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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4965
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0977
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0985
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2025
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2311
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1010
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8528

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNSC IN BR PK IT JP GM
SUBJECT: UNSC REFORM: GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSES CONSENSUS 
DECISION TO LAUNCH INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 
SECURITY COUNCIL EXPANSION IN AN INFORMAL GA PLENARY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The final, acrimonious negotiations 
September 15 over the end-of-session report and draft 
decision by the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security 
Council expansion were only resolved with a last minute 
negotiation on the floor of the General Assembly, prior to 
closing the final plenary of the 62nd session.  According to 
the consensus decision, the OEWG will continue to discuss the 
framework and modalities of intergovernmental negotiations 
until February 1, 2009, and then intergovernmental 
negotiations will be launched in an informal plenary session 
of the UNGA no later than February 28, 2009 with a view to 
seeking a solution that can "garner the widest possible 
political acceptance by Member States."  End summary. 
 
PGA Insists on 
Two-tracks 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Throughout the negotiations, the PGA and the Vice 
Chairs of his Task Force on Security Council expansion, the 
Permanent Representatives of Bangladesh, Chile, Djibouti, and 
Portugal, tried to appeal to both main blocs by setting forth 
a two-track process shrouded in "constructive ambiguity," as 
the PGA described in the September 12 OEWG meeting.  To 
appeal to the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) bloc, led by Italy, 
Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, and Mexico, the text called for 
the OEWG to continue immediately to discuss the framework and 
modalities of intergovernmental negotiations.  To appeal to 
the Group of Four (G-4), led by the leading contenders for 
future permanent Security Council seats - India, Germany, 
Japan, and Brazil, the text called for intergovernmental 
negotiations to commence in an informal plenary of the 
General Assembly no later than March 2009 that would seek a 
solution that can "garner the widest possible political 
acceptance by the membership." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Both sides refused to follow the PGA's path of 
"constructive ambiguity" and instead clamored for clarity and 
the track which advanced their interests.  India and Germany 
led the speakers from their group in arguing vehemently 
against any continuation of the Open-ended Working Group, 
even for discussion on the framework and modalities for the 
negotiations.  The UFC, while speaking in favor of the idea 
of intergovernmental negotiations, argued against starting 
those negotiations in an informal plenary of the UNGA, which 
would be subject to votes. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The PGA disseminated a compromise proposal late on 
September 14 which called for a discussion of the negotiating 
framework and modalities in the Open-ended Working Group with 
the PGA presenting the results of these consultations to an 
informal plenary session of the GA, no later than December 
31, 2008.  Then, intergovernmental negotiations would 
commence in an informal plenary of the GA no later than 
January 31, 2009. 
 
Last minute negotiations 
lead nowhere 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) When the 12th meeting of the OEWG meeting opened at 
11 am on September 15, Italy spoke first, on behalf of the 
UFC and called for an amendment of the text to change the 
venue for intergovernmental negotiation from an "informal 
plenary of the GA" to the "OEWG."  As the Italian Perm Rep 
made the proposals, the German delegation led a chorus of 
snickers that proceeded to set the tone for the rest of the 
day.  After ten UFC member states spoke in favor of the 
amendment and 17 G-4 supporters rejected it, the PGA called 
for the meeting to be suspended at 1 pm for further 
consultations.  He said he would consider withdrawing the 
text if no consensus emerged and leave it to member states to 
decide next steps.  The PRs of the main parties then gathered 
in the PGA's office for a fractious three-hour meeting trying 
to work out a possible compromise. 
 
PGA withdraws text; 
South Africa tables text 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) When the OEWG reconvened at 4 pm, the PGA announced 
there was no consensus, given the reservations on the text 
 
 
 
expressed by 10 delegations, and withdrew it.  The South 
Africans then formally introduced the same text for 
consideration as their own draft and declared that they had 
50 co-sponsors.  After a long debate on procedural charges 
and counter charges, Germany called for an end of the debate. 
 The PGA then called for two speakers in favor of closing 
debate and two against, as if the OEWG were going to vote. 
After hearing two speakers in favor of closing debate and 
none against, he gaveled the debate closed and then quickly 
gaveled the text through, though placards were raised in 
opposition, leaving most in the room stunned.  He then was 
forced to call on those member states with placards raised 
and they all spoke out against the motion.  Pakistan 
specifically noted that some of their fears about 
negotiations outside of the OEWG were being realized that 
day.  The PGA then gaveled the session closed with the 
understanding that the South African proposal would be voted 
on in the General Assembly plenary, which had suspended its 
final session in the morning to await the outcome of the 
OEWG.  Both the G-4 and UFC were ready to vote. 
 
UFC decides to concede at 11th hour 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) As the plenary session opened, the Italian Perm Rep 
approached Ambassador Khalilzad and other members of USdel to 
say that he had reconsidered.  He said that a vote would set 
a bad precedent for working groups that operate by consensus, 
and would eliminate the OEWG altogether.  Was there still 
time to make a deal, he asked.  He needed two changes to the 
text: (1) pushing back the start date of intergovernmental 
negotiations and (2) substituting "taking into consideration" 
for "taking note of."  The G-4 subsequently accepted both 
changes.  At this point, the UFC began to splinter as a bloc 
and individual members began seeking different changes.  The 
G-4 balked and insisted again on a vote.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad appealed to the G-4 to be gracious and reminded 
them that, if they were going to work together in the future 
(on the Council), impressions were already forming about 
their heavy-handedness.  He noted that, while the UFC may 
have made a mistake in not accepting a compromise earlier, 
humiliating a group of important countries would make any 
future proposal on the Security Council's future 
unsustainable. 
 
¶8.  (U) Once the PGA gaveled the resumption of the 122nd 
plenary meeting, the GA plenary agreed by consensus on the 
decision (A/62/47) concerning the work of the OEWG.  The text 
of the two decisive paragraphs follows: 
 
"(c) Decides, building on the progress achieved thus far, in 
particular during its sixty-first and sixty-second sessions, 
as well as the positions of and proposals made by Member 
States, to continue immediately to address within the 
Open-ended Working Group the framework and modalities in 
order to prepare and facilitate intergovernmental 
negotiations on the question of equitable representation on 
and increase in the membership of the Security Council and 
other matters related to the Council.  The Chairman of the 
Open-ended Working Group will present the results of these 
consultations to an informal plenary session of the General 
Assembly, no later than February 1, 2009; 
 
"(d) Also decides, taking into consideration the results 
achieved so far, in particular during its sixty-first and 
sixty-second sessions, as well as the positions of an 
proposals made by Member States, to commence 
intergovernmental negotiations in informal plenary of the 
General Assembly during the sixty-third session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, but not later than February 28, 
2009, based on proposals by Member States, in good faith, 
with mutual respect and in an open, inclusive and transparent 
manner, on the question of equitable representation on and 
increase in the membership of the Security Council and other 
matters related to the Council, seeking a solution that can 
garner the widest possible political acceptance by Member 
States." 
 
(Note: Full text of the consensus decision (A/62/47) will be 
available on the UN website and will be sent to IO/UNP once 
it is posted.  End note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) While G-4 members succeeded in achieving a deadline 
for the start of intergovernmental negotiations on Security 
Council expansion in an informal plenary session of the 
General Assembly, these negotiations are not likely to 
conclude in the near-term.  Any expansion of the Security 
Council will require the support of two-thirds of the 
membership.  The September 15 decision also includes a 
political goal of "the widest possible political acceptance 
by Member States."  Any successful resolution on expansion 
would then require ratification by two-thirds of Member 
States and all five permanent members of the Security Council. 
 
¶10.  (C) In addition, G-4 cohesiveness has been weakened. 
Throughout this latest round of negotiations, Japan 
consistently called for a constructive solution, and worked 
with the PGA to find a compromise solution.  This put it at 
odds with India and Germany.  Germany took a hard-headed 
approach and tried to browbeat Italy and a few other members 
of the UFC.  The Indian delegation was the most rigid.  Their 
acerbic interventions in the OEWG insulted the UFC, the PGA, 
and irritated China.  The Indian Perm Rep, who spoke after 
the Chinese DPR at the September 15 OEWG meeting, sharply 
criticized the Chinese position in support of the OEWG and 
consensus deliberations, characterizing it as the "swan song 
of a declining organization (Security Council)."  The 
Italian-led UFC faltered badly, first by their decision to 
stick to their original position instead of presenting a more 
compelling alternative earlier in the process to draw the PGA 
away from his two-track approach, and second by making an 
11th-hour compromise that could have been made hours before. 
Finally, China came out publicly in support of the UFC 
position September 15 and saw that they had little sway over 
the African states, many of whom decided to side with the 
G-4. 
Khalilzad