P 301456Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 104182 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP TRGY PREL PARM ETTC MNUC AORC IAEA UNSC JP
 
SUBJECT: CRITICAL EQUIPMENT NEEDS FOR IRAN,S NEW IR-2 
CENTRIFUGE DESIGN: SPECIFIC COMPANY INFORMATION AND 
CLARIFICATION ON EPOXY RESIN 
 
REF: A. STATE 021770 
     ¶B. STATE 039585 
     ¶C. STATE 052030 
     ¶D. TOKYO 001556 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) BACKGROUND: 
 
-- On May 15, Washington provided all Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) Participating Governments (PGs) with detailed 
information regarding critical commodities Iran requires to 
support the deployment of the next generation of gas 
centrifuges for its uranium enrichment program (ref C). This 
list identified technologies Iran cannot indigenously 
manufacture and therefore needs to procure from foreign 
suppliers. 
 
-- In response to this information (ref C), the GOJ asked 
several questions about the United States, controls on epoxy 
resin (ref D) and Washington now has clarifying information 
to provide to the GOJ. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) We would also like to provide specific information 
to the GOJ regarding major Japanese manufacturers of the 
items Iran needs for the IR-2 centrifuge design. The U.S. is 
making a similar approach to major supplier countries in 
Europe, as well as key transshipment countries. The U.S 
intends to approach governments with any new developments in 
U.S. efforts to prevent Iranian procurement of critical 
commodities. 
 
¶4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Post is requested to approach 
appropriate GOJ officials to deliver the nonpapers in paras 5 
and 6.  In doing so, post should pursue the following 
objectives: 
 
-- Share information on ongoing USG efforts to prevent 
Iranian procurement of key gas centrifuge-related commodities 
and provide additional information to the GOJ to make them 
aware of companies that are major producers of such items in 
their country. 
 
-- Encourage the GOJ, if they have not already done so, to 
discuss and highlight to businesses and law enforcement 
authorities the importance of being vigilant against the 
deceptive procurement practices of Iran, particularly as it 
relates to items useful in a gas centrifuge program. 
 
-- Provide the GOJ with clarifications regarding epoxy resin 
used in centrifuge programs and encourage the GOJ to 
carefully review any exports of epoxy resins to Iran. 
 
-- Urge host government to share any relevant information 
from their industry outreach activities with the USG, the 
NSG, and the IAEA. 
 
¶5. (U) BEGIN U.S. NON-PAPER. 
 
-- Industry outreach is critical to ensuring that Iran cannot 
procure items to advance its WMD programs, including its 
uranium enrichment activities. 
 
-- Although the U.S. has enacted comprehensive economic 
sanctions against the Iranian government, risks remain and 
the U.S. is undertaking various initiatives to raise 
awareness among U.S. industry to avoid illicit diversion of 
their products.  Greater awareness will prevent the unwitting 
transfer of items to Iran that may contribute to Iran,s 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, their means of 
delivery, or advanced conventional weapons. 
 
-- For example, the U.S. alerts U.S. companies that Iran uses 
deceptive tactics to make procurement for its nuclear, 
ballistic missile, and advanced conventional weapons programs 
appear to be unrelated commercial activities. Iranian 
entities also form front companies in other countries for the 
sole purpose of sending dual-use items to Iran for use in 
these programs. These front companies enable the regime to 
obtain materials that the country of origin would typically 
prohibit for export to Iran. 
 
-- Therefore, we are asking U.S. companies to be particularly 
vigilant about their overseas customers, especially customers 
operating in known transshipment countries and countries with 
weak or nonexistent export controls. 
 
-- The U.S. government is currently reaching out to U.S. 
manufacturers of critical commodities that Iran will need to 
procure for its new gas centrifuge design.  We are alerting 
them to be cautious of unknown customers who could be 
procuring items on behalf of Iran,s illicit programs. 
 
-- The U.S. government is also considering additional ways to 
alert industry and will keep your government informed of new 
developments in our industry outreach initiatives. 
 
-- If you have not already done so, we encourage you to 
conduct outreach to your industry to raise awareness 
regarding the requirements of export controls for Iran. We 
also request that you alert companies to Iran,s deceptive 
procurement practices. 
 
-- Targeted outreach to companies known to produce these 
critical commodities can sensitize manufacturers and 
exporters to Iran,s deceptive procurement tactics and make 
them aware of export control regulations which ) consistent 
with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 
1803, 1747, and 1737 - prohibit exporting sensitive 
commodities that could advance proliferation-sensitive 
nuclear activities in Iran, such as uranium enrichment, spent 
fuel reprocessing, heavy water production and/or reactor 
operation. 
 
-- The following Japanese companies are major producers of 
critical commodities that Iran will need to procure for its 
new gas centrifuge design. 
 
Carbon Fiber: 
-- Toray Group, Nihonbashi Mitsui Tower, 1-1, 
Nihonbashi-Muromachi, 2-Chome, Chuo-Ku, Tokyo, 103-8666, Tel: 
81-3-3245-5111, website: www.toray.com 
 
-- Toho Tenax, Co., Kasumigaseki Common Gate West Tower, 
3-2-1 kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo 100-8585, Tel: 
81-3-3506-6506, Website: www.tohotenax.com 
 
-- Mitsubishi Rayon, Co. Ltd., 6-41, Konan 1-Chome, 
Minato-Ku, Tokyo, 108-8506, Tel: 81-3-5495-3100, Website: 
www.mrc.co.jp 
 
            Filament Winding Machines: 
-- Kamitsu Seisakusho, Ltd, Techno Park 16-1, Sanda, Hyogo, 
669-1339, Tel: 81-79-560-7735, Website: www.kamitsu.co.jp 
 
-- We ask that your government share any relevant 
information, such as inquiries your companies receive from 
Iranian entities, with the United States, the NSG, and the 
IAEA.  Information sharing will aid ongoing efforts to track 
Iranian procurement attempts and provide additional insight 
into Iranian procurement practices. 
 
-- We are seeking ways to present information to broad groups 
of likely suppliers, re-exporters or transshipers on the 
critical commodities Iran is seeking from foreign suppliers 
for its nuclear and missile programs.  We welcome your 
government,s suggestions on how to best accomplish this and 
are open to further discussions at the expert level. 
 
End U.S. NON-PAPER. 
 
¶6. (U) BEGIN U.S. NON-PAPER ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. 
 
Response to Japan,s Questions on Epoxy Resin 
 
Question 1- Concrete features or characteristics of epoxy 
resins which may be required to bind carbon fibers used in 
centrifuges. 
 
-- Epoxy resins used in the production of carbon fiber rotor 
tubes should be resistant to uranium hexafluoride, hydrogen 
fluoride, or other fluorinated compounds.  If a metal liner 
is used in the carbon fiber rotor, however, then the 
compatibility with fluorinated compounds is no longer a 
concern, and strength is more important. Common epoxy resins 
such as bisphenol A diglycidyl ether (Araldite F, Epon 825 or 
DER 332) or bisphenol F diglycidyl ether (Epon 828 or DER 
354) cured with an aromatic amine such as metaphenylenediamine 
(MPDA) (a hardener or catalyst) could be used in this 
instance. 
 
Question 2- Specific commercial names of epoxy resins, if any. 
 
--  A number of companies distribute epoxy resin and curing 
agent systems. The major manufacturers include: Huntsman 
(Araldite is the trade name) which was formerly used by Ciba 
Geigy, Hexion Specialty Chemicals (Epon is the trade name) 
which was formerly used by Shell, and Dow Epoxy (DER is the 
trade name). These producers have distributors worldwide. 
 
Question 3- How does the Government of the United States 
control epoxy resins (shipped) to Iran? 
 
-- Since epoxy resin is not controlled by any of the 
multilateral export control regimes, it is classified in the 
U.S. as EAR99 (which is a U.S. catch-all control) and can be 
shipped to most countries of the world without a license. For 
Iran, however, the U.S. has enacted extensive economic 
sanctions which broadly prohibit exportation, directly or 
indirectly, from the United States or by a U.S. person, 
wherever located, of any good, technology or service to Iran 
or the Government of Iran. 
 
-- The United States is also undertaking a comprehensive 
outreach program to sensitize U.S. exporters regarding the 
deceptive trade practices of Iran, specifically with regard 
to the use of front companies in third countries. This 
aggressive outreach will help prevent the diversion of U.S. 
origin items (such as epoxy resin)- which are useful for 
Iran,s WMD programs, but not controlled for most 
destinations- from being diverted to WMD programs. 
 
END U.S. NON-PAPER ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. 
 
-------------------------- 
REPORTING DEADLINE AND POC 
-------------------------- 
 
(U) Post is requested to report any substantive responses 
within seven (7) days of receipt of this cable.  Lisa Meyers 
(ISN/CPI, 202-736-7939, MeyersLA@state.sgov.gov) is the 
Department's POC for this activity. 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text