VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1870/01 3011415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271415Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7807
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 4892
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS ANKARA 001870 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PRA, ISN/NESS; DOE/NNSA FOR 
BIENIAWSKI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP ENRG MNUC PARM TRGY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: MOU SIGNED ON HEU FUEL RETURN AND 
CONVERSION OF TURKEY'S TR-2 RESEARCH REACTOR 
 
REF: A. STATE 9294 
     ¶B. ANKARA 401 
     ¶C. STATE 106280 
     ¶D. ANKARA 1721 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified. Please Treat Accordingly. 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY:  Officials from the U.S. Department of 
Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) 
Office of Global Threat Reduction, and from the Department's 
Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security (ISN/NESS) met 
with the president and other officials from the Turkish 
Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) on September 19 to re-engage 
on discussions of highly-enriched-uranium (HEU) fuel return 
and research-reactor conversion (REFS A and B) under the 
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).  The sides 
successfully completed and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and a side letter (text in paragraph 8) that 
outlined their respective plans for completing this project. 
Some additional discussion took place on possible GTRI 
cooperation in the area of radiological security, about which 
a follow-up letter and nonpaper was sent to TAEK on October 3 
(REF C).  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Greater Receptivity Following 123 Agreement 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Prior to the U.S. bringing into force the U.S.-Turkey 
Agreement for Cooperation ("123 Agreement") in June, TAEK had 
remained resistant to re-engaging in talks on repatriation of 
the U.S.-origin HEU fuel at the TR-2 research reactor at 
Cekmece.  In light of the 123 Agreement and possibly also due 
to Turkey having just participated in aa bilateral 
interagency symposium with various U.S. agencies on 
nonproliferation and export control cooperation (REF D), TAEK 
president Okay Cakiroglu seemed eager to get down to business 
and finally take steps to complete the fuel-return project. 
His main concerns were addressed in the draft MOU presented 
by the U.S. side at the initial meeting, namely (a) that 
fresh LEU replacement fuel be provided prior to the removal 
of the HEU fuel still in the core, so as to minimize any 
impact on reactor operations, and (b) that a full contingent 
of LEU fuel be provided, including enough to cover a leftover 
"credit" for a partial HEU repatriation carried out in 1984, 
prior to the expiration of the former 123 Agreement.  TAEK 
participants agreed that the 18 fresh fuel assemblies (FA) 
were a very reasonable trade for the 30 HEU FA's to be 
returned, all but one of which was irradiated. 
 
---------------------------- 
Conditions to Close the Deal 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) After briefly reviewing the draft MOU, Cakiroglu 
presented only two concerns:  (a) that the contracting for 
the replacement LEU be "clean" and bilateral, and not be 
complicated by a trilateral undertaking in which Areva-CERCA, 
a French company, would be mentioned as providing -- on 
different terms -- 10 of the 18 fuel elements, and (b) that 
the one "fresh" (non-irradiated) HEU fuel element at Cekmece 
be allowed to remain in Turkey for scientific and 
instrumentation-related research, given that it would be 
virtually impossible to obtain any more HEU in the future. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. side suggested that if the leftover credit 
still on the books at DOE's Y-12 site (for roughly 4.7 kg of 
HEU, translating into the equivalent of about 21 kg of LEU 
equivalent) could be cleared off the books in this 
transaction, then DOE would likely be able to provide all 18 
replacement elements in a single DOE-funded contract.  Before 
the afternoon meeting with TAEK, the U.S. del contacted 
Areva-CERCA representative Larent Halle, who was able to 
confirm CERCA's willingness to proceed in this manner and 
that the nominal time between contract signing and delivery 
of the LEU fuel to Turkey would be 12 months. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regarding Turkey,s request to retain the fresh HEU 
fuel assembly, the U.S. side suggested that TAEK provide a 
side letter that would state the scientific justification for 
retaining the one fresh HEU element (which contains about 200 
g of uranium) for research and instrumentation.  The letter 
should also note that this material would be subject to all 
appropriate physical protection measures and safeguards, not 
be re-inserted into the reactor, and be made available for 
return to the United States (without further LEU 
compensation) as soon as it was no longer needed for such 
 
research in Turkey.  The U.S. side also pressed for a 
compromise in which Turkey would retain only a few of the 17 
plates in that assembly, but TAEK argued that removal of 
plates from such an instrumented control assembly would not 
be advisable prior to shipment. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Discussion on Radiological Security 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the afternoon meeting, after the MOU and side 
letter were signed (final text included in paragraph 8, 
signed originals were hand-carried by the delegation back to 
Washington, copies of the documents have been sent to EUR/SE 
and DOE/NNSA), the U.S. head of del also raised the 
possibility of GTRI cooperation on radiological security -- 
for example, physical protection for sources used in 
hospitals or radiological border security involving Iraq and 
Jordan.  Cakiroglu pushed back with several points:  Turkey's 
regulation (through TAEK) of radioactive sources now involves 
over 30,000 licenses and is better than most countries in the 
EU and vastly improved vs. 5 years ago; there is no problem 
with orphaned sources in Turkey; any terrorists in Turkey 
would probably be too afraid of the radioactivity from 
hospital sources to try to steal them.  He did note, however, 
that it might be of interest to have U.S. and Turkish experts 
"mutually" discuss their approaches, such as "design basis 
threat" assessments and relevant countermeasures based on 
that methodology, and if the U.S. had any concerns with 
specific facilities in Turkey in this regard, they should be 
mentioned explicitly.  (The U.S. followed up on these points 
with a proposal in REF C for a meeting of experts.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Cakiroglu also agreed that there had been some 
ongoing concerns with radioactive scrap metal coming into 
Turkey from Iraq 3-4 years ago.  He mentioned that several 
actions were proposed at the time to address this (including 
installing detectors 10 km within Iraq; providing training in 
Turkey for 30 Iraqi experts, or a joint meeting of 
senior-level officials with Jordan), but he was aware of 
little follow-through except for a $230,000 IAEA-funded 
radiological-security project for Iraq.  Nevertheless, these 
problems have since diminished.  He also claimed that 
radiological research in Turkey was continuing to make 
progress, and that certain agricultural accomplishments were 
especially noteworthy, including advances in affecting the 
blooming cycle of olive trees, a key crop in Turkey's 
economy. 
 
¶8. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF MOU AND SIDE LETTER: 
 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN 
THE TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
AND 
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
CONCERNING REPLACEMENT OF TR-2 RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL FOR 
CONTINUED OPERATIONS 
 
RECOGNIZING the Agreement of Cooperation between the 
Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Republic of Turkey Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy that entered into force on June 2, 2008; 
 
ACKNOWLEDGING that peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be 
encouraged in ways that reduce proliferation risks; 
 
The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) and the United 
States Department of Energy (DOE), through its National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) agree to move forward 
to establish a low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled TR-2 
Research Reactor for continued reactor operations. 
 
NNSA and TAEK note their intent in principle to cooperate on 
completing the full conversion of the TR-2 Research Reactor 
at the ekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center to 
operate on LEU fuel and on returning the highly enriched 
uranium fuel to the country of origin.  NNSA and TAEK intend 
to accomplish these efforts through the following actions: 
 
¶1.    NNSA will provide 18 LEU replacement fuel assemblies, 
which are equivalent in amount to the unused U-235 in the 30 
assemblies to be repatriated and account for all past credits 
between TAEK and NNSA; 
 
¶2.    During LEU fuel fabrication, TAEK and NNSA will enter 
into a contract for the return of the HEU fuel to the United 
States under the general provisions of the example contract 
 
provided by NNSA with several additional clarifications: 
 
a.    Replacement LEU fuel will be delivered to the ekmece 
Nuclear Research and Training Center prior to the discharge 
of the TR-2 HEU fuel so as to ensure no impact on reactor 
operations, 
 
b.    Following this meeting, DOE/NNSA will immediately 
initiate contract negotiations so that replacement LEU fuel 
will be delivered to the ekmece Nuclear Research and 
Training Center within 12 months of signing of the contract, 
 
c.    The TR-2 reactor will be converted to operation on LEU 
fuel only, 
 
d.    Other conditions as mutually agreed upon. 
 
¶3.    Upon delivery of the new LEU fuel to the ekmece 
Nuclear Research and Training Center, TAEK would make 
available and coordinate the prompt return of the HEU to the 
United States under the conditions of the TAEK ) NNSA 
contract; 
 
¶4.    NNSA would pay for transport costs associated with 
repatriation of the HEU fuel and TAEK would assist with 
coordination within Turkey; and 
 
¶5.    No fees would be charged to TAEK for fuel disposition. 
 
Signed at TAEK, on the 19th day of September, 2008. 
 
FOR THE NNSA: 
/s/ 
Andrew Bieniawski 
Assistant Deputy Administrator 
For Global Threat Reduction 
 
FOR TAEK: 
/s/ 
Okay Cakiroglu 
President 
 
END TEXT OF MOU. 
 
BEGIN TEXT OF SIDE LETTER: 
 
(LETTERHEAD) TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
 
Mr. Andrew Bieniawski 
Director, Office of Global Threat Reduction 
U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security 
Administration 
Washington, DC 
 
Dear Mr. Bieniawski: 
 
Referring to the Memorandum of Understanding between TAEK and 
DOE/NNSA of September 19, 2008, concerning low enriched 
uranium replacement fuel for the TR-2 Reactor at Cekmece and 
return of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements to 
the United States, I would like to confirm the following 
understandings: 
 
TAEK will retain one unirradiated HEU fuel assembly (which is 
an instrumented control assembly consisting of 17 plates, 
containing a total of approximately 208 grams of U-235) for 
research, scientific, and instrumentation purposes. 
 
The retained HEU material will not be inserted into the TR-2 
reactor. 
 
All appropriate physical protection measures and requisite 
IAEA safeguards will continue to be applied to this material. 
 
TAEK intends to make this material available for return to 
the United States in the future once it is no longer needed 
for the above-stated purposes in Turkey. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
/s/ 
 
Okay CAKIROGLU 
President 
 
END TEXT OF SIDE LETTER. 
 
¶9. (U) Participants: 
 
Andrew Bieniawski, Director, Office of Global Threat 
Reduction, DOE/NNSA/NA-21 (Head of Del) 
Dan Fenstermacher, Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety and 
Security, ISN/NESS, Dept. of State 
Chuck Messick, Program Manager, FRR SNF Acceptance Program, 
Savannah River Site 
 
Okay Cakiroglu, President, TAEK 
Dr. Ali Tanerkurt, Vice President, TAEK 
Dr. Ediz Tanker, Vice President, TAEK 
Ms. Aysun Yucel, Head of Nuclear Safety Department, TAEK 
Dr. A. Sinan Taylan, Head of Nuclear Installation Division of 
the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center 
 
¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by the U.S. delegation. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON