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RR RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL
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DE RUEHME #2834/01 2632147
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 192147Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3323
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 002834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL/AHW AND ILSCR, WHA/MEX. USDOL FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON ENRG PHUM PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO,S SUPREME COURT (SORT OF) RULES IN FAVOR OF 
SECRET BALLOT UNION ELECTIONS 
 
REF: REF: 07 MEXICO 5161 
 
¶1.  Summary: On September 10, Mexico,s Supreme Court issued 
a ruling that would require the use of secret ballots in 
union elections.  Previously, under Mexican Federal Labor 
Law, secret ballots were an option but not a requirement. 
The governmental bodies responsible for establishing the 
procedures for and validating the results of union elections 
are the Conciliation and Arbitration Councils and, up until 
now, in the absence of a specific directive on how to 
organize election, rarely opted to use secret ballots to 
resolve union contests or disputes.  Over the years, the 
optional use of secret ballots prompted numerous court 
challenges seeking to establish when and how they could be 
used.  These cases resulted in a string of conflicting 
decisions related to the procedures for holding union 
elections.  Now, as a result of the Supreme Court,s 
decision, all prior conflicting rulings on the use of secret 
ballots have, in theory, been overturned.  The decision to 
mandate secret ballots is being hailed by union leaders and 
labor activists associated with Mexico,s main opposition 
political party as a significant human rights victory. 
Undoubtedly the ruling is a significant step forward with the 
potential to dramatically change how labor unions function in 
Mexico.  However, the ruling applies only to Conciliation and 
Arbitration Councils and to cases where the choice of union 
representation is at issue.  It does not in any way touch on 
the manner in which internal elections for union officials 
are held.  It remains to be seen how vigorously GOM labor 
authorities will move to fully implement the ruling on secret 
ballot elections.  End Summary. 
 
 
SECRET BALLOTS ARE OPTIONAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Securing the right to a secret ballot in union elections 
has long been one of the highest priorities for labor 
activists in Mexico.  The goal of these activists was to 
establish a legal right to secret ballot elections both when 
choosing union officials and when determining which union 
would represent the workers in collective bargaining 
negotiations.  Until recently, Mexican Federal Labor Law 
(FLL) permitted but did not mandate the use of secret ballots 
in union elections.  In fact the FLL provided no clear 
guidance of any kind as to the procedures to be followed in 
union elections.  Because of this lack of specific direction 
on the procedures for conducting union elections, the FLL had 
traditionally been interpreted as meaning that a secret vote 
was just one option available from a broad range of 
possibilities when organizing union ballots. 
 
¶3.  In the absence of a specific legal requirement to use 
secret ballots most labor authorities throughout Mexico left 
decisions on the procedures for holding union elections up to 
the offices of federal or state Conciliation and Arbitration 
Councils.  More often than not these Councils looked for the 
path of least resistance in resolving labor disputes.  The 
Councils would organize secret ballot elections provided all 
parties to a given dispute indicated a willingness to resolve 
their differences in advance.  However, if one of the 
disputing parties objected to secret ballot elections, the 
Councils unfailingly argued that they had no authority to 
impose a secret ballot on anyone unwilling to participate. 
 
¶4.  Post notes that although the various Councils were 
unwilling to impose a secret ballot on those disinclined to 
participate in this type of election; they did not hesitate 
to compel the use of one of the other available options for 
holding elections.  The &open vote8, the most common 
procedure used to conduct union elections, gathered workers 
together in a place deemed appropriate by a Council and 
required a public show of hands.  Open votes always took 
place in front of contending unions and company management. 
The standard practice of routinely imposing an &open vote8 
or one of the other available election procedures prompted a 
long string of court challenges by the losing side once a 
Council denied them the option of a secret ballot. 
 
 
CONFLICTING COURT DECISIONS 
--------------------------- 
 
MEXICO 00002834  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶5.  Mexican FLL allows for appeals to the country,s judicial 
system in both federal and state cases where a dispute exists 
over some aspect of a union election.  Although there is no 
way to accurately gage the validity of the grievances filed 
by the losing side in a union election, the complainants 
routinely claimed that their side would have won if  only the 
Council (federal or state) had agreed to put the matter to a 
secret ballot.  The clear aim of those seeking judicial 
redress was to have their arguments validated and to obtain a 
court order requiring a secret ballot &do over8 of the 
disputed election but instead, they were met with a series of 
conflicting court decisions that were all over the judicial 
map. 
 
¶6.  Generally when a court attempted to tackle a complaint 
based on a Council decision to disallow a secret ballot, it 
would ultimately be confronted with the realization that 
Mexico,s FLL provided no clear guidance on the use of such 
procedures.  In fact the FLL (specifically Article 931 of the 
FLL) is all but silent on the procedures to be used when 
conducting union elections.  Given the law,s lack of 
specific guidance, Mexican courts viewed themselves as 
empowered to decide disputed labor cases in any way they 
deemed best.  In some cases the courts ordered new secret 
ballot elections and in others they did not, choosing instead 
to validate whatever alternative procedure had already been 
used to resolve the union election in question. 
 
¶7.  This &do as you deem best8 approach did result in some 
instances where the courts ordered new secret ballot 
elections, but the number of these cases was never very high. 
 Although the number of such cases was limited, they were 
high enough to prevent either the Councils or the various 
elements of Mexico,s organized labor movement from knowing 
exactly where the judiciary stood on the use of secret 
ballots when conducting union elections.  Ultimately, the 
incidence of court rulings ordering secret ballot elections 
and the lack of any consistency in these judgments was high 
enough to encourage those unhappy with the outcome of a union 
election to appeal to the judiciary in the hopes of obtaining 
more favorable results. Groups arguing in favor of secret 
ballot elections wanted to use the secret ballot process when 
choosing union officers and when determining which union 
would represent the workers in collective bargaining 
negotiations. 
 
 
THE SUPREME COURT FINALLY DECIDES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  The case which finally prompted Mexico,s Supreme Court 
(SCJN) to take on the issue of secret ballots involved a 
dispute between the National Miners Union (SNTMMSRM) and the 
National Mine Exploration and Exploitation Workers Union of 
the Mexican Republic (SNEEBMRM), which were both competing 
for recognition as the legal bargaining representative for 
the workers at a copper mine.  Until 2006 the SNTMMSRM had 
been the only union of mine workers in Mexico.  The SNEEBMRM 
is a newly formed union that is rumored to have considerable 
GOM support.  As reported in reftel, in September 2007 the 
newly formed SNEEBMRM won a series of &open vote8 elections 
against the National Miners Unions that would have been 
viewed as seriously flawed by international standards.  The 
new union,s electoral victories were contested in court by 
the losing union and ultimately made its way to Mexico,s 
SCJN in early 2007. 
 
¶9.  In deliberating on the dispute between the two miners, 
unions, the SCJN pointedly acknowledged that FLL 
(specifically Article 931) provided no clear guidance on the 
procedures to be used for conducting union election. 
Nevertheless, the court said, a systematic analysis of the 
concepts underlying the FLL, and a deliberate examination of 
the fact that a union vote is the ultimate expression of the 
will of the workers, forced the SCJN to conclude that the law 
should guard the right expression by protecting the 
confidentiality of a worker,s vote.  In addition, the Court 
stated that its deliberations were strongly guided by the 
ideals contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and by ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize).  Finally, the Court 
 
MEXICO 00002834  003 OF 004 
 
 
affirmed its clear intent to protect workers from any and all 
external pressures that could influence their votes. 
Consequently, the SCJN decreed that secret ballot votes were 
now mandatory in any instance when two or more union competed 
for recognition as the legal bargaining representative. 
 
¶10.  In making its ruling on the mandatory use of secret 
ballots the SCJN sought to eliminate the ambiguity in the FLL 
that had caused so many problems in the past.  The Court did 
this by providing specific guidelines for the conduct of 
union elections.  Since the SCJN,s ruling on secret ballots, 
all elections in which two or more unions competing to 
represent a group of worker must include a complete list of 
all workers employed by a particular company, the use of 
printed voting ballots, the use of appropriate booths and 
voting boxes, the presentation of an official photo 
identification by all workers attempting to vote which must 
be cross-reference with the employee list provided by the 
employer, prior notification of the date and time of the 
election as well as the selection of a neutral voting place, 
and onsite presence of representatives from the competing 
unions during the election process. 
 
 
PRAISE FOR COURT DECISION 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  The GOM,s Secretariat of Labor (STPS) hailed the 
Court,s decision on secret ballot elections as a 
&transcendental step toward liberty, democracy and labor 
transparency in the country from which there would be no 
going back8.  This comment was essentially echoed by the 
Presidents of the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration 
Councils who committed all of the offices within the 
jurisdiction of GOM federal labor authorities to fully 
implement the Court,s ruling.  In addition to the praise the 
court decision received from the STPS and the federal 
Councils it was also hailed by union leaders and labor 
activists associated with Mexico,s main opposition political 
party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) as a 
&historic8 human rights victory.  These accolades from the 
PRD affiliated groups are particularly significant in that 
these persons and organization rarely have complimentary 
things to say about the administration of labor law in Mexico. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12.  There is no doubt that the Supreme Court,s decision to 
mandate secret ballot elections is a significant step forward 
in the administration of Mexican labor law.  Moreover, this 
ruling also has the potential to dramatically change how 
labor unions function in Mexico.  Mexico has a considerable 
number of labor unions that are all too eager to subordinate 
worker interests to those of employers for the right price. 
Up until now challenging these employer friendly unions has 
been difficult and occasionally dangerous to workers who 
openly and publicly declared themselves in opposition to 
these labor organizations.  Now, at least in theory, the 
ability of unscrupulous employers or corrupt unions to 
pressure, intimidate or improperly influence a worker,s vote 
will be greatly limited.  It remains to be seen, however, if 
GOM labor authorities will vigorously move to fully implement 
the ruling on secret ballot elections, particularly since the 
use of these union voting procedures will clearly disrupt 
unethical behavior by those who have been able to practice it 
with impunity for an unpleasantly long period of time. 
 
¶13.  As significant as the SCJN ruling on secret ballot union 
elections is, it still, unfortunately, falls short.  Labor 
activists in Mexico are rightly pleased with the Court,s 
decision but once the pleasure in obtaining a long sought 
goal subsides, they will realize that their battle is only 
partially won.  While the Court,s ruling should change the 
way unions compete against one another, it would not alter 
internal union activities.  Although workers will now have 
more legal protections to decide which union will represent 
them, they still will not have the right to vote in secret 
ballots when electing new leadership.  Open votes are still 
the standard rule for internal union elections.  Because of 
this, union leaders, once elected, are almost impossible to 
 
MEXICO 00002834  004 OF 004 
 
 
remove no matter how poorly they serve the interests of the 
workers.  Open vote elections have allowed some labor leaders 
to amass incredible amounts of wealth and power with little 
or no accountability.  Mexico,s constitution guarantees 
nearly complete union autonomy and as a result it will be 
very difficult for the Courts to compel them to adopt a more 
democratic and transparent way of electing their leaders. 
 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
GARZA