VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0799/01 2691212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251212Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2001
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGU 000799 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR SEPTEMBER 15-19, 2008 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 776 
 
This is CWC-042-08 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Budget consultations continued apace, with a 
session on the International Cooperation and 
Assistance Branch September 15 and the first wrap-up 
session September 19.  Questions flowed but there was 
no sign of agreement on the key issue -- the increase 
in OCPF inspections.  The first facilitations on 
Article X and XI for the fall season demonstrated 
continued stalemate on X with Iran presenting (again) 
its vague proposal for a victims' network.  Article 
XI moved forward incrementally with Iran finally 
agreeing to the Cuban proposal (from June) to plan a 
workshop that could brainstorm "concrete measures." 
 
¶2. (SBU) Delreps participated in a meeting of the 
Executive Council representatives who visited the 
Shchuchye facility to review the draft report, a 
meeting with the UK, Italy and Technical Secretariat 
(TS) representatives to discuss Libya's conversion 
plans and the sandbag berm, as well as the weekly 
Western Group discussion. 
 
---- 
WEOG 
---- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On September 15, Coordinator Ruth Surkau 
(Germany) chaired the weekly meeting of the Western 
European and Others Group (WEOG).  Surkau started 
with an overview of the September 11 budget 
consultation on the Inspectorate, characterizing it 
as politicized.  She noted that two main issues 
raised during the consultation were the number of 
inspections of Other Chemical Production Facilities 
(OCPFs) and Iran's resistance to using the term "non- 
proliferation." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Budget facilitator Martin Strub 
(Switzerland) said that Iran was isolated during the 
consultation.  On OCPFs, while Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) delegations appeared united in calling for 
continued discussions of OCPF-related issues, there 
is no common NAM position on OCPF inspection numbers. 
Strub announced that he would meet with Executive 
Council (EC) Chair Amb. Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) and 
EC Vice-Chair for Budget Issues Amb. Francisco Jose 
Aguillar (Costa Rica) on the need to restart OCPF 
discussions to avoid industry issues hijacking 
approval of the budget.  The UK noted that WEOG 
delegations were also united in calling for 
restarting industry discussions, including on OCPFs. 
The Netherlands pointed out that OCPF discussion need 
to be moved out of the budget consultations and into 
the Industry Cluster and suggested that EC Vice-Chair 
for Industry Issues Amb. Benchaa Dani (Algeria) be 
included in Strub's discussions with Tomova and 
Aguillar. 
 
¶5. (U) On universality, new facilitator Lee Litman 
(UK) announced that he would hold a consultation 
after the TS report comes out.  He asked about a 
possible CSP decision and noted that the TS 
(Government Relations Head Malik Ellahi) did not 
believe one to be required.  Ambassador Javits 
reported that the Dominican Republic is on the verge 
of acceding and that the Bahamas is under a heavy 
U.S. lobby also to accede.  Surkau noted the TS plans 
a trip to Lebanon.  German Ambassador Burkart said a 
decision may not be required but there may be good 
news to put into report language from some of these 
initiatives.  Several delegations pointed to the need 
for balance among Articles if action is taken on X or 
XI and not VII, as well as the links between Article 
VII and universality. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
BUDGET: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (U) On September 15, budget facilitator Martin 
Strub (Switzerland) held a consultation on the 
International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) 
Division's budget.  Kalimi Mworia (Director, ICA) 
presented an overview of the Division's initiatives 
for 2009 and highlighted the Program for Africa, 
which she said will affect all ICA activities with 
increased support for African applicants.  Mworia 
also noted that while all core ICA activities are 
primarily funded through the regular budget, many 
supplemental activities rely on voluntary 
contributions. 
 
¶7. (U) Deputy Director-General (DDG) John Freeman 
announced that by the end of 2008, in response to 
States Parties' request for better assessment and 
evaluation of activities, the TS will have two 
training courses on program evaluation and impact 
assessment, with special emphasis on ICA.  (NOTE: 
Del previously heard from the Netherlands that it 
will be providing the funding for this training.) 
 
¶8.  (U) The South African delegate questioned ICA's 
implementation rate for activities in 2008, noting 
that the Division has the second smallest staff in 
the TS (after External Relations Division) and citing 
the large under-spend in ICA in 2007.  Mworia said 
that spending is on course and that she expects full 
utilization of the regular budget.  Labib Sahab 
(Head, Budget) reported that, to date, ICA has 
obligated 82% of its budget (50% of which has been 
disbursed); the DDG noted the ICA historically spends 
more in the second half of the year. 
 
¶9. (U) A number of delegations asked for 
clarification on ICA's key performance indicators 
(KPIs) - many of which are not measurable -- and also 
questioned inconsistencies throughout ICA's budget 
narrative.  Mworia promised to look into improving 
the KPIs and correcting any inconsistencies, and the 
DDG said that the TS would respond to them during the 
budget wrap-up consultations.  The DDG also noted 
that any corrections raised during the budget 
consultations would be reflected in a corrigendum to 
be released prior to EC-54. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Of note, Chinese Deputy PermRep Li Hong 
(apparently acting in his role as Article XI 
facilitator) twice asked for ICA support for the 
proposed Article XI workshop.  The DDG responded that 
he was not aware of any concrete decision on the 
workshop proposal and no provision has been made to 
support it. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Iran made a number of rambling, often 
incoherent interventions, but raised a few points of 
note: 
- the need for emphasis on exchange of equipment and 
technology (instead of workshops and training); 
- ICA's portion of the budget (8%) is insufficient 
and needs to be increased further with all increases 
going directly to the International Cooperation 
Branch (ICB); 
- Tehran expects more specific Article X-related 
activities and will propose a decision for the 
Conference of States Parties (CSP), so the budget for 
the Assistance and Protection Branch (APB) might have 
to change after the budget is passed by the Executive 
Council (EC). 
 
---------------------------------- 
WRITING THE SHCHUCHYE VISIT REPORT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) On September 15, Delrep attended a meeting of 
the EC delegation that visited Shchuchye.  As the 
initial draft of the report (drafted by TS rep 
Gabriela Coman-Enescu) had only just been circulated, 
participants had mostly general comments.  There was 
agreement that for the most part this seemed to be a 
well-balanced and accurate account of the trip.  A 
paragraph on the role of international contributions, 
placed as it was in the concluding section of the 
report, generated the most discussion.  Coman-Enescu 
agreed to reexamine the language to ensure that it 
accurately portrayed Kholstov's remarks, but avoided 
giving any impression that the donors were somehow 
responsible for delays in the Russian program.  EC 
Chair Tomova and Director-General (DG) Pfirter 
requested that comments be submitted by September 17, 
and scheduled a follow-up meeting for September 19. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
U.S., UK AND ITALY MEETING WITH TS OFFICIALS ON LIBYA 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) On September 16 Delreps, along with members 
of the UK and Italian delegations, met with members 
of the OPCW Chemical Demilitarization Branch (CDB) to 
discuss the procedural handling of Libya's request to 
retain the sandbag wall/berm around its former 
production facility at Rabta.  Despite a U.S. request 
for Legal Affairs Office participation, no legal 
representative was present.  CDB Head Anelli had 
previously explained to Delrep that the protective 
berm would simply be switched from the list of 
specialized structures to the list of standardized 
structures.  When pressed for more information as to 
the legal precedent for this change, Anelli 
acknowledged that there had not, as yet, been an 
analogous situation, and indicated that the 
Secretariat thought it best not to draw too much 
attention to this request.  He explained that there 
will likely be another set of equipment (following 
that added to the conversion plan at EC-53) added to 
the Libyan conversion plan, and that the Secretariat 
planned to move the protective berm from one list to 
another in the annex to this note (that will likely 
be distributed for EC-55), but not highlight the 
change in the explanatory note.  Once the change has 
been approved, using the standard silence procedure 
for changes to conversion plans, the TS will issue a 
corrigendum to the original conversion plan. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Delrep expressed concern at attempting to 
pass off an unprecedented change with no accompanying 
explanation.  Anelli asked whether it might be 
sufficient to have the Libyans provide a detailed 
justification in a national paper (also for EC 55). 
Delrep agreed to check with Washington but did not 
indicate satisfaction with what seems to be an 
unusually evasive approach by the Secretariat.  UK 
Rep Wolstenholme indicated this would likely be 
acceptable for London, but will also confirm. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
---------- 
 
¶15.   (U) On September 17, Li Hong (China) facilitated 
an Article XI consultation attended by approximately 
30 delegations.  Li announced that he had raised the 
prospect of holding a workshop on the implementation 
of Article XI (as proposed originally by Cuba) during 
the most recent budget consultation to see if money 
would be available to fund it during the next year 
(see ICA above).  Li regretted that the TS would not 
provide a clear answer until the State Parties 
reached agreement on whether to hold the workshop or 
not.  In this regard, Li asked delegations to 
consider voluntary funding for such a workshop to 
augment OPCW funds. 
 
¶16.   (U) Li then opened the floor to discussion on 
whether delegations wanted to move forward with 
planning the workshop. U.S. Delrep expressed support 
for the workshop and a working group to discuss 
specific details (timing, budget, participants, 
goals) that could be reported back to the larger 
consultation.  Several delegations followed in 
supporting this position, including China, South 
Africa, and WEOG countries.  The facilitator 
suggested that Cuba might chair such a working group; 
the Cuban delegate said he would request permission 
to do so.  By week's end, he privately told Delreps 
and others that Havana had not yet approved the sub- 
chair role. 
 
¶17.   (U) In the first intervention in consultations 
by the new Iranian delegate, Iran, which had 
previously blocked the workshop, agreed to a "dual 
track" approach, with the workshop as one track.  He 
provided no further clarification on the second. 
 
¶18. (U) The UK outlined its national paper on Article 
XI, which was distributed at this meeting (an earlier 
draft was shared with U.S. and WEOG and faxed to 
ISN).  Li indicated in response to a question that 
the Indian paper has not been sent yet for 
distribution; India previewed the paper at the last 
Article XI meeting but was not present at this one. 
 
¶19. (U) Li then moved onto the final agenda item: 
recommendations for the next EC and CSP.  No 
delegation provided any thoughts on preferences for 
report language or a decision.  Iran, however, did 
intervene with a request for the TS to prepare a 
compilation of all the historical documents 
addressing Article XI, including working papers 
drafted before the CWC went into effect.  The Iranian 
delegate cited 1993 and 1996 proposals as an example. 
Ambassador Javits and several other delegations asked 
Iran to share a list of the documents it had 
researched, for the benefit of the group.  Iran 
responded that they did not have access to all these 
documents and repeated their plea for the TS to 
undertake such an exercise. 
 
¶20.  (SBU)  After more discussion with some 
delegations acknowledging the value of historical 
review, Li struck a compromise in requesting the TS 
to work with Iran in compiling documents to be made 
available to all delegations.  (U.S. Del Comment: 
This document search will take time, perhaps delaying 
discussion.  The early dates cited by Iran may 
portend new battles to fend off old ideas on the 
breadth of exchange in Article XI.  End Comment) 
 
----------------------------- 
BUDGET: FIRST WRAP-UP SESSION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) On September 18, Budget facilitator Strub 
convened a wrap-up session on the first three 
consultations (Verification, Inspectorate and 
International Cooperation and Assistance). DDG 
Freeman and Head of Human Resources Ali Ashgar 
provided clarification to earlier questions on UN pay 
scales, calculation of inflation (the Euro zone not 
just the Netherlands), and differences in the numbers 
of positions at various pay grades.  Iran noted that 
changes in posts required EC approval; the DDG 
acknowledged the requirement to do so but said that 
the differences reflected in the charts were not re- 
classifications of positions. 
 
¶22. (U) Iran objected to the inclusion of Article VII 
activities within ICA and requested more information 
on specific purchases of equipment by the 
inspectorate, particularly after last year's 
"windfall" money that was used for equipment. On the 
first question, the DDG responded that if the ICA 
legal positions were not included there, the 
positions would not exist.  The TS agreed to provide 
more information on specific equipment purchased. 
The South African delegate asked about the vacancy 
rate and currency exchange fluctuations.  Ashgar 
reported that the vacancy rate is 15 days on average 
for inspectors, 45 days for P level staff, and "very 
small" for G-level positions since they are recruited 
locally.  He confirmed that the TS does not use a 
structural vacancy rate. 
 
¶23. (U) With no further questions from any other 
delegations, the facilitator inquired if there is 
agreement on the number of inspections.  Flags rose 
immediately, with South Africa first out of the box 
to state that the lack of questions does not in any 
way signify agreement with the number of inspections. 
UK, Iran and Cuba followed with the same point. 
Strub summed up that unfortunately, no agreement on 
the number of inspections means that there is no 
agreement on the budget.  South Africa clarified that 
this consultation was understood to be a question 
session not a time for decisions.  (Del comment: 
Translation, the fight is still to come.) 
 
--------- 
ARTICLE X 
--------- 
 
¶24.  (U) On September 18, incoming facilitator Victor 
Smirnovsky (Russia) chaired his first Article X 
consultations.  The first agenda item was a 
presentation by UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) representative Martijn 
Viersma, who briefed delegations on UNOCHA's 
structure, functions, and coordination mechanisms 
(presentation forwarded separately to Washington). 
Viersma described in some detail the coordination 
response tools at UNOCHA's disposal and the phases of 
response to a humanitarian disaster.  He then 
outlined past and present cooperation between UNOCHA 
and the OPCW, and noted that an ad hoc dialogue had 
existed since 2000. 
 
¶25. (U) Most recently, in April 2008 Assistance and 
Protection Branch (APB) Head Gennadi Lutay and 
Muhammad Kazi (APB staff) met with UNOCHA reps to 
elaborate on areas where the efforts of the two 
organizations might complement each other.  Viersma 
noted that OPCW officers had been trained in the On- 
Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) concept 
to facilitate future work together in a command post 
if the services of both organizations were to be 
required in response to a disaster.  OPCW officers 
have also participated in UN Civil-Military training, 
UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) 
training, and TRIPLEX exercises (a series of 
exercises under the umbrella of a voluntary 
partnership to provide emergency humanitarian 
assistance).  Viersma also referred to possible 
cooperation between the OPCW and UNOCHA's 
Environmental Emergency section.  He noted that other 
specific agreements could be developed. 
 
¶26. (U) France inquired as to whether UNOCHA was 
planning specific exercises with the OPCW, and how 
UNOCHA would intervene in a terrorist attack. 
Viersma replied that areas for future cooperation are 
being considered, and that there was not a specific 
role for OCHA in a terrorist attack.  Lutay noted 
that an OPCW team was currently participating in the 
TRIPLEX 2008 exercise, and also that the joint 
UNOCHA/UN Environment Program (UNEP) team that would 
respond to a hazardous material disaster might 
benefit from OPCW expertise.  Lutay added that UNOCHA 
would likely need OPCW expertise in a situation in 
which safe (not contaminated) areas had to be clearly 
defined before the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. 
 
¶27. (U) Italy noted that delegations could learn from 
the organization and functions of UNOCHA, but that 
the specific mandate of the OPCW is limited.  The 
Italian rep also asked about organic CW expertise at 
UNOCHA and how the OPCW fit into UNOCHA's phased 
response to a crisis.  Viersma replied that UNOCHA 
has experts on call, but could benefit from OPCW 
expertise; he did not respond to the second question. 
He was also vague in response to a South African 
question as to the operational specifics of a 
response to a hypothetical large scale chemical 
incident in an underdeveloped, densely populated 
area, if the government asked for assistance.  Lutay 
noted that there would be a shared process of initial 
assessment between the two organizations, which 
prompted a question from Germany about which 
organization or entity would take the lead.  Lutay 
responded that national authorities would be the 
primary contacts and coordinators for requesting and 
accepting assistance. 
 
¶28. (U) Iran then began its expected line of 
questioning about UNOCHA's role in helping victims of 
a CW attack, noting that rapid and appropriate 
response could mitigate long-term effects.  Viersma 
responded by pointing out that UNOCHA's primary task 
is coordinating relief from other agencies, and not 
necessarily rendering assistance directly.  Lutay 
added that Article X, Paragraph 7 offers of 
assistance could come into play, and that several 
States Parties had offered medical 
response/treatment. 
 
¶29. (U) Iranian questions segued into Agenda Item 2, 
the Iranian proposal to establish a network for the 
victims of chemical weapons.  Iran reiterated the 
proposal it has introduced several times in 
consultations, and noted its concern that the OPCW is 
inadequately equipped to deal with this aspect of a 
CW attack.  The Iranian delegation recommended the 
OPCW work on establishing itself as the focal point 
of a network of emergency responders and experts that 
the OPCW would then coordinate in the event of a CW 
incident.  The delegate spoke at length, in turn 
positively noting the good work the Secretariat is 
doing in this area and the credit it should receive, 
then implying the TS is mandated to address this 
"hopeless situation."  Iran bemoaned the fact that no 
one had provided feedback on its proposal; noted that 
it had hoped to "enrich" the proposal with the help 
of colleagues; and requested that the Secretariat 
begin working on a framework, beginning with 
identifying the needs of CW victims. 
 
¶30. (U) Facilitator Smirnovsky noted that the 
Secretariat has made several presentations on the 
tools at its disposal regarding emergency assistance, 
and suggested that perhaps the Iranian proposal could 
use clarification.  He also expressed some doubts 
about whether the OPCW was really staffed for the 
level of coordination Iran seemed to envision, and 
suggested that focusing on enhancing cooperation 
between OPCW ad UNOCHA (clearly staffed for and 
experienced incoordination of relief) might be a 
more fruitful approach. 
 
¶31. (U) The Iranian delegation made several 
additional interventions; the most noteworthy theme 
was the repeated use of the word "after care" 
(denoting long term care of CW victims).  Iran also 
mentioned the use of the network to provide relief 
for existing victims of CW use, the most clear 
admission to date that this proposal is aimed at 
Iranian CW victims. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Del comment:  The presentation of the 
UNOCHA rep clearly demonstrated the complexity of 
coordinating emergency assistance, as well as 
UNOCHA's expertise and capabilities in this area. 
Smirnovsky's suggestion to focus on cooperation, as 
opposed to building an organic capability not 
foreseen by the Convention, was useful. 
Unfortunately, the Secretariat failed to take 
advantage of the UNOCHA presentation and the 
facilitator's remarks to make more convincingly the 
case that it could provide expertise and assistance 
in responding to CW emergencies.  Over the past year, 
del has noticed a growing sense of frustration with 
the Secretariat in this area; although the TS is 
making progress on Article X, it seems unable to 
articulate this progress and/or respond effectively 
to delegations' questions.  Responses are often 
defensive or fail to address the issue in question. 
The Czech and Dutch delegations have made significant 
efforts to improve TS communication of its 
achievements in this area, largely to no avail.  It 
is unfortunate that the work of the Organization in a 
highly politicized area is inadequately represented. 
End comment. 
 
¶33. (U) At the end of the meeting, the Secretariat 
circulated a status report on Article X, Paragraph 4 
(National Protective Programs) declarations, as of 
September 18.  While the deadline for submission is 
April and many have come in late, Lutay pointed out 
that so far this year 81 have been submitted so far, 
a reversal of last year's drop in submissions from 
¶2006.  An updated copy of the Iranian proposal for an 
International Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons 
was also circulated, as well as the Czech non-paper 
on Effective Implementation of Article X, as 
previously forwarded to Washington.  Smirnovsky also 
reminded delegations of the report language from CSP- 
12, and set October 7 as the next date for 
consultations, at which the Czech non-paper will be 
discussed and the Secretariat will brief States 
Parties on OPCW participation in TRIPLEX 2008. 
 
¶34. (U) Beik sends. 
Culberston