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DE RUEHFR #1717 2561757
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4295
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T PARIS 001717 
 
NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PINR FR SY LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH BELIEVE THAT ASSASSINATION OF SYRIAN 
GENERAL SLEIMAN WAS AN INSIDE JOB 
 
REF: PARIS 1703 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Kathy Allegrone 
for reasons 1.4. (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  As Washington readers and others ponder French 
policy toward Syria, and as an expansion of para 3 in reftel, 
we pass along the previously unreported views of two of our 
GOF interlocutors from meetings in late August on the 
mysterious assassination earlier in the month of Syrian 
brigadier general Muhammad Sleiman and its potential 
significance for the regime of Syrian President Asad.  NEA 
adviser at the French presidency Boris Boillon, on August 20, 
asserted that the killing seemed to be some sort of inside 
job.  He flatly rejected the notion that the Israelis had 
taken out Sleiman, particularly the theory that a sniper had 
shot him on a boat situated somewhere off the coast of the 
Syrian coastal city of Tartus.  Boillon claimed that French 
information was that the hit was more "classic" and 
"mafia-like" with police stopping traffic in the immediate 
vicinity, bodyguards looking the other way, and the assailant 
pumping a slug into Sleiman's head. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  When asked how he interpreted the killing, 
Boillon said that several theories presented themselves, the 
only common denominator of which was internecine rivalry in 
the entourage close to Bashar al-Asad.  Although Bashar's 
disgruntled brother-in-law and sidelined head of Syrian 
Military Intelligence 'Asif Shawkat seems to have the most 
compelling motive for knocking off someone he might have 
regarded as a rival and source of his reputed downfall in 
recent months, Boillon thought Bashar's brother Mahir was a 
more likely suspect.  Boillon described Mahir as ambitious, a 
bit of a wild man, and determined to increase his power and 
influence within the inner circle.  Inasmuch as Mahir might 
have contrived to bring down Shawkat, he might also have 
decided to take out his next key rival, Sleiman, in a more 
permanent way. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Boillon further referred  the related possibility 
that Mahir had rubbed out Sleiman in the same way he might 
have rubbed out Hizballah leader 'Imad Mughniyah ) possibly 
even on Bashar's orders.  The latter explanation would tie in 
with the notion of cleaning house as Syria needed to present 
a more respectable image while it pursued its rapprochement 
with France and/or needed to remove those who "knew too much" 
(in the case of Sleiman, about the clandestine nuclear 
program).  Of course, Boillon added, one could never rule out 
the notion that Sleiman's death was related to a bloody 
struggle over control of lucrative criminal activities. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  Pouille on August 28, meanwhile, was less 
forthcoming than Boillon in terms of offering interpretations 
of Sleiman's death, but he was equally categorical in 
disputing the theory that the Israelis were responsible.  He 
cited the French ambassador in Damascus as his source for the 
contention that the killing was an inside job to "settle old 
scores" as well as conveniently get rid of someone who might 
have information of value to the UNIIIC on Lebanon or to the 
IAEA on Syria's nuclear program. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Comment:  We offer these insights, some of which 
have appeared in abridged form in the French press, less for 
the light they may shed on Sleiman's assassination than they 
do about the French perception of the Asad regime.  Indeed, 
Boillon's rundown of the various theories sounded like he had 
recently read a finished French intelligence assessment of 
the situation.  Both Boillon and Pouille sought, in these 
conversations, to stress that France does not judge the Asad 
regime dangerously unstable or Asad's grip on power slipping. 
 Nonetheless, they believe that the internal situation is 
fragile enough to warrant concern and a nuanced approach.  We 
believe this could partly account for Sarkozy's decision to 
move so quickly to cultivate his personal relationship with 
Bashar and to "gamble" (as the French media have put it) on 
Bashar's willingness to change course on Lebanon, peace with 
Israel, and even Syria's relationship with Iran.  For what it 
may be worth, former Lebanese military intelligence chief 
Johnny Abdo recently contended the assassination was an 
inside job and pointed to the absence of the sort of mass 
arrests inside Syria that would normally accompany this type 
of killing by criminal or non-regime elements.  End comment 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Fran ce 
 
STAPLETON