O 222343Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 101233 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PREL PARM
 
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: BACKGROUND INFORMATION, TALKING POINTS AND 
QS AND AS 
 
1.(U) Summary and Action Request: On September 22, 2008 
a paper entitled, "National Security and Nuclear Weapons 
in the 21st Century" was signed by Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates and Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and 
given limited release to Congress. On September 23 it 
will be released publicly and will be available on the 
unclassified internet at 
www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweaponspolicy .pdf.  The 
paper expands on a July 2007 statement, signed by 
Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Bodman, 
and addresses in greater detail the considerations 
behind U.S. requirements for nuclear weapons. The 
principal objective of the paper is to provide the logic 
and rationale for the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
national security strategy, and describe how operational 
nuclear forces, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and 
the supporting nuclear infrastructure together enable 
the United States to manage risk in an uncertain world. 
The paper will inform public opinion, Congress, allies 
and others about U.S. nuclear weapons policies, 
programs, and capabilities. 
 
OBJECTIVES: 
 
-- (U) This cable provides Talking Points and Qs and As 
regarding the paper should Embassy personnel receive 
inquiries from host government officials, local media, 
or host-country opinion makers about the purpose and 
meaning of the paper. Copies of the paper will be 
distributed directly to relevant Defense Attaches in 
Washington-based embassies from North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) members, South Korea, Japan and 
Australia, as well as China and Russia. 
 
-- (U) For NATO embassies, Embassies Seoul, Tokyo, 
Canberra, Beijing, Moscow, and Kyiv: Posts should 
deliver the Talking Points in para 2 and report Host 
Government's response, if any. Posts should draw on the 
Qs and As in para 3 as appropriate.  In addition, Action 
Addressees are requested to advise Department and assess 
the impact of any local media coverage and comment, and 
reactions or inquiries from local elites or other 
interested groups.  Slug replies to ISN/RA Terry Godby, 
ISN/SPO Brandy Buttrick, DOE/NNSA John Harvey, OSD/P 
David Stein, and NSC Brig Gen Jeffry Smith. 
 
--(U)  All other posts: deliver the Talking Points in 
para 2 on an if asked basis only, drawing on the Qs and 
As in para 4 as appropriate, and report Host government 
response, if any. 
 
-- (U) Washington's intention is to respond quickly to 
negative or inaccurate commentary.  Washington is also 
prepared to provide informational briefings to 
Washington-based embassies and follow-up with addressees 
as required. 
 
¶2. (U) Begin talking points: 
 
--On September 22, 2008, the United States released a 
paper signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman entitled, "National 
Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century." 
 
--Copies of the paper will be distributed by the 
Department of Defense directly to relevant Defense 
Attaches in Washington-based embassies from NATO 
members, South Korea, Japan and Australia, as well as 
China and Russia. 
 
--The paper expands on a July 2007 statement, signed by 
Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Gates, and 
Secretary of Energy Bodman, and addresses in greater 
detail the considerations behind U.S. requirements for 
nuclear weapons. 
 
--The principal objective of the paper is to provide the 
logic and rationale for the role of nuclear weapons in 
U.S. national security strategy, and describe how 
operational nuclear forces, the stockpile of nuclear 
warheads, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure work 
together to enable the United States to protect U.S. and 
allied security in an uncertain world. 
 
--The paper will inform public opinion, Congress, allies 
and others about U.S. nuclear weapons policies, 
programs, and capabilities. 
 
--In the interest of transparency, the United States is 
providing your government with the following information 
about the current direction of U.S. nuclear weapons 
policy, programs, and capabilities. 
 
-- The United States has made significant reductions in 
its nuclear arsenal. 
 
--The United States has reduced its operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about 50 percent 
over the past 15 years, and plans to reduce them to a 
level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012 as called for by the 
Moscow Treaty. 
 
--This represents a cut of about 80 percent from the 
highest levels during the Cold War.  The United States 
has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by over 90 
percent since 1991. 
 
--To maintain a credible deterrent at these lower 
levels, however, the United States requires nuclear 
forces that can adapt to changing needs, and a 
responsive research, development, and production 
infrastructure that can maintain existing capabilities 
and manufacture new or replacement components as needed. 
 
--Early in his first term, in recognition of the changed 
security environment, President Bush called for a 
fundamental reorientation of the United States' 
strategic force posture. 
 
--The President directed the Department of Defense to 
develop a portfolio of strategic capabilities?including 
missile defenses and advanced conventional strike 
assets?and to reduce the nuclear force to meet 21st 
Century requirements. 
 
--The Administration's strategy is an appropriate and 
responsive approach to the uncertainties and challenges 
we face in the decades ahead. 
 
--Even as they are reduced in numbers, nuclear weapons 
remain an essential and enduring element of this new 
strategic triad, and underpin in a fundamental way these 
new capabilities. 
 
--Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate 
deterrent capability that supports U.S. national 
security.  Extended deterrence is key to U.S. alliances, 
both in NATO and in Asia and the Pacific, assuring 
allies and friends of the credibility of U.S. security 
commitments. 
 
-- U.S. nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from 
the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies 
and friends.  In the absence of the U.S. extended 
deterrence commitment, some non-nuclear allies might 
perceive a need to develop and deploy their own nuclear 
capability. 
 
--Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear 
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure is of 
vital importance to U.S. and allied interests.  The 
United States must also have the means to respond to 
dramatic adverse developments that can reduce the 
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
 
--The United States must also retain sufficient force 
structure to enable the deployment of additional 
warheads, if needed, for the most stressing, plausible 
challenges ahead. 
 
 --Until a truly responsive nuclear infrastructure is 
operational, the United States will need to retain an 
appropriate inventory of non-deployed warheads to manage 
geopolitical, technical and operational risks. 
 
--Both the U.K. and France have each made sober 
assessments of the risks and uncertainties in the new 
security environment, and each has reached similar 
conclusions regarding these facts and trends.  Both have 
made decisions to maintain their nuclear forces and 
infrastructure well into this century to guard against 
the challenges ahead. 
 
--Currently, the U.S. is pursuing service life 
extensions for existing warheads. 
 
--Over time, however, confidence in the nuclear 
stockpile is expected to decrease as programs to replace 
aging components cause warheads to deviate further from 
baseline designs which were originally validated during 
the period of underground nuclear testing.  The long- 
term goal is to rely more on a revived infrastructure, 
and less on the non-deployed stockpile to respond to 
unforeseen events. 
 
--The desired size of a responsive nuclear 
infrastructure would depend on a number of key 
variables, but until a truly responsive nuclear 
infrastructure is operational, the United States will 
need to retain an appropriate inventory of non-deployed 
warheads to manage geopolitical, technical and 
operational risks. 
 
¶3.  Questions and Answers (if asked) 
 
¶Q. Why is the Administration issuing such a paper in the 
last days of its tenure? 
 
A:  Congress has called for a comprehensive statement on 
U.S. nuclear strategy and policy.  This paper describes 
the relationship among strategic nuclear force 
structure, the stockpile of nuclear warheads, and the 
nuclear warhead research and production infrastructure. 
Many of the policy issues and strategic capabilities 
discussed in this paper represent continuity with 
decisions made by prior administrations.  For example, 
the Clinton Administration developed the "lead and 
hedge" strategy as a way to reduce the size of the 
deployed strategic nuclear force, while also ensuring 
that the United States would be able to respond to 
future challenges that could be more stressing than 
estimated at that time. The current Administration seeks 
to build on that approach by relying, over time, more 
heavily on a responsive nuclear weapons design and 
manufacturing infrastructure to manage risk, and less on 
an inventory of non-deployed warheads. We believe the 
logic presented here provides a sound basis on which 
future administrations can consider further adjustments 
to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force 
structure. 
 
¶Q.  Is it true that the United States does not have the 
capability to produce new nuclear weapons? 
 
¶A.  At present, the United States is capable of 
refurbishing existing weapons through life extension 
programs; we do not have the capability to produce "new" 
nuclear weapons. 
 
¶Q. Is the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence 
still necessary in the post Cold War world? 
 
¶A. Nuclear forces continue to be a key element in U.S. 
alliances with other countries, for example, NATO 
allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia.  U.S. nuclear 
forces act as a counterbalance to the military 
capabilities of hostile states that endanger 
international order.  The role that U.S. nuclear forces 
continue to play in the deterrence of attack against 
allies remains an essential instrument of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing the 
incentives of a number of allied countries to acquire 
nuclear weapons of their own. 
 
¶Q. Isn't it hypocritical for the United States to tell 
North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear weapons 
programs when it is developing and preparing to deploy 
new nuclear warheads? 
 
¶A.  No.  As a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, the 
United States is not prohibited from modernizing its 
nuclear stockpile.  North Korea and Iran are undermining 
the global nonproliferation regime with nuclear programs 
that have violated the NPT and their safeguards 
agreements as well as Chapter VII UN Security Council 
resolutions.  U.S. nuclear guarantees to allies support 
U.S. nonproliferation policy by significantly reducing 
the incentives of a number of allied countries to 
acquire nuclear weapons of their own. 
 
¶Q. Is this announcement related to the recent missile 
defense announcement on establishing a missile defense 
system in Europe? 
 
¶A.  No, these announcements are unrelated.  The proposed 
fielding of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe would 
provide the capability to defend much of Europe and the 
U.S. against ballistic missiles launched from the Middle 
East.  U.S. nuclear forces are intended to deter WMD 
attacks.  Missile defenses reinforce deterrence and 
provide a means of self-defense if deterrence should 
fail. 
 
Q:  Do you really see a potential need to replace the 
entire U.S. stockpile with new weapons? 
 
A: The Directors of the U.S. national laboratories have 
testified before Congress that reliance on a life- 
extension or refurbishment strategy for maintaining U.S. 
nuclear weapons presents increased risks to long-term 
stockpile reliability and is unsustainable in the long 
term. 
 
Q: Why does the U.S. need to invest in a "responsive 
nuclear weapons infrastructure"? 
 
A: The United States has not designed a new nuclear 
warhead since the 1980s and has not built a new warhead 
since the early 1990s.  As a result, the nuclear weapons 
infrastructure has atrophied and existing U.S. nuclear 
weapons ? most of which were designed 20 to 30 years ago 
? are being maintained well beyond the service life for 
which they were designed.  Critical personnel, with 
experience in the design and testing of nuclear weapons, 
are also aging and retiring, and in the absence of a 
viable nuclear infrastructure, their expertise cannot be 
replaced. 
 
¶Q.  What is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)? 
 
¶A.  The RRW program is intended to evaluate warhead 
options to replace legacy systems developed during the 
Cold War that are nearing the end of their service 
lives.  An RRW will have the same military capabilities 
as the warhead it replaces.  RRW will ensure greater 
safety and security, long-term high confidence in 
warhead reliability, and be easier to manufacture and 
maintain. 
 
¶Q. Why can't the U.S. add safety features to legacy 
systems and be done with it? 
 
¶A. The designs of legacy systems will not permit the 
inclusion of all of the desirable additional safety 
features during refurbishment or reduce the amount of 
hazardous material. 
 
¶Q. What is the future U.S. stockpile requirement? 
 
¶A.  Many questions regarding the future nuclear 
stockpile and nuclear force cannot be answered with 
precision today.  The answers will depend on knowledge 
gained by further work on programs such as RRW, by 
efforts to modernize the nuclear warhead infrastructure, 
and by closely watching emerging trends around the 
world. 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text