VZCZCXRO8630
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #1968/01 2790719
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050719Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3508
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0664
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0067
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0776
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0222
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0144
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1951
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1899
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2236
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001968 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS NATO KZ
 
SUBJECT:   KAZAKHSTAN:  MILITARY UNITS SOON MAY BE READY TO DEPLOY 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified (military FOUO). Not for public 
internet. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: A NATO evaluation team judged the Kazakhstani 
deployable battalion (KAZBAT) "interoperable and deployable," but 
did note some deficiencies.  ARCENT experts believe that the 
deficiencies are not insurmountable.  The Deputy Minister of Defense 
indicated that Kazakhstan will soon deploy two staff officers to 
Afghanistan and that these officers will be a test case for a larger 
deployment of Kazakhstani military.  It is the mission's belief that 
continued engagement and assistance to the Kazakhstan military could 
reap substantial rewards, both in policy as well as commercial 
sales. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The sixth annual exercise, Steppe Eagle, was held near 
Almaty September 15-25. The goal of the exercise was to determine 
whether or not the Kazakhstani deployable battalion (KAZBAT) met the 
requirements of NATO interoperability Level One and evaluate its 
progress towards Level Two.  The exercise was truly international 
with a multinational NATO evaluation team composed of officers and 
NCOs from seven NATO nations and three Partnership for Peace 
countries.  The United States sent a substantial military contingent 
to assist KAZBAT.  The British army provided the opposition force 
with more than 70 members of the Mercian regiment. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The chief evaluator, a Norwegian colonel, judged KAZBAT 
"interoperable and deployable."  But this was not without 
qualifications.  The evaluation team had a long list of 
recommendations that KAZBAT must meet to be NATO Level Two.  The 
chief evaluator said, "KAZBAT could immediately deploy to provide 
perimeter security to a compound in a relatively secure area of 
Afghanistan but could not conduct combat operations in Helmand 
province."    An American officer told Charge, "70% of U.S. Army 
units would not have qualified under these standards." Among the 
deficiencies, for example, was the lack of an organic explosive 
ordinance disposal (EOD) unit.  The Kazakhs have rotated EOD troops 
into Iraq for the last five years and have dozens of 
coalition-trained, experienced EOD specialists.  Cross-attaching 
some of these experienced EOD experts could be easily accomplished 
before a deployment.  Another deficiency was outdated Russian-origin 
chemical, biological, and radiological equipment.  The chief 
evaluator stated, "In these days of dirty bombs, the most modern 
equipment is required."  (COMMENT: It is unlikely that dirty bombs 
would be a major threat to KAZBAT if deployed to a peace support 
operation (PSO). END COMMENT).  It was discussed that providing 
additional equipment would not be an insurmountable obstacle to 
prepare KAZBAT for a potential PSO. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The KAZBAT troops and officers seemed relatively pleased 
despite the criticism and considered the exercise a success.  They 
marched in good order at the closing parade and lustily cheered 
their junior officers and NCOs as they received various awards, 
indications of excellent morale among the airmobile forces (some 
still draftees although the goal is all contract).  Other draftee 
elements of the Kazakhstani army can often appear dispirited.  At 
the vodka-fueled concluding dinner, General Makayev, commander of 
the airmobile forces, favorably compared his experience working with 
U.S. and British forces while he was dismissive of the Russian and 
former Soviet armies.   He concluded, "You may have heard that 
Kazakhstani officers do not want to cooperate with NATO. That is not 
true here."  General Makayev punctuated the point by giving repeated 
bear hugs and the occasional kiss on the cheek to a senior western 
officer. (NOTE: This is a tradition among former Soviet and Russian 
paratroopers. END NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During an earlier meeting with Charge the Deputy Minister 
of Defense, Major General Sembinov, stated that very soon two 
Kazakhstan staff officers would be assigned to ISAF in Kabul.  He 
added that the success of their deployment would be the test case 
for additional Kazakhstanis serving in Afghanistan.  The British 
Ambassador noted that he had heard that the Kazakhstanis were 
interested in serving with a Slovak unit in Afghanistan.  Sembinov 
 
ASTANA 00001968  002 OF 002 
 
 
also underlined that Kazakhstan has assigned one military observer 
to Georgia and has an officer serving with the UN in Nepal. 
Clearly, Sembinov is committed to using KAZBAT in a coalition PSO. 
To date, the political leadership has been strongly opposed to an 
Afghanistan mission, but with the Iraq mission ending, this could be 
the opportunity to change that position.  General Sembinov also 
requested that he travel to Iraq for the final departure of the 
Kazakhstani troops, which the Kazakh Government would like 
accomplished by Constitution Day, October 25.  He asserted that he 
wants to discuss a continuing bilateral military relationship with 
Iraq.  He also asked that the Kazakhstanis be able to return to 
Kazakhstan the U.S. equipment they have in Iraq, especially the 
mine-protected Humvees.  These vehicles would be essential for a 
future deployment. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT: Coming on the heels of the Georgia crisis, the 
success of Steppe Eagle was a strong indicator that the GOK wants to 
continue a security relationship with the West, as well as with 
Russia.  Very typically, just before Steppe Eagle, Kazakhstan sent 
troops to Russia for CSTO exercises.  Both exercises were 
long-planned, and the post-Georgia situation did not deter either 
from going forward and being trumpeted in the press.  Even the often 
described "pro-Russian" Defense Minister Akhmetov appeared at a 
press conference for Steppe Eagle.  Standing between two Humvees, 
the most prominent non-Russian equipment in the Kazakhstani 
inventory, he praised NATO-Kazakhstani cooperation.  We believe that 
continued and enhanced mil-to-mil cooperation could reap substantial 
advantages for the United Sates.  For example, following through on 
the complete Huey 2 helicopter FMF program could lead to future 
commercial aircraft sales including C-130s. END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND