VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSF #0637/01 2740750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300750Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC 0238
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5424
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0737
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0527

UNCLAS SOFIA 000637 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/CE FOR TOM YEAGER 
INL FOR ELIZABETH CARROLL 
FBI HQ FOR SC MATTHEW HERON 
FBI FOR AD KENNETH KAISER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KCRM BU
SUBJECT: SETTING UP A BULGARIAN COUNTER-OC TASK FORCE: 
REQUEST FOR FBI AND POLYGRAPH ANTI-OC EXPERTS 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  Interior Minister Mikov and Deputy 
Minister Yankulova welcomed the results of the U.S. 
assessment of the Interior Ministry (MOI) and agreed to 
implement our recommendation to create a centralized pilot 
counter-OC task force.  Mikov requested U.S. practical 
assistance.  Post seeks a Federal Bureau of Investigation OC 
expert, with experience in fighting the New York City 
organized crime groups, and polygraph expert assistance from 
the DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP).  Under both domestic and 
international pressure to show reform and results, Mikov 
stressed the need to implement this task force immediately. 
End Summary. 
 
Problems Fighting OC 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  DOJ (ICITAP) and the Embassy Rule of Law Task 
Force cooperated in a methodical assessment of the MOI.  It 
confirms massive structural, procedural, training, staffing, 
personnel, and internal control shortcomings.  An urgent 
overhaul is necessary.  But the Bulgarians also need to show 
demonstrable immediate anti-OC progress. Our assessment shows 
that: 
 
-- the decentralization of the MOI organized crime unit, 
initiated in 2006 and reinforced in a recent re-organization, 
allows for leaks of sensitive information such as identities 
of investigation targets, informants, witnesses, and 
undercover operatives; and 
 
-- regional counter-OC units are subordinated to the regional 
police commander, undermining their independence. 
 
As a result, and combined with other failures and 
mismanagement, the MOI does not have any evidence against the 
most notorious of Bulgarian crime bosses.  The MOI has 
completely lost the confidence of the Prosecution Service, 
which now relies on the new security agency DANS for 
sensitive organized crime cases.  Duplication of 
responsibilities with the DANS (whose officers are paid twice 
as much as MOI's) creates competition and morale issues. 
But, DANS, designed for counter-intelligence and 
counter-terrorism, does not have the requisite capacity or 
legal authority to investigate crimes (and we want it to 
concentrate on its core missions in any case). 
 
What Bulgarians can do now 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U)   Interior Minister Mikov and DepMinister Yankulova 
accepted our report,s findings and recommendations. 
Separately, Prosecutor General Velchev also emphatically 
agreed that a pilot counter-OC strike force is needed, and 
committed to work with Mikov on setting it up.  Under 
existing legal authority, the Interior Minister and the 
Prosecutor General's Office can re-direct human resources to 
create such a pilot task force.  It would target major known 
crime figures and prepare at least one case for trial, using 
current laws including Article 321 of the Bulgarian penal 
code, which criminalizes membership in an organized crime 
group.  The task force members would be vetted with an 
updated thorough background investigation and a polygraph 
examination.  Prosecutors, who would lead the task force, 
should be paid consistent with the level of responsibility 
and danger.  Until MOI proves it is not compromised or 
complicit, DANS operatives will be essential for team 
integrity and foreign government confidence.  The key is to 
develop information that can be used in a court of law; hence 
investigative authority will be entrusted to those MOI 
members in whom Prosecutor General Velchev and the Interior 
Minister have complete confidence.  The Prosecutor General 
has told us bluntly that he will not accept cases from a task 
force without DANS involvement. 
 
What we need from Washington 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)   A targeted investment in the initial start up of 
the task force will help overall chances of success.  We 
recommend specific support, including: 
 
-- FBI:  Send one Senior Specialist Agent with experience in 
combating organized crime organizations in New York City to 
consult with the designated Bulgarian operational lead for 
the task force on the task force structure and personnel, 
procedures, and mechanisms for coordinating across agencies 
and jurisdictions during the task force set-up period.  This 
advisor would not be operational and would act in an advisory 
capacity only.  We estimate that this initial period will 
last approximately 90 days. 
 
-- DOJ:  ICITAP to consult with the Bulgarians on the vetting 
of task force members, including the use of polygraphs so the 
task force selects the right people. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Mikov and Velchev are serious about moving forward; 
and they have again turned to the U.S. for advice and 
assistance.  The Prime Minister is committed to showing 
results.  The job is immense, and many Bulgarians now believe 
that both DANS and the MOI are discredited (septel), and 
perhaps beyond Bulgarian,s capacity.  Much of this is normal 
Bulgarian skepticism and pessimism.  It,s not the whole 
story.  Ordinary Bulgarians thirst for success and look for 
friends to offer a helping hand.  Modest U.S. commitments of 
TDY expertise will push the Bulgarians forward.  Bulgarian 
authorities know they bear ultimate responsibility for the 
task force's success or failure.  And they accept that U.S. 
assistance is tied to mutually-agreed upon benchmarks 
 
McEldowney