VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0763/01 2671323
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231323Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0118
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0802

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000763 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, NEA, IO/UNP JMARIZ, AND USUN 
JDELAURENTIS. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 
TAGS: EFIN IZ PGOV PINR PREL UNSC UN CS
SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: AUGUST 28 UNSC BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: A. SAN JOSE 707 
     ¶B. SAN JOSE 730 
     ¶C. SAN JOSE 594 
     ¶D. SAN JOSE 129 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor David E. Henifin for reason 
1.4(d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  IO Acting A/S Brian Hook's August 28 
bilateral consultations with the MFA on UNSC matters were 
successful in bringing the U.S. and the GOCR to mutual 
understanding - if not agreement - on a range of UNSC issues. 
 A/S Hook lobbied the MFA for greater cooperation on speed in 
the UNSC, better voting coincidence, and not automatically 
voting in favor of UN Human Rights Council reports.  The MFA: 
 
-- shared U.S. concerns and views on Georgia; 
-- boxed itself in on its support of the ICJ, making it 
unfeasible for the GOCR to be critical of Serbia's decision 
to bring the case of Kosovo independence to the ICJ; 
-- was appalled by the lack of any UNSC action and "complete 
silence" regarding Pakistan in relation to non-proliferation, 
in contrast to strong UNSC pressure on Iran; 
-- would "not acquiesce" in its resistance to closing down 
Oil-for-Food without assurances that goods were delivered 
in accordance with contracts (Ref A); 
-- seemed to have a well-reasoned rationale for recognizing 
"State" of Palestine, taking into account Costa Rica's "yes" 
vote on UN Resolution 181 and the GOCR desire to give a 
strong show of support to Abbas, in the face of Hamas; 
-- had a clear position against adding more UNSC permanent 
members and preferred to focus on working methods reform; 
-- said it would re-examine its voting in favor of Human 
Rights Council reports and would consider Costa Rica's 14 
percent Overall voting coincidence with the U.S.; and 
-- planned two thematic debates for its UNSC presidency in 
November:  the first on regional security agreements under 
Chapter 8 of the UN Charter presided by President Arias (Ref 
B), and the second on peace and security issues under Chapter 
16 presided by FonMin Stagno.  A/S Hook did not clear this 
cable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
WITH THE FONMIN: OF GEORGIA, KOSOVO AND THE ICJ 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Acting A/S Brian Hook's August 27-28 visit was an 
excellent opportunity to engage in bilateral consultations 
with the MFA on UNSC matters.  The timely visit followed up 
on the March visit by PDAS Jim Warlick and IO and USUN staff 
(Ref B).  The consultations began with a small meeting 
between FonMin Stagno, the MFA's Antonio Alarcon (COS) and 
Christian Guillermet (P-equivalent Director for Foreign 
Policy); Ambassador Cianchette, Acting A/S Hook and IO SA 
Erin McLinn.  A larger meeting of both delegations followed. 
See para 21 for delegation lists.  The following, for the 
record, are the highlights of those consultations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the principals meeting, IO Hook relayed to us 
that the GOCR was "with us on Georgia," but that pushing 
Costa Rica on the ICJ Serbia/Kosovo issue would be to no 
avail since the Costa Ricans had already "boxed themselves 
in" on support of the ICJ. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
WITH MFA TEAM:  NON-PRO ISSUES, IRAN AND PAKISTAN 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) In the larger meeting, Stagno expressed dismay 
regarding the lack of any UNSC attention to Pakistani nuclear 
proliferation - either by state or non-state actors - 
including the A.Q. Khan case, for which Khan only received a 
"slap on the wrist."  Stagno supported UNSC and international 
community pressure on Iran and its challenge to the 
architecture of the international non-proliferation regime, 
but was "baffled" by the "complete silence" on Pakistan.  As 
chair of the 1540 Committee, Stagno said Costa Rica felt 
"uncomfortable" not raising the issue of Pakistan and the 
A.Q. Khan network, though he understood the political 
complications that raising the issue might have on the War on 
Terror, the Taliban, and the new Pakistani government. 
Stagno pointed out the "nightmare scenario" of non-state 
actors possessing nuclear technology or materials and decried 
Pakistan's visible "non-compliance" vis-Q-vis a non-state 
actor, as in the Khan case.  The MFA was worried that the 
UNSC was sending "distinct and incomprehensible messages" on 
non-proliferation and was "negligent" by ignoring Pakistan. 
The GOCR did not advocate lighter treatment of Iran, just 
appropriately heavier treatment of Pakistan. 
 
¶5. (C) Hook agreed that Pakistan's reports were "cleansed of 
any truth."  He told the MFA that the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) was the Bush Administration's response to 
the A.Q. Khan case since Khan accomplished what he did 
through shipping activity and did not run a proliferation 
organization per se.  (NOTE: Costa Rica has not signed on 
to the PSI but did attend the May 29 PSI workshop in 
Washington organized by ISN/CPI. END NOTE.) Hook also pointed 
to UNSCRs 1540 and 1803 as steps that U.S. had taken to 
address proliferation issues.  Hook promised to review 
applicable non-proliferation language used for North Korea 
and to get back to Stagno with a possible approach. 
 
------------ 
OIL FOR FOOD 
------------ 
 
¶6. (C) On the Oil-for-Food program (reported Ref A), Stagno 
recognized there was political pressure to close down OFF and 
that the remaining funds were "negligible" in the grand 
scheme of things.  However, he said the GOCR would "not 
acquiesce" unless it received assurances that goods had been 
delivered.  The MFA offered no solutions, but agreed to a SYG 
Briefing on the matter.  Hook told Stagno that the political 
reality of the P5's desire to close down the program was 
separate from principle, though both concerns were valid.  He 
urged that the "perfect not be the enemy of the done."  Hook 
said he would call Under-Secretary-General Chris Burnham for 
more background and see if there was a way through the issue. 
 
---------------------------- 
THEMATIC DEBATES IN NOVEMBER 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Stagno told us that Costa Rica planned two thematic 
debates for its November UNSC presidency.  The first, to be 
presided over by President Arias, would focus on how regional 
security arrangements (under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter) 
could reduce tensions and military spending.  (See invitation 
to POTUS, Ref B.) Stagno will preside over the second debate, 
which will deal with peace and justice issues under Chapter 
¶16.  Regarding regional security arrangements, Stagno said 
that Latin America had never been more democratic, yet 
military spending continued to increase.  He noted that 
Venezuela was not the only concern; Chile, too, was 
re-building its military, even though it was a 
well-established democracy facing no serious regional threat. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Thus, the MFA believed that regional security 
arrangements could generate significant confidence building 
measures which in turn would limit military spending which 
was unjustified because there were no interstate conflicts 
(or immediately foreseeable conflicts).  (NOTE: This proposal 
is in line with the a) GOCR's push in the UN for a 
conventional arms transfer treaty and overall arms control 
and b) GOCR's push for the "Costa Rica Consensus" to lower 
world weapons expenditure and beef up world foreign 
assistance to those who disarm. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THE PALESTINIANS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Regarding the Middle East peace process, Stagno gave 
the most detailed rationale we had heard for the GOCR's 
recognition of the Palestinian "state" (Ref D).  The FonMin 
said that recognition was calculated to provide support for 
President Abbas and impetus for the ultimate creation of 
Palestine, as set forth in UN resolution 181, which Costa 
Rica supported.  Stagno appeared frustrated that mechanisms 
such as UN Resolution 181, the Oslo Accords, the Madrid Plan, 
and the Road Map - which all called for tiered processes to 
establish a Palestinian State within certain time frames - 
were always derailed by "spoilers" before they could get to 
fundamental issues such as the status of Jerusalem; 
settlements; borders; security arrangements; and the right of 
refugee return.  Stagno assured us that Palestinian 
recognition did "not prejudice" the GOCR's view on these 
fundamental issues.  Stagno cautioned that if the 
international community did not back Abbas and the moderates, 
then Hamas would be emboldened and the GOCR did not want to 
see a further Hamas victory.  Stagno, however, said that he 
was "uncomfortable" with the UN being put on par with member 
states in the Quartet. 
 
¶10. (C) Hook stressed to Stagno that Middle East peace was a 
top priority of POTUS and the Secretary.  He said the Quartet 
was the current mechanism and the SYG's role is more one of 
"using his good offices" in negotiations.  Hook warned that 
UN and UNSC dialogue on Israel was a big problem for the 
U.S., given Libya's recent toxic remarks on the Council.  The 
UN had not been effective on Israel, he added, due to the 
bias of many member states, and Israel remained an issue for 
the U.S. image around the world.  Under these circumstances, 
Hook suggested  that in multilateral fora, USG goals should 
to be to "first, do no harm," to our Middle East objectives 
and work for breakthroughs outside the UN.  At Stagno's 
request, Hook said he would touch base with NEA PDAS David 
Welch to assess the status of the peace process and get back 
to Stagno. 
 
¶11. (SBU) On a related issue, Stagno criticized Israel for 
not doing its own demarches while leaving the U.S. to do the 
brunt of Israeli lobbying around the world.  While he was UN 
Ambassador, Stagno remembered only being demarched twice. 
MFA Foreign Policy Director Guillermet said that during his 
six years in Geneva, he never received a demarche from 
Israel. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
COUNCIL REFORM/EXPANSION AND THE NEED FOR SPEED 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶12. (C) On UNSC reform, the FonMin reiterated GOCR opposition 
to expansion, for four reasons.  First, as a small 
country looking at an enlarged UNSC, Costa Rica's odds of 
holding a non-permanent seat again in the future would be 
reduced.  Second, Costa Rica did not approve of all the 
candidates nations and their respective credentials.  India 
was not yet a party to the NPT, for example; Brazil would be 
unfairly upgraded over Mexico when Mexico paid more UN dues; 
Japan's UN contributions were dwindling; and as part of the 
EU with a common foreign policy, a seat for Germany would be 
redundant with France and Britain already permanent members. 
Third, the MFA believed the UNSC would have more credibility 
via modification of its working methods (such as ending the 
silent veto).  Fourth, with a drawn-out process of elections, 
surprise members may get in due to "voter fatigue," as 
happened with Mexico and Panama after contentious UNSC 
elections in the past.  Stagno cautioned that "sometimes you 
don't get what you are expecting" and cited examples of an 
accidental election of a Nigeria or Libya, which would 
provide those countries with unmerited moral authority. 
 
¶13. (C) Stagno claimed that the S5 shared views with GOCR on 
working methods - but not on enlargement - and that there 
would be insufficient value added by enlargement of the UNSC. 
 Hook responded that the U.S. wanted a more efficient and 
effective Council, and that though the U.S. has been on the 
record with its support of Japan for some time, it was hard 
to imagine consensus-building being any easier in an enlarged 
Council; consensus was elusive enough with 15 members. 
 
¶14. (C) Hook addressed the GOCR's action on Zimbabwe in July, 
where the GOCR UN Mission examined the Mugabe sanctions 
resolution text for more than a week (Ref C), thus giving 
Russia and China the "cover of time" to veto it.  Hook said 
it took the UNSC two weeks to "show up on the grid and take 
action," overtly hinting that Costa Rica's delays cost the 
opportunity for unified Council action; by the time of the 
veto, it was not front page news.  Hook told Stagno that 
speed was "very important in the UNSC or we lose momentum for 
action." Stagno defended the GOCR's desire for text-tweaking 
and said the resolution needed a well-defined start date for 
sanctions - and that date could not have been when Mugabe was 
born! He noted that the GOCR "eventually agreed" on the 
resolution.  The GOCR saw the resolution as a "wonderful 
opportunity" to send a clear message to standing Heads of 
State about violations committed during the electoral 
process. 
 
------------------------ 
BURMA AND SPECIAL ENVOYS 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) On Burma, Hook expressed U.S. dissatisfaction with 
special envoys in general, since they tend to take the place 
of or delay UNSC action and give a false sense of progress, 
while the regime exploited the talks to buy time.  Hook 
stressed that the U.S. was at the "end of its rope" with UN 
Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari.  Hook asked Stagno to help 
think of a face-saving way to get rid of Gambari, adding that 
Aung San Suu Kyi did not even want to meet with him anymore. 
Stagno did not have the best impressions of Gambari, either. 
 
------------------------------ 
VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE US 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (SBU) On U.S. agenda items, Hook told Stagno of IO's new 
initiative to improve voting coincidence with 25 like-minded, 
democratic countries.  When asked to guess the percentage of 
GOCR's overall votes with the U.S., Stagno 
guessed "30 percent of the time."  Stagno seemed surprised 
when Hook told him that the real number was only 14 percent. 
Hook signaled that appropriators in Congress could see this 
with disapproval - especially for those who receive U.S. 
foreign assistance - and would not understand why there was 
such a gap.  Hook acknowledged the GOCR spoke with "moral 
clarity" on human rights issues, and he promised to send 
Stagno a recent Heritage Foundation study on the subject of 
voting coincidence. 
 
¶17. (SBU) On voting coincidence, while Stagno made it clear 
that the GOCR did not have to be in "lock step" with the U.S. 
and should not be expected to be, he acknowledged that he had 
not seen voting coincidence reports since he was UN 
Ambassador in 2005.  (NOTE: We have passed Stagno's office 
the 2007 Department Report on UN Voting Practices.)  Stagno 
noted that when the GOCR examined voting records then, the 
differences were often due to U.S. votes on issues such as 
climate change and disarmament and not due to specific 
US-Costa Rica disagreements.  He evinced openness to further 
conversation on this topic. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
AND WHAT ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) Finally, Hook asked why the GOCR voted in favor of 
the annual Human Rights Council Report when the body's work 
was not credible.  Stagno explained that the GOCR supported 
reform in 2005 and the creation of the Human Rights Council 
and the Peacebuilding Commission, though the international 
community got the worst results - the old Human Rights 
Commission with a new name.  Stagno felt that some elements 
of the annual reports were favorable, so they voted in favor. 
 
¶19. (C) Hook argued that just because it is a human rights 
body the HR Council did not deserve automatic support, and 
that by voting in favor of the report, members -- especially 
with strong HR records like Costa Rica -- legitimized the HR 
Council's work.  Hook pointed out that HR Council reform 
would come faster if we sent the message that the HR Council 
was not serious about human rights and we let it "run off the 
road into a ditch" itself.  Hook suggested that the MFA 
consider a resolution calling on the UNGA to take action on 
the annual HR Council reports, with a positive vision (not 
just critical), for continued HRC operation but under two to 
three clear conditions.  Hook suggested that the U.S. and the 
GOCR touch base with each other - and with Panama - when the 
next report came out.  Stagno conceded that Hook had a "valid 
point," offered to study the issue further, and stated that 
the GOCR did not fear "major surgery in the 
HRC." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶20. (C) It remains clear that the GOCR wants to make a 
difference in the Security Council. Though we did not agree 
on all points, the dialogue during these consultations was an 
important and timely opportunity to coordinate on important 
issues.  Stagno and his MFA team appreciated the chance to 
compare views as "equal members" of the Council, and he was, 
as always, impressively on top of his complex and 
comprehensive portfolio.  These consultations may not 
drastically alter GOCR behavior, however.  We expect the GOCR 
will continue to stand on principle and try to improve 
procedures at every opportunity in the UNSC, sometimes at the 
expense of speed and substance.  Being "courted" by the 
Department's top IO official in these consultations may help, 
however.  With Stagno clearly in charge of Costa Rica's UN 
policy (as reaffirmed to us on September 17 by COS Alarcon), 
calls to Stagno from A/S Hook from time to time may generate 
more GOCR cooperation on select issues. 
 
¶21. (U) Participants: 
 
GOCR: 
 
-- Bruno Stagno, Foreign Minister 
-- Antonio Alarcon, FonMin's Chief of Staff 
-- Christian Guillermet, Director, Foreign Policy 
-- Adriana Murillo, Human Rights Officer and UNSC Team 
Leader 
-- Juan Salas, UNSC Desk Officer 
-- Deyanira Ramirez, UN Desk Officer 
-- Carlos Cordero, Disarmament and Organized Crime Officer, 
UNSC Team 
 
USG: 
 
-- Ambassador Cianchette (opening session) 
-- Brian Hook, IO Acting A/S 
-- Erin McLinn, IO Staff Assistant 
-- David Henifin, Pol-Econ Counselor 
-- Cheryl Neely, PolOff 
 
CIANCHETTE