VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #1088/01 2622316
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182316Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0076

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 001088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2018 
TAGS: ES PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: ARENA PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CONFIDENT; INDICATES MORE AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN IN THE MAKING
 
REF: SAN SALVADOR 827 
 
Classified By: DCM Blau for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Although he is still behind in the latest 
opinion polls, conservative, pro-U.S. ARENA Presidential 
candidate Rodrigo Avila is confident that he will be able to 
convince the Salvadoran electorate that backing the left-wing 
FMLN is a dangerous leap into the unknown.  Avila indicates 
that he will name a Vice Presidential candidate within the 
next two weeks, and that his campaign will soon shift into a 
more aggressive mode.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The DCM hosted a lunch for ARENA Presidential 
candidate Rodrigo Avila, his wife Celina, and ARENA campaign 
manager Cesar Funes on September 16.  Avila started the 
conversation by noting that his campaign has improved 
markedly since July, and that he is closing the distance 
between himself and FMLN Presidential candidate Mauricio 
Funes.  (Note: One recent opinion poll, from early September, 
shows Funes ahead of Avila by three percent, but with over 
one-third of the electorate undecided.  End note).  Admitting 
that he got off to a slow start, Avila then stated that he 
expects to be tied with Funes by early October.  Avila said 
that while the public perception is that his campaign has 
been slow to reach critical mass because of squabbling and 
divisiveness within ARENA, the reality is that he has opted 
to take his time and make sure that he gets all the important 
judgment calls right. 
 
¶3. (C) Both Avila and Cesar Funes (Note: No relation to 
Mauricio Funes) stated that the Vice Presidential nomination 
will be crucial to the outcome of the election.  Avila told 
us that he has several candidates in mind, and that he will 
be announcing his choice within the next two weeks.  Although 
he declined to identify who he will name, Avila said that his 
choice will reflect his determination to incite change within 
the ranks of ARENA, and to make the party more inclusive and 
reflective of Salvadoran society.  Avila then bluntly stated 
that local businessman Arturo Zablah, who served as Minister 
of Economy under President Cristiani (1989-1994; reftel) and 
is portrayed in the media as having the best shot at landing 
the ARENA Vice Presidential nomination, will not be his 
choice.  Avila said that he would have named Zablah to the 
position three weeks ago, had Zablah not leaked to the media 
the details of a personal interview in which the two 
discussed the outlines of Avila's economic policy. 
 
¶4. (C) The conversation then turned to the dynamics of 
Avila's contest with FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes.  Both 
Avila and his campaign manager agreed that Mauricio Funes is 
a formidable candidate, and that the public recognition Funes 
built up while hosting a highly-rated television news program 
for ten years gives the FMLN an "effective shield" from the 
radical image it has always had.  Campaign manager Cesar 
Funes dismissed Mauricio Funes' attempts to distance himself 
from hard-left party stalwarts such as FMLN Vice Presidential 
candidate (and former guerrilla leader) Sanchez Ceren as 
either insincere or foolish.  He stated that Mauricio Funes 
would if victorious serve as the trojan horse that delivers 
El Salvador into the growing ranks of the anti-American 
"Chavista" faction already entrenched in neighboring 
Nicaragua and elsewhere. 
 
¶5. (C) In terms of his own campaign strategy, Avila stated 
that his greatest challenge is to "sell" Salvadoran voters on 
the notion that he both wants and can enact beneficial 
change.  Avila told us that he genuinely wants to make ARENA 
a more inclusive political party, and, more importantly, that 
he intends to foment economic growth, create jobs, and expand 
prosperity beyond the upper and middle classes.  He said that 
voter anger over rising gasoline and commodity prices are 
hurting his polling numbers and that, but for these two 
dynamics beyond ARENA's control, he would "probably be out in 
front of Funes by a considerable margin by now."  Avila 
stated that the key to winning the election will be to play 
upon the Salvadoran voters genuine fear of the FMLN, but to 
"not overdo it."  Both he and his campaign manager indicated 
that they will more aggressively alert the electorate to the 
"true nature of what the FMLN represents," i.e. "Chavismo" 
and economic uncertainty, and at the same time continue to 
stress that he offers "genuine change" in the context of "a 
democratic political system that respects private property 
and maintains a good relationship with the U.S." 
 
¶6. (C) In an interesting aside, Avila told us that he was "frustrated" by an "attitude" that he had observed in Washington that gave him the impression that the USG assumed Funes and the FMLN "had the election already won." Avila also referred to criticism of the Saca administration's handling of violent protests last year in Suchitoto as an example of how ARENA is "sometimes misunderstood in Washington," as well as unfairly demonized by left-leaning media, non-governmental organizations, and human rights groups.
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Avila and ARENA campaign manager Funes left 
no doubt that despite being behind in the polls, they are 
nonetheless confident they will prevail.  At the same time, 
they also gave us the distinct impression they are still 
waiting for the right moment to attack Funes with negative 
advertising.  Avila and company appear to believe that naming 
a Vice Presidential candidate will give them a significant 
bounce in the polls, as well as serve as a springboard for a 
more aggressive campaign that capitalizes upon voter fear of 
the uncertainty that an FMLN victory could usher in.  End 
comment. 
BLAU