P 172128Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 099666 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM IR MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC UK GM FR
BE, IT, SZ 
 
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 
CENTRIFUGE DESIGN 
 
REF: A. STATE 021770 
     ¶B. STATE 039585 
     ¶C. STATE 052030 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 3. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND:  Washington provided all Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) Participating Government (PGs) with 
detailed information regarding the critical commodities Iran 
will require to support the deployment of the next generation 
of gas centrifuges for its uranium enrichment program in ref 
¶C.  Washington subsequently identified a list of those 
technologies which Iran cannot indigenously manufacture, and 
would need to procure from foreign suppliers.  We would like 
to provide information about key suppliers resident in 
certain European PGs.  The U.S. is making a similar approach 
to host governments in Asia, as well as key transshipment 
countries.  The U.S. intends to approach governments with any 
new developments in the U.S.,s efforts to prevent Iranian 
procurement of critical commodities. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Posts are requested to approach 
appropriate host government officials to deliver the nonpaper 
in para 4.  In doing so, posts should pursue the following 
objectives: 
 
-- Share information on ongoing USG efforts to prevent 
Iranian procurement of key gas centrifuge-related commodities 
and provide additional information to specific NSG PGs to 
make them aware of companies that are major suppliers of such 
items in their country. 
 
-- Encourage host governments, if they have not already done 
so, to discuss and highlight to businesses and law 
enforcement authorities the importance of vigilance against 
the deceptive procurement practices of Iran particularly 
relating to items useful in a gas centrifuge program. 
 
-- Urge host governments to share any relevant information 
from their industry outreach activities with the USG, the 
NSG, and the IAEA. 
 
¶4. (U) Begin U.S. non-paper 
 
FOR ALL POSTS 
 
-- Industry outreach is critical to ensuring that Iran cannot 
procure items to advance its WMD programs, including its 
uranium enrichment activities. 
 
-- Even though the U.S. has enacted comprehensive economic 
sanctions against the Iranian government, the U.S. government 
is undertaking various initiatives to raise awareness among 
U.S. industry to avoid illicit diversion of their products, 
and prevent the unwitting transfer of items to Iran that may 
contribute to Iran,s nuclear, ballistic missile, and 
advanced conventional weapons programs. 
 
-- For example, the U.S. alerts U.S. companies that Iran uses 
deceptive tactics to make its procurement efforts for its 
nuclear, ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons 
programs appear to be legitimate commercial activities. 
Iranian entities also form front companies in other countries 
for the sole purpose of sending dual-use items to Iran for 
use in these programs.  These front companies enable the 
regime to obtain materials that the country of origin would 
typically prohibit for export to Iran. 
 
-- Therefore, we are asking U.S. companies to be extremely 
vigilant about their overseas customers, especially customers 
operating in known transshipment countries and countries with 
weak or nonexistent export controls. 
 
-- The U.S. government is currently reaching out to U.S. 
manufacturers of critical commodities that Iran needs to 
procure from foreign suppliers for its new gas centrifuge 
design and alerting these companies to be cautious of unknown 
customers that may be procuring items on behalf of Iran,s 
illicit programs. 
 
-- The U.S. government is also considering additional ways to 
alert industry and will keep your government informed of new 
developments in our industry outreach initiatives. 
 
-- If you have not already done so, we encourage you to 
conduct outreach to your industry to raise awareness 
regarding the requirements of your export controls for Iran. 
We also request that you alert companies about Iran,s 
deceptive procurement practices. 
 
-- Targeted outreach to companies known to produce these 
critical commodities can sensitize manufacturers and 
exporters to Iran,s deceptive procurement tactics and make 
them aware of export control regulations which ) consistent 
with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 
1803, 1747, and 1737 - prohibit exporting sensitive 
commodities that could advance proliferation-sensitive 
nuclear activities in Iran, such as uranium enrichment, spent 
fuel reprocessing, heavy water production and/or reactor 
operation. 
 
-- We ask that your government share any relevant 
information, such as inquiries your companies receive from 
Iranian entities, with the USG, the NSG, and the IAEA as this 
information could aid ongoing efforts to track Iranian 
procurement attempts and provide additional insight on 
Iranian procurement practices. 
 
-- We are seeking ways to present information to broad groups 
of likely suppliers, re-exporters or transshipers on the 
critical commodities Iran is seeking from foreign suppliers 
for its nuclear and missile programs.  We would like to hear 
your government,s suggestions on how to best accomplish this 
and are open to further discussions at the expert level. 
 
-- The following companies are major producers of critical 
commodities that Iran needs to procure from foreign suppliers 
for the new gas centrifuge design. 
 
FOR BERLIN 
 
Carbon Fiber: 
-- SGL Carbon AG, Rheingaustr. 182-184, Wiesbaden, 65203, 
Tel: 49-611-6029-0, Website: www.sglcarbon.com 
 
      Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Josef Baer Maschinefabrik, Friedenstrass 32, 88250 
Weingarten, Wrtt 
 
-- IWT Industrielle Wickeltechnik GmbH, Weinstrasse 39, 91058 
Erlangen, Tel: 49-9131-698275, Website: www.iwt-gmbh.de 
 
-- DLR Institute of Structures and Design, German Aerospace 
Center, Pfaffenwaldring 38-40, 70569 Stuttgart, Tel: 
49-711-6862-0, Website: www.dlr.de 
 
FOR BERN 
      Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Huber Suhner AG, CH-8330 Pfffikon ZH, Tel: 
41-49-925-25-60, Website: www.hubersuhner.com 
 
FOR PARIS 
       Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Future Plastrex, a Division of Future Pipe Industries, 5 
Rue Bellini 92806 Puteaux 
 
FOR LONDON 
Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Pultrex Ltd., The Octagon, 27 Middleborough Colchester 
Essex CO1 1TG, Tel: 44-1206-36955, Website: www.Pultrex.com 
 
-- SPT Machines, Ltd., Unit K3 Brookside Avenue, Rustington, 
Little Hampton, West Sussex BN16 3CF, Tel: 44-1903-784-212, 
Website: www.sptmachines.co.uk 
 
FOR BRUSSELS 
Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Material S.A., Lozengberg 23 1932 Zaventem, Brussels, Tel: 
32-2-715-9494, Website: www.material.be 
 
FOR ROME 
Filament Winding Machines: 
-- VEM SpA, Via Lago di Levico, 36015 Schio (VI), Italy, Tel: 
39-0445-57-5955, Website: www.vem.it 
 
-- Vetrorsina SpA, Via Portuense 10, 44020 Masis, Giacomo, 
Tel: 39-0532-327911, Website: www.vetrorsina.com 
 
FOR BERLIN, PARIS, LONDON, BRUSSELS, and ROME 
 
-- We also request that your government encourage companies 
to be cautious about requests to transfer these critical 
commodities within the EU, as Iran may seek to exploit the EU 
countries with weaker export control enforcement mechanisms 
and limited knowledge of the sensitivity of these items. 
 
-------------------------- 
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC 
-------------------------- 
 
(U) Posts are requested to report any substantive responses 
within seven (7) days of receipt of this cable.  Lisa Meyers 
(ISN/CPI, 202-736-7939 MeyersLA@state.sgov.gov) is the 
Department's POC for this activity. 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text