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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 099672 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: 63RD UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: UNITED STATES GOALS AND 
PRIORITIES 
 
REF: 08 STATE 93981 
 
¶1. (SBU) The upcoming General Debate of the 63rd UN 
General Assembly (UNGA), September 23 - October 1, and 
regular session, which continues through December, will 
provide a platform for the advancement of key U.S. 
interests.  We will use the high-level ministerial 
meetings Secretary-General Ban is hosting and additional 
multilateral and bilateral meetings surrounding the UNGA 
General Debate to advance priorities on democracy and 
human rights and on regional issues including Georgia, 
Kosovo, Burma, Iran, Sudan/Darfur, and the Middle East, 
and to demonstrate U.S. leadership on the issues of 
development and food security. 
 
¶2. (SBU) During the remainder of the regular session of 
UNGA we will press for other U.S. priorities, such as 
human rights, UN reform including reform of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), and improved voting coincidence 
within the UN General Assembly. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In discussing U.S. priorities for UNGA with host 
governments, posts should draw from the following points 
as appropriate.  In addition, background material on UNGA 
will be available on the following State Department 
Intranet site: 
http://p.state.sbu/sites/USUN/GA63/default.as px. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Priority Issues for the UNGA General Debate: 
 
a. Georgia: The U.S. condemns Russia's actions, including 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and re-states 
support for Georgia's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty.  Even so, support for the successful 
introduction of a new resolution at UNGA to this effect 
does not look promising.  Consultations on the margins of 
UNGA would provide a good platform to seek strong 
statements on these issues, as well as a demand that 
Russia cooperate with OSCE, UN, and EU as the UN Observer 
Mission in Georgia's (UNOMIG) current mandate expires in 
October.  Our discussions of UNOMIG's future should be 
directed toward the creation of an international 
peacekeeping mechanism that will serve as a foundation for 
a solution to the crisis in Georgia.  We can expect these 
discussions to be challenging, given Russia's veto in the 
UNSC and its entrenched position in Georgia.  Our efforts 
should also seek to garner strong international support 
for the findings and recommendations of the UN 
humanitarian fact-finding mission. 
 
b. Middle East:  The Secretary will participate in 
meetings of the Middle East Quartet and in bilateral 
meetings with the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. 
Our efforts are directed at sustaining diplomatic support 
for the Annapolis process and the serious 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, as well as seeking 
increased international financial support for the 
Palestinian Authority government under President Abbas and 
Prime Minister Fayyad.  We urge UN Member States to oppose 
resolutions containing one-sided criticisms of Israel. 
Unbalanced resolutions do not contribute to peace, damage 
the serious yet delicate bilateral negotiations between 
Israelis and Palestinians, and undermine the credibility 
of the UN. 
 
c. Kosovo: Serbia has asked that the UNGA consider a 
resolution requesting an International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) advisory opinion on the question, "Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by provisional institutions of 
self-government in Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?"  The U.S. strongly opposes this resolution but is 
still considering how to prevent its passage without 
isolating the U.S.  If, as expected, the UNGA General 
Committee places the resolution on the UNGA agenda, there 
would likely be a UNGA vote on the proposal later this 
fall.  The ICJ's advisory opinion would not be legally 
binding, but it would likely carry significant weight 
internationally, and States and institutions may hesitate 
to recognize Kosovo or move forward on cooperation with 
Kosovo while the opinion is pending.  Uncertainty also 
risks undermining the effectiveness of the Kosovo 
government, as well as of the UN and EU missions on the 
ground.  Depending on what it says, the opinion could have 
an adverse impact beyond the Kosovo question, including, 
for example, by creating uncertainty in other states where 
secession and territorial integrity are under debate. 
 
STATE 00099672  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
d. Afghanistan: The International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mandate is due to be renewed by October 13. 
Italy has proposed additional language in the preamble 
welcoming an ISAF role in upcoming national elections, 
steps to transfer authority on security issues to Afghan 
authorities, and re-establishment of the Tripartite 
Commission meetings comprising ISAF's, Afghanistan's, and 
Pakistan's military leadership.  We support renewal of 
ISAF's mandate with this added language, and we will seek 
to balance any references in the text to the August 21 
bombing incident in the Shindand district with 
condemnation of Taliban tactics that intentionally lead to 
increased civilian casualties.  In addition, we will 
support a dramatic increase in the 2008 - 2009 UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) budget as UNAMA 
opens six new provincial offices.  We also seek better 
donor coordination to improve economic development that 
can increase jobs and long-term stability. 
 
e. Iran: UNGA provides a platform to further increase 
pressure on Iran consistent with the dual track strategy. 
We should seek public and private support for a fourth 
UNSC resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran.  We 
should further stress the need for strong cross-regional 
support for an Iran human rights resolution in the Third 
Committee.  This includes commitment from member states to 
oppose any no-action motion, which would end all debate on 
the human rights situation in Iran at this UNGA session. 
(NOTE: In 2007, the no-action motion on Iran failed by 
only a single vote. END NOTE.)  Iran has not complied with 
UNSC resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803, all of which 
mandate its suspension of proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities.  Iran has not only failed to provide a clear, 
positive response to the refreshed P5+1 offer, but has 
also refused to cooperate with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's (IAEA) investigation into its 
weaponization activities. Iran also continues severe 
restrictions on and violations of the rights of its 
people, which the international community must continue to 
condemn.  We should also stress that Iran could play a 
constructive role in Israel, the Palestinian Territories, 
Lebanon, and Iraq by ending its lethal support to Hamas, 
Hizballah, and Iraqi insurgents. 
 
f. Iraq: The President and the Iraqi delegation will 
co-host an event to thank Coalition partners and 
participants in the NATO training mission for their 
services in Iraq and to encourage them to continue their 
contributions in other missions.  We expect high-level 
attendance at this event.  In addition, we will continue 
to re-iterate our commitment to helping the Iraqi people 
achieve a democratic, stable, safe, and prosperous Iraq. 
We urge real and prompt steps to allow the UN Assistance 
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to implement its expanded mandate 
to engage Baghdad on issues important for political 
progress and national reconciliation, including: 
internally disputed boundaries; provincial elections; and 
regional engagement.  We want to see progress on the 
building of a new UN compound, and we look forward to full 
Iraqi support, financially and otherwise, to this cause. 
The U.S. also offers and seeks public expressions of 
support for the International Compact and the Expanded 
Neighbors process and for those countries not present in 
Baghdad to enhance their diplomatic relations with Iraq. 
We will thank those countries who have joined us in 
contributing to the reduction of Iraq's debt burden, urge 
others to deliver on their previous pledges of debt 
reduction and financial and technical assistance, and 
press remaining creditors for positive statements on debt 
forgiveness. 
 
g. Lebanon: While some parts of UNSC resolution 1701 have 
been implemented, we remain deeply concerned about weapons 
smuggling from Syria and the lack of progress in disarming 
Hizballah and other militias.  The recent report of the 
Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) 
indicated no progress in stemming the arms flow from Syria 
over the past two years.  All provisions of resolution 
1701 must be implemented.  We strongly support the 
decision of Syria and Lebanon to establish full diplomatic 
relations and call for the speedy opening of Embassies in 
Beirut and Damascus.  Parallel to that, the two countries 
should begin talks on the delineation of their border, 
including in the Sheba'a Farms area.  We also urge all 
states to contribute to and support the establishment of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
 
h. Burma: Despite multiple visits by Secretary-General 
Ban's envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, the regime has yet to engage 
in a time-bound discussion with opposition leader Aung San 
 
STATE 00099672  003 OF 005 
 
 
Suu Kyi (ASSK).  Likewise, it has made no progress on the 
release of ASSK or other political prisoners.  The U.S. 
will coordinate with like-minded partners to refocus the 
UN's efforts on what we consider to be core matters (e.g., 
release of political prisoners) and away from issues not 
covered in the official mandate (e.g., possible assistance 
to Burmese electoral commission, possible participation in 
an economic forum). The EU plans to offer a resolution on 
Burma's human rights record in the Third Committee, which 
the U.S. fully supports. Gambari formally briefed the UN 
Security Council on September 11 on the outcome of his 
latest mission to Burma, despite continued opposition by 
Russia and China to addressing Burma in the UNSC and amid 
widespread sentiment that the Gambari mission has not been 
successful.  "Next steps" are the likely subject of 
discussion at a Secretary-General-sponsored "Group of 
Friends of the Secretary-General on Burma" meeting, to be 
held at the Foreign Minister level on September 29. 
 
i. Zimbabwe: We will continue to focus UNGA attention on 
the situation in Zimbabwe and implementation of the 
September 15 Agreement between the parties.  The U.S. 
hopes the agreement provides an opportunity to put 
Zimbabwe on the path to democratic reform and economic 
prosperity.  If implemented, the agreement offers the 
people of Zimbabwe a chance to live in peace without fear 
of violence and intimidation.  On March 29, the Zimbabwean 
people voted for a change.  The election of an MDC 
Parliamentarian as Speaker of the Parliament is a step in 
that direction.  Despite opposition by Russia and China to 
a UNSC resolution, neither have blocked Assistant 
Secretary General Haile Menkerios from briefing the 
Security Council on the status of the South African-led 
negotiations or the humanitarian situation in the 
country.  After repeated diplomatic and NGO requests, the 
government finally lifted the ban on non-government 
organizations' and private voluntary organizations' field 
operations, but left itself an opening to shut down 
certain NGOs or activities as they review the documents 
NGOs must submit by the end of September.  We are 
encouraged by the lifting of the ban but will watch 
cautiously to see if unfettered humanitarian access 
becomes a fact.  We remain deeply concerned about ongoing 
human rights violations, systematic harassment of the 
opposition, and the dismantling of independent news media 
and the judiciary. 
 
j. Sudan/Darfur: The U.S. continues to implement the 
President's $100 million train and equip program for 
African UNAMID troops.  Through this program we have 
trained and/or equipped an additional 4,500 troops. 
However, a combination of Government of Sudan obstacles, 
Troop Contributor reluctance, and UN Secretariat 
logistical constraints have blocked the rapid and 
effective deployment of these troops to Darfur.  There is 
ample evidence that weapons and military equipment sold to 
Sudan by a number of countries continue to surface in 
Darfur.  Several countries and organizations have proposed 
deferring ICC action against President Bashir under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute via a UNSC resolution.  The 
U.S. has not taken a position on the issue; however, we 
have signaled our support for accountability in Darfur. 
 
k. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):  USAID 
Administrator Henrietta Fore will participate in 
Secretary-General Ban's September 25 High-Level Event on 
the MDGs.  The U.S. objective will be to emphasize our 
support for the core MDGs of reducing poverty and hunger, 
improving health and education, and combating major 
diseases, with the focus on sound strategies for both 
achieving and sustaining them.  We will highlight our 
strong track record in supporting poverty eradication 
through sustained economic growth.  Our approach to 
development is centered on good governance, pro-growth 
economic policies, investing in people, and addressing 
fragile and failing states in need of special assistance. 
At the same time, we will need to resist firmly a 
continuing effort within the UN to expand the scope of the 
MDGs (adding new targets and indicators) and to treat them 
as a proxy for effective development strategies, which 
need to be developed at the country level, rather than as 
global benchmarks.  In particular, the U.S. continues to 
object to the recent assertion by the UN Secretariat of a 
new MDG target on "universal access to reproductive 
health," which has not been agreed to by UN Member 
States.  We should redirect any misguided and unproductive 
debate over the amount of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as a percentage of GDP to a discussion of the full 
range of contributions to development, i.e., trade, 
investment, and other private capital flows which are far 
larger than ODA.  By this "total economic engagement" 
 
STATE 00099672  004 OF 005 
 
 
measure, the U.S. leads the world in its contribution to 
development. (See STATE 47433 for additional background 
and guidance on the MDGs.) 
 
l. Food Security: USAID will sponsor two food security 
side events on September 23 - one highlighting 
partnerships to increase agricultural investment, which 
will include senior officials from government, 
universities, and the private sector, and the other 
advancing our dialogue on African-led agricultural 
development in Africa through a small roundtable with 
selected African heads of state, ministers, and leadership 
from the African Union. The U.S. is the world's largest 
food aid provider, and is meeting its G8 commitments and 
taking a leadership role on global food security through a 
three-part integrated strategy: 1) a robust, flexible 
humanitarian response; 2) urgent measures to increase 
agricultural production, productivity, and trade in 
developing countries; and 3) supporting trade 
liberalization and the use of advanced agricultural 
technologies, such as biotechnology, to address the 
systemic causes of high food prices.  Secretary of 
Agriculture Schafer (or Administrator Fore) will attend a 
high-level dinner hosted by the Secretary-General to 
address causes and effects of food insecurity.  Priorities 
for UNGA include furthering commitments made at the 
High-Level Conference on World Food Security in Rome in 
June and the G8 in July to develop a flexible 
international partnership to address food security. 
 
m. Free Trade:  The President is expected to attend a 
U.S.-hosted leaders meeting with Western Hemisphere 
countries with which we have free trade agreements. This 
will be an opportunity to take stock of the significant 
progress we have made in our Hemisphere through shared 
commitments to trade and investment liberalization, social 
inclusion, rule of law, and democracy.  Leaders will agree 
at the meeting to increase our efforts to deepen our 
cooperation to ensure that the benefits of free trade and 
open investment are broadly shared throughout our 
societies. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Themes for the Regular Session of the UNGA: 
 
a. Human Rights and Human Dignity: Reftel STATE 93981 
provides detail on the U.S.' priorities for Third 
Committee human rights priorities at this year's UNGA, 
which include resolutions on the human rights situations 
in Iran, Burma, and DPRK, as well as possible initiatives 
on Zimbabwe and certain thematic human rights issues such 
as freedom of expression, prisoners of conscience, and 
close monitoring of discussions on "defamation of 
religions."  We face a number of tough votes on human 
rights resolutions for which we will need the support of 
capitals to win adoption.  Our highest priority among the 
country-specific measures is the Canadian-sponsored 
resolution on human rights in Iran; last year, this 
resolution survived a no-action motion by only one vote. 
The above-mentioned cable requests posts to demarche at 
the highest appropriate level to solicit support for U.S. 
priority resolutions that will be offered, and to seek 
host government views on other important resolutions that 
may be offered in the upcoming fall session of the UNGA 
Third Committee. 
 
b. Climate Change:  The 14th Conference of the Parties to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
will take place in Poznan, Poland in December.  With 
accelerated meetings and ongoing discussions on a future 
climate change agreement within the UNFCCC, climate change 
will likely feature in a variety of discussions at the 
UNGA.  Further, a group of Small Island Developing States 
is pushing a request that the UNGA and the UNSC address 
the peace and security implications of climate change. 
Our goal is to gain support for our priorities in a 
climate change agreement, which include: Mitigation of 
global emissions through commitments from all major 
economies; Development and deployment of existing and new 
low carbon technologies; Encouraging incorporation of 
adaptation into national development strategies.  UNGA 
deliberations and decisions should not pre-judge nor 
pre-empt negotiations under the Framework Convention. 
 
c. Voting Blocs in the UN General Assembly: As key issues 
of importance to U.S. policy interests, including Israel, 
human rights, development assistance, and the UN budget 
are increasingly brought to votes, one of our priorities 
is more effective influence on other countries to improve 
voting coincidence inside the UN with friendly nations. 
This will entail assertive approaches to G-77 and 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries that have reasonably 
 
STATE 00099672  005 OF 005 
 
 
good relations with the U.S. but have a tendency to vote 
on resolutions based on bloc positions, often irrespective 
of resolution merits or individual countries' policy. 
Therefore, at this session the Department will launch the 
pilot phase of a long-term strategy in the UNGA to build 
coalitions and establish new voting patterns where U.S. 
and NAM or G-77 interests coincide.  This pilot will 
involve a list of 17 countries.  Posts in those countries 
will receive a separate cable requesting a demarche on the 
subject. 
 
d. UN Reform: Our focus continues to be on reforms that 
improve oversight, accountability, and integrity.  The 
Secretary-General's public statements emphasize these 
principles for the UN Secretariat, but he has not focused 
on specific proposals to improve performance among the 
UN's rank-and-file staff.  In 2007, we launched our UN 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative at 22 other UN 
agencies to strengthen oversight and accountability, 
increase public access to information, establish a 
credible approach to ethical conduct and integrity, and 
increase financial transparency.  While most of these 
agencies recognize the importance of our goals, much 
remains to be done. 
 
e. UN 2008 - 2009 Budget Add-ons:  We support a biennial 
budget that achieves maximum efficiency and the meaningful 
ordering of priorities in the UN's program of work.  We 
intend to work to limit the level of real budget growth 
that would result from approval of the proposed add-ons 
and to impose discipline over the budget process, 
continuing to object to the piecemeal approach to 
budgeting. 
 
f. UN Security Council Reform:  In the 63rd session, the 
main topic of discussion will be launching 
inter-governmental negotiations outside the framework of 
the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG).  A number of Member 
States, led by the G-4 (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan) 
have grown frustrated with the inertia within the OEWG, 
which was tasked with establishing the frameworks and 
modalities prior to commencing negotiations.  Our position 
is that any inter-government negotiations should proceed 
with pre-established rules and procedures, with consensus 
being the final objective.  We will closely monitor 
progress on this issue to ensure that discussions occur 
within the broader context of UN reform.  We support 
Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC. 
 
Minimize considered. 
RICE