VZCZCXRO9472
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0497/01 2671057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231057Z SEP 08 ZDK
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8533
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9666
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 4197
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8855
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3253
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 3500
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2776
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2500
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3913
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000497 
 
SIPDIS 
[SENSITIVE] 
 
STATE PASS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FOREIGN POLICY: INTERESTS VS. IDEOLOGY, AND MAYBE 
RAW MATERIAL FOR A REAL DEBATE 
 
REF: RIO 236 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) A significant number of academics and international 
relations consultants in Sao Paulo are frustrated with Brazil's 
current foreign policy.  In their view, left-wing elements in both 
the Workers Party (PT) and in the Foreign Ministry put ideology 
ahead of national interest.  The critics maintain that this has cost 
Brazil economic and diplomatic opportunities, though President 
Lula's pragmatism has limited the damage.  Despite the lost 
opportunities, our contacts do not think that Brazil's foreign 
policy will change any time soon, bolstered as it is by 
protectionist elements in the business community, ideologues in 
academe and government and, most importantly, by a series of beliefs 
- the critics would call them myths - about both the U.S. and 
Brazil.  Though the academic ideas get little play now, they could 
provide a leverage point for programming on foreign 
policy-formation, one that could broaden the domestic conversation 
on Brazil's foreign relations.  This is a debate we should encourage 
as both Brazil and the U.S. increasingly share common interests in 
promoting greater democracy, stability and free markets in the 
hemisphere.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Poloff spoke to a wide variety of Congen interlocutors on 
Brazil's foreign policy including: former Ambassador to the United 
States Rubens Barbosa, Communist Party Congressman and Sao Paulo PT 
Deputy Mayoral candidate Aldo Rebelo, University of Sao Paulo (USP) 
Political Scientist Guilhon de Albuquerque, USP Professor of 
International Relations Amancio Jorge de Oliveira, Globo TV 
journalist Jose Alan, translator and commentator John Fitzpatrick, 
and think tank researchers Rogerio Schmitt (Tendencias) and Thiago 
Aragao (Arko Advice). 
 
Old Thinking vs. New Status 
 
¶3.  (U) The vast majority of these interlocutors criticized GOB 
foreign policy for its ideologically-based naivet, which they saw 
as out of step with Brazil's status as an emerging major power.  On 
the one hand, Brazil is an increasingly prosperous country that 
enjoys "absolute [democratic] stability," in the words of journalist 
Jose Alan.  On the other, these observers said repeatedly that the 
country's foreign affairs remain locked in a 1960s-era leftist 
straightjacket, one that makes it impossible for the GOB to defend 
increasingly important economic interests in neighboring countries. 
 
Ticking Off the Costs 
 
¶4.  (U) Interlocutors cited a variety of areas in which they 
believed Brazil had sacrificed its interests for ideological 
reasons.  These included: 
 
-the loss of Petrobras' Bolivia-based refinery as a result of the 
Bolivian government's nationalization of the facility in March 
2006; 
 
-the likely increase in cost of electricity obtained from the Itaipu 
dam in Paraguay, pending renegotiation of the terms of the treaty 
governing the sharing of electrical generation there; 
 
-the lack of protections for Brazilian investors abroad.  According 
to former Ambassador Rubens Barbosa and others, for ideological 
reasons, the GOB is simply not comfortable defending Brazilian 
business interests in neighboring countries; 
 
-missed opportunities to mediate conflicts in Bolivia, Colombia and 
between Uruguay and Argentina; 
 
-the waning of influence among Brazil's neighbors, as Paraguay, 
Bolivia and Argentina have all, to varying degrees, fallen under the 
influence of Hugo Chavez; 
 
-economic "missed opportunities" due to Brazil's political 
commitment to Mercosul; and, 
 
-a failure to appreciate and exploit synergies with the United 
States, with which Brazil increasingly shares common interests. 
 
SAO PAULO 00000497  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Barbosa maintained that Brazil focused too much 
attention on China (which is a competitor) or the other BRIC 
countries or South Africa, rather than looking at potential partners 
in terms of the actual benefits they offer.  (Note: This 
contradiction was apparent during the recent Doha negotiations, 
where Brazil's position was at the end closer to that of the U.S. 
than to its nominal G-20 allies such as Argentina and India.  End 
Note.) 
 
Ideas that Limit Brazil's Vision 
 
¶6. (SBU) Foreign policy experts and observers noted a powerful 
consensus that frustrates an interests-based consideration of 
Brazil's foreign policy.  Several elements stood out, including: 
 
-The continuing influence of 1960s-era Marxist/nationalist ideas 
among PT leaders and some in the Foreign Ministry.  Some in the PT, 
for example, reportedly welcomed the Bolivia's 2006 nationalization 
of Petrobras facilities in that country as legitimate resistance to 
"imperialism." 
 
- Brazil's "Manifest Destiny" 
 
USP Professor Albuquerque cited a lecture that Foreign Minister 
Celso Amorim gave to students at the University of Sao Paulo in 2004 
as emblematic of some of the more far-out notions that influence 
Brazil's foreign policy.  In that lecture, Amorim told students that 
Brazil would soon emerge as a major world power.  He said the U.S. 
was "in decline" and that external factors hobbled all other major 
contenders for influence.  (Japan would block China's rise; India 
suffers too much misery; and Russia's population is falling.)  In 
his view, only Brazil had the right combination of technology, 
resources and absence of barriers to transform itself into a 
"rule-maker" in the international system.  (Note: Albuquerque 
thought Amorim's lecture went too far, and observed that even some 
students seemed perplexed by it.  At the same time, Albuquerque 
thought it accurately represented one element in a highly - and some 
might say grandiosely - nationalist world view that influences some 
in the GOB Foreign Ministry.  End Note COMMENT: It is notable that 
this interlocutor selects a 2004 speech to criticize, rather than 
taking into account the many later speeches, or any possibility in 
evolution in Amorim's views, that could serve to undercut his own 
entrenched perspective.  End Comment.) 
 
-Fear of Becoming "Another Mexico" 
 
USP Professor of International Relations Amancio Jorge de Oliveira 
said that Brazil's foreign policy elites resist engagement with the 
U.S., particularly a broad-style free trade agreement, out of fear 
of becoming "another Mexico."  Post-NAFTA, 90 percent of Mexico's 
foreign trade is with the U.S., a fact that, according to Oliveira, 
effectively pulls the country out of Latin America.  Brazilian 
foreign policy elites do not want to follow this path, and so will 
only engage in piecemeal deals with the United States.  For this 
reason, the GOB always refers to "South American unity" in its 
foreign policy statements, since it sees Mexico and Central America 
as essentially "lost" to the United States, according to Oliveira. 
 
Consequences for the Foreign Ministry 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Professor Albuquerque and other interlocutors cited how 
Foreign Minister Amorim's and Secretary General Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimaraes' nationalist/leftist inclinations have altered the 
pipeline for diplomats in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry.  In recent 
years, the Ministry has imposed ideological litmus tests for 
promotions, moving up relatively inexperienced (and left-wing 
oriented) officers to key positions, and requiring that officers 
read a list of books selected for their nationalist and leftist 
credentials.  These measures, combined with the recent expansion of 
incoming classes, could institutionalize the leftist slant of 
Brazil's foreign policy, these interlocutors fear. 
 
Lula's Pragmatism Does Damage Control 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Most observers cited President Lula's overall personal 
influence as positive, particularly where relations with the United 
States were concerned.  While Lula is a man of the left, he is 
fundamentally a grassroots-oriented, pragmatic politician and not an 
ideologue, they believe.  (Note: While our interlocutors stressed 
 
SAO PAULO 00000497  003 OF 003 
 
 
Lula's pragmatism, some of his recent statements about new oil 
discoveries suggest that where that potential bonanza is concerned, 
he remains attracted to certain statist ideas.  End Note.)  They 
note that President Lula also enjoys excellent chemistry with 
President Bush and is less than supportive of Hugo Chavez, whom Lula 
sees as having usurped his leadership role as the voice of South 
America's poor while Lula was occupied by the scandals that wracked 
his administration in 2004-2005, according to these observers. 
 
And Yet, Does It Matter?  Consensus and Complacency 
 
¶9.  USP Professor of International Relations Amancio Jorge de 
Oliveira tied together the analyses offered by others and offered a 
pragmatic evaluation.  He agreed with the criticisms of almost all 
those cited in this cable.  Oliveira concurred that Brazil's 
emphasis on South-South and regional solidarity in foreign policy 
was misplaced, that the country was missing opportunities to both 
protect its economic interests and promote itself.  Nonetheless, in 
Oliveira's view, while the criticisms of Brazil's contemporary 
foreign policy are true, they are also irrelevant.  Brazil is a big 
country that is enjoying rapid economic growth.  Between 
protectionist industrialists and ideologues in government and the 
universities, there exists a strong consensus in favor of the status 
quo among key members of Brazil's elite, and, in this context, 
foreign policy simply does not capture the center stage in the minds 
of most Brazilians. 
 
Comment: Foreign Policy and Opportunity 
 
¶10. (SBU) Brazil's present foreign policy is unlikely to change any 
time soon, these sources believe.  Sources interviewed complained of 
an absence of real debate about foreign affairs in this increasingly 
prosperous yet still inwardly-oriented society.  In fact, the 
conflict between interests and ideology described here is not 
limited to political aspects of foreign affairs, but also affects 
economic policy.  The debates about what to do post-Doha as well as 
how Brazil can best develop its new large offshore oil reserves also 
feature this same conflict between statist/third world-ist 
ideological habits and how best to pick partners/use markets to 
enhance trade and develop resources. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Despite the entrenched positions among many key 
opinion-makers, we should promote and develop forums - university 
events, think tanks and the like - where Brazilians can consider a 
wider range of foreign policy options, including those that would 
take their concrete interests more clearly into account.  The 
critics interviewed here represent a current in local thinking that 
deserves wider play and will likely become more important as Brazil 
continues to emerge as an exporter of capital and as an increasingly 
developed society, interested in investment promotion, democracy 
promotion and hemispheric stability. 
 
¶12.  (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared by Embassy Brasilia. 
 
STORY