VZCZCXRO6198
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPOD #0234/01 2491232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 051232Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0944
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 1031

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000234 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MW
SUBJECT: A TOUGH YEAR FOR ONCE-LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY 
 
PODGORICA 00000234  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Dominated by leader Nebojsa Medojevic's 
outsized personality, the Movement for Change (PzP) -- 
Montenegro's most popular opposition party at the start of the 
year -- has plummeted in the polls following Medojevic's 
disappointing third-place finish in the April 2008 presidential 
election.  PzP officials have focused mostly on external factors 
to explain this decline, but the party's failure to invest in 
its local structures and its attempt to be all things to all 
voters contributed to its problems.  With few other centrist 
opposition alternatives, the PzP has time to turn things around, 
but another poor showing in the fall 2009 parliamentary election 
could spell trouble for the party.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
Riding High In January... 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Movement for Change (PzP) and its energetic young 
leader, Nebojsa Medojevic, entered 2008 with high hopes. 
Established in 2006 as a moderate, pro-European alternative to 
the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the Serb 
nationalist parties, the PzP did surprisingly well in 
parliamentary elections that year, garnering 11 mandates.  Less 
than two years later, the party was Montenegro's leading 
opposition force, and the ambitious and charismatic Medojevic 
was gearing up for a run at the presidency in the April 2008 
election.  Medojevic and other PzP leaders confidently predicted 
that he would take votes from the ruling Democratic Party of 
Socialists (DPS) and opposition parties alike, and was a sure 
bet to face President Vujanovic in the election's second round. 
 
 
 
 
...Watching The Poll Numbers Drop In June 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) What a difference a few months make.  Not only did 
Medojevic fail to progress to a second round of voting, as 
Vujanovic won outright, with more than 50 percent of the vote, 
but he came in a disappointing third, behind both Vujanovic and 
Serb nationalist Andrija Mandic.  To add insult to injury, 
Medojevic finished just a few percent points ahead of Srdjan 
Milic of the Socialist People's Party (SNP), a candidate who had 
been all but given up for dead at the start of the campaign. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The PzP and Medojevic are inseparable in the public 
mind, and Medojevic's poor showing precipitated a slide in 
support for the party.  According to one late June survey, the 
PzP is now backed by only 10.8 percent of voters, trailing 
Mandic's Serbian People's Party (14.4 percent) and Milic's SNP 
(11.1) (Note:  The SNP initially had lost many of its voters to 
the PzP in the 2006 elections).  Even worse, these numbers 
marked a sharp decline from June 2007, when (at 22.4 percent) 
the PzP had almost twice the support of any other opposition 
party. 
 
 
 
After The Fall, Finger-Pointing.... 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) PzP leaders are still grappling with how things got so 
bad, so fast.  Asked whether the party was stock-taking, PzP MP 
Zarija Pejovic told us, "believe me, we've been doing nothing 
else since April."  However, most PzP officials point to 
external factors.  PzP spokesman Koca Pavlovic and party VP 
Goran Batricevic told us that Medojevic -- as the strongest 
opposition candidate at the start of the campaign -- was the 
focus of concerted attacks by Vujanovic and the DPS.  In 
addition, they asserted that Kosovo independence had benefited 
Serb nationalist Mandic, just as the PzP's support for the 
Constitution had alienated many Serb voters. (Note:  A Bosniak 
leader also told the Ambassador before the election that 
Vujanovic's overwhelming lead was likely to discourage some 
Bosniaks from "wasting" their votes on Medojevic.) 
 
 
 
PODGORICA 00000234  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
...And Plenty Of Criticism 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Several PzP officials also conceded that the party's 
underdeveloped structure played a part.  In a telling sign of 
the PzP's structural weakness, Medojevic struggled to gather the 
7,500 signatures required to register for the presidential 
campaign.  And while other parties went door-to-door to mobilize 
support, the PzP, lacking cadres, concentrated on expensive (the 
party ended up taking significant loans) but ultimately 
ineffective advertising.  Furthermore, a contact close to the 
PzP told us that some local party chapters were given only 1,000 
euros for the entire campaign. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Outside observers also fingered the PzP's political 
strategy, and, ultimately, the personality of its leader.  For 
example, leading pollster Milos Besic told us recently that 
Medojevic's campaign had been too extreme and too aggressive; 
this turned off many voters, particularly the elderly. (We 
witnessed an example of Medojevic's hyberbole at a March 
campaign rally in an Albanian-majority district in Podgorica. 
Medojevic told the crowd that the election represented, "a clear 
choice between light and darkness, good and evil...") 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Svetozar Jovicevic, a founding member of the PzP who is 
now an independent analyst, told us that Medojevic had forgotten 
the party's principles in a chase to attract as many voters as 
possible.  Under Medojevic's guidance, the party had ducked the 
independence question -- a fact not forgotten by the 
pro-statehood DPS supporters that Medojevic had hoped to 
attract.  Then, in the hopes of becoming the opposition's sole 
candidate, the PzP initially backed pro-Serb radicals in debates 
over the Constitution -- leading to accusations of betrayal when 
Medojevic backtracked and supported the Constitution's passage. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Looking ahead, it is unclear whether the party, many of 
whose leaders appear dispirited, has a strategy to recover lost 
ground before the fall 2009 elections.  Their tendancy to blame 
external factors (Kosovo, DPS attacks, etc.) for their party's 
decline may have deflected attention from necessary organization 
building, long neglected in a party dominated by the charismatic 
and controlling Medojevic.  The repayment of sizeable debts 
incurred during Medojevic's presidential run will make 
organizational development still more difficult.  It also is 
unclear whether the cocky Medojevic will heed advice to stop 
trying to be all things to all people and stake out consistent 
positions.  The party's lack of clarity on Kosovo recognition 
and weak response to the Karadzic arrest do not bode well in 
this regard. 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) On the positive side, the PzP occupies the centrist 
political space between the ruling coalition and Serb 
nationalist parties.  It is being challenged by a rejuvenated 
SNP, but that party still has more appeal to older voters and 
so-called Yugo-nostalgiacs than to young Montenegrins the PzP 
has targeted.  There is some sentiment both from within the 
party and among some independents for a PzP-SNP alliance, to 
join with several smaller moderate opposition parties.  For this 
to happen, however, Medojevic would need to swallow his pride 
and come to a power-sharing arrangement with Milic and perhaps 
others.   In the meantime, a poor showing in the next election 
could splinter this personality-driven party, leaving a hole in 
Montenegro's political center. 
MOORE