VZCZCXRO3653
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0776/01 2600926
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160926Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR D, P, DRL, EAP/MLS 
NSC FOR L. PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM KTIA CB
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CAMBODIAN 
OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS 
 
REF: A. PHNOM PENH 763 
     ¶B. PHNOM PENH 705 
     ¶C. PHNOM PENH 629 
     ¶D. PHNOM PENH 611 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PIPER CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (U) September 15, 2008; 13:30; Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
 
¶2.  (U)  Meeting Participants 
 
U.S. 
The Deputy Secretary 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel 
Charge D'Affaires, a.i. Piper Campbell 
A/DCM Greg Lawless (notetaker) 
 
Opposition Parties 
Sam Rainsy, President, Sam Rainsy Party 
Kem Sokha, President, Human Rights Party 
 
¶3.  (C) SUMMARY:  In an alternately strident critique of the 
newly elected government and an impassioned plea to further 
develop democracy in Cambodia, opposition party leaders Sam 
Rainsy and Kem Sokha September 15 explained to the Deputy 
Secretary that their parties would boycott the initial 
session of the National Assembly on September 24.  Though 
acknowledging the elections were less violent, they outlined 
a litany of complaints about election rigging.  An immediate 
concern expressed by Sam Rainsy was the Cambodian Peoples 
Party's (CPP) announcement that all of the parliament's nine 
committee chairmanships would go to CPP.  Rainsy averred that 
the CPP was unwilling to talk about committee assignments in 
advance of the first parliamentary session.  He explored the 
possibility of arranging for a brokered deal of the 
opposition parties' committee positions.  Kem Sokha outlined 
a long-term goal for further reforms.  Expressing concern 
that the CPP was trying to eliminate the opposition, Rainsy 
insisted that the current government was in violation of the 
spirit of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement and that it had 
built a "facade of democracy."  For that reason, the 
opposition would boycott.  Prime Minister Hun Sen confirmed 
the same day that the opposition might lose committee seats 
by boycotting, but would not be stripped of their National 
Assembly seats.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SRP to Boycott Opening National Assembly Session 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (C) Noting that the Sam Rainsy Party and Human Rights 
Party were the second and third largest parties in the 
National Assembly, Rainsy said that the minority parties in 
Cambodia had no rights in the Cambodian system, as they would 
in other parliamentary systems.  Noting that the CPP would 
take all the committee chairmanships, he said that the 
National Assembly is a "Party assembly."  In the upcoming 
first session of the new National Assembly elected last July 
27, the CPP would propose a package vote for the national 
assembly leadership and for the new government.  Such a vote 
was "anti-democratic," said Rainsy.  Moreover, election 
irregularities were not addressed properly.  Since the 
opposition did not want to endorse an undemocratic and 
illegitimate government, they would boycott the first session 
of the new National Assembly.  Rainsy alluded to an earlier 
CPP statement that the Sam Rainsy party might be stripped of 
its National Assembly seats if it boycotted the first session 
and worried the CPP was trying to eliminate the opposition. 
(NOTE: Prime Minister Hun Sen September 15 confirmed private 
CPP statements (Ref A) that the CPP would not strip the SRP 
of its parliamentary seats but that SRP would be on no 
committees if its members did not participate in the 
swearing-in ceremony.  Further, the SRP parliamentarians 
would not be paid their MP salaries.  PM Hun Sen told the 
press, "I don't want the (SRP) seats divided among other 
parties." END NOTE.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Citing the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, Rainsy said 
that it was a very good instrument to address Cambodia's 
internal and external problems.  He said that the agreement 
could ensure governmental integrity and that Cambodia follow 
a democratic path.  Cambodia is at a turning point and its 
people were looking to the U.S. for support for the 
democratic process, he added.  Democracy was being perverted, 
and was moving further and further from the Paris Peace 
Agreement. 
 
Reforms of the NEC, More Checks and Balances 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000776  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Kem Sokha outlined a long-term goal for further 
reforms of the election law and the National Election 
Committee (NEC), for constitutional support for a balance of 
power, and for the conferral of a more explicit "status" for 
the opposition in parliament.  Noting past U.S. support for 
democracy and governance programs in Cambodia, he urged more 
support for the UN Center of Human Rights and for NGO's and 
civil society. 
 
¶7.  (C) In answer to several questions by the Deputy 
Secretary, Rainsy averred that the election complaints 
mechanism was biased and that the NEC could not be a neutral 
arbiter.  Kem Sokha said that he would like to see a more 
independent and neutral NEC.  Rainsy noted that the EU and 
UNDP would be releasing assessments of the election in 
October, hinting these would be negative.  (NOTE: The EU 
released its initial assessment of the pre-election and 
election period just two days after the election.  END NOTE.) 
 In the end, what Rainsy wanted most was not a correction to 
the election, but recognition for a minority party role in 
the National Assembly. 
 
U.S. in Broker Role? 
-------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Noting that former U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Kent 
Wiedemann had helped Sam Rainsy negotiate with CPP leaders 
the building of a memorial at the site of a 1997 grenade 
attack against the Sam Rainsy Party, Sam Rainsy appealed to 
the U.S. to now build a bridge with the CPP "as a peace 
partner."  Otherwise, in 10 days Cambodia could undergo a 
political crisis.  Kem Sokha reiterated the appeal for U.S. 
assistance, noting his party's commitment to work within 
Cambodia's legal and electoral framework. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Deputy Secretary asked if there might be a 
difference of perception regarding the conduct of the 
election and suggested there might be a role for the 
opposition on the various committees in the National 
Assembly.  (NOTE: When SRP joined the National Assembly in 
1998, it had two members on each of the nine committees.  END 
NOTE.)  Rainsy insisted he would have no power without 
Committee Chairmanship positions, which were in themselves 
difficult to manage under an overwhelming majority.  Without 
an active opposition with a meaningful role to put a brake on 
government excesses or find solutions to the population's 
pressing needs, the people would be "ripe for revolt," he 
concluded. 
CAMPBELL