size of 4-5 children.  Within the Erbil Chaldean community, a 
family leaves every month, according to a parishioner.  These 
families often leave illegally, smuggled to Western Europe for USD 
20,000 per person.   Every family in Erbil is reported to have a 
relative abroad. 
 
¶9.   (SBU) The last three years have seen a dramatic increase in the 
number of Christians in the KR, primarily Chaldo-Assyrians fleeing 
violence in Baghdad and Mosul.  In 2007, UNHCR estimated that there 
were 20,000 Christian IDPs in the Region, of which 11,000 were in 
Erbil, 8,767 in Dohuk and under a thousand in Suleymaniya.  Although 
the Kurdistan Region controls entry of IDPs by requesting 
sponsorship, UNHCR reported that Christian IDPs gain easy access by 
virtue of ready sponsorship from the Christian community, or by 
being a professional, which facilitates entry. 
 
IDPs in Kurdistan Region: "We long to return or to emigrate" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (SBU) As confirmed by UNHCR reports and conversations with 
IDPs, Christian IDP's, particularly those of means, settle in urban 
areas and rent their own homes.  These IDPs tend to be in Erbil or 
Dohuk city, are professionals, and are able to live a while by 
drawing on their savings.  Some are eventually able to find a job, 
but most do not.  Finding a good job as an IDP - as for other 
residents of the Kurdistan region - requires good connections. 
Inability to speak Kurdish is a serious impediment, both for adults 
seeking work as well as for students who need to finish their 
education.  Father Basha Warda, Director of the St. Peter Chaldean 
Seminary, stated that there were 3,000 youths who had graduated from 
high school but were unable to continue into University in the 
region because they do not speak Kurdish.  IDPs often find that they 
are viewed suspiciously in shops "as Arabic-speakers."   Six- and 
three-month stipends of USD 125 from the Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration have provided a modest means of monthly support to 
registerd IDPs.  "We long to return or to emigrate" about sums up 
the views of most IDPs, with settling in Kurdistan rarely voiced as 
a preferred choice.  While anecdotes of some successful returns are 
exchanged (including one instance where the Sadr militia reportedly 
helped kick out squatters in a Christian house in Bagdad when the 
original residents returned) for the most part it is still too early 
for others to see whether they will return to Baghdad.  Most are 
concerned that they will not be able to take possession of their 
former homes; some sold all of their belongings (including their 
houses) before leaving. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Other IDPs have taken up the offer to return to their 
ancestral region, the Zahko region of Dohuk Governorate, to villages 
that their families left forty years earlier.  This latter group is 
given a KRG stipend and a newly-constructed (but basic) house. 
Under the direction of Finance Minister Sarkis, a hundred of these 
towns have been reconstituted and Kurdish residents paid to 
relocate.  Minister Sarkis sees slow but steady progress in his plan 
to return these historically Christian areas to their original state 
(although he noted that Turkish bombing is preventing construction 
in some towns that are near the Turkish border.)  However, a much 
more pessimistic note is sounded by others who say that returnees 
find themselves - after decades of urban living - living in 
 
BAGHDAD 00003198  003 OF 003 
 
 
depressed rural areas.  While previous generations may have 
practiced agriculture, the current inhabitants have neither 
expertise nor interest in farming.  Young people resettled in these 
towns do not stay for long. 
 
The Salt of the Earth 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Residents and IDPs are ambivalent on the question of 
autonomous or self-governing areas versus integration into the 
polis.  One individual originally from Baghdad was strongly against 
any kind of autonomous area, stating "Christians are like salt - we 
must be sprinkled everywhere."  Others stated that separation might 
solve some immediate problems, but in the long run the community's 
future lay in an Iraq where the rights of all are respected.  The 
highest ranking Chaldean prelate in Erbil, Bishop Raban Al-Qas, 
argued against measures which drew attention to Christians, such as 
sending money or "sending Christians to save Christians."  He argued 
that this called attention to the Christians, separated them and 
could endanger them.  He asked for respect for rights and religion 
within society.  Representatives of the ADM political party feel 
that both are needed - integration into society as well as 
protection.  They see an autonomous area offering political and 
economic advantages, particularly as the towns on the Ninewah plain 
have suffered neglect from both sides (Kurdish and Arab) and 
villagers live in deplorable conditions.  ADM officials view quotas 
for political representation as essential, since the lower Christian 
birthrate and emigration of the community would otherwise make it 
susceptible to a loss of political representation, since they may 
not be able to meet the threshold for participation in "open list" 
elections. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Finance Minister Sarkis is seen as the strongest 
political advocate of an autonomous Christian region.  In a meeting 
with Ambassador Krajeski on August 24, he stated that having 
representatives in Parliament and the National Assembly is not 
enough.  The only way for Christians to survive was through 
autonomy.  Areas that were historically under Christian control or 
where Christians sought to return were "the property of our people 
and Kurds and Arabs know this."  He said that the creation of this 
zone would be a unique experience envied by other areas.  He gave 
the example of Ainkawa as a good example of the benefits of such an 
arrangement, citing the fact that all of the local administration 
there was Christian.  In the new autonomous area, Christians would 
have their own parliament, elected leadership and budget.  It didn't 
matter if the region was big or small - in their own area they would 
be "first class citizens" and not have to "beg and bow" for favors. 
  Furthermore he predicted that others would want to live in those 
districts preferring Christian rule to Kurdish or Arabic control. 
The situation may look good in Ainkawa, he warned, but if I were to 
leave my office in three months the situation would reverse. 
 
Comment:  A Potential Model for Minority Protections 
-------- 
¶14.  (SBU) Life for Christians in the Kurdish region is safer than 
in other parts of Iraq but provides them with only limited economic 
opportunities.  Under the "Kurdish model," Christians are assured a 
minimum level of political representation through quotas, dedicated 
KRG funding, and in some instances special legal status for 
Christian communities.  Nonetheless, the region does not now - even 
with the addition of IDPs - contain a sufficient number of 
Christians to exert much political influence on behalf of the 
community at the regional level, let alone national level.  Despite 
a good record for welcoming Christian IDPs fleeing other parts of 
Iraq so far, Kurdish leaders are unlikely to suggest the Kurdish 
Region as the host of a national Christian enclave.  Still, as the 
region that has best protected Iraqi minority communities since 
2003, the Kurdish model provides lessons in how to craft 
communitarian rights that might be applicable to other regions of 
Iraq.  End Comment. 
 
CROCKER