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Viewing cable 08MEXICO2793, PRI REVVING UP FOR 2009 ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MEXICO2793 2008-09-13 12:14 2011-05-24 10:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles:
http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/el-mandatario-mexiquense-financia-empresas-encuestadoras-que-den-resultados-a-su-favor
VZCZCXRO2239
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2793/01 2571214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131214Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
169723
2008-09-13 12:14:00
08MEXICO2793
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
08MEXICO2764|08MEXICO2766|08MEXICO281
VZCZCXRO2239
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2793/01 2571214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131214Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
TAGS: ELAB MX PGOV PINR PREL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002793 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB MX PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: PRI REVVING UP FOR 2009 ELECTIONS 
 REF: A. MEXICO 2766 
     B. MEXICO 2764 
     C. MEXICO 0281 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: PRI has sought over the past two years to 
recover from Roberto Madrazo's disheartening third place 
finish in the hard fought 2006 presidential race and is now 
gunning for big gains in the 2009 legislative and regional 
elections.  PRI is looking to restructure the party from the 
inside out, better define its ideological stance, and take 
advantage of tough economic and security conditions to 
position itself for next year's votes.  Nevertheless, a 
resounding PRI victory in 2009 at this point is far from 
certain, and it faces a tough opponent in President Felipe 
Calderon and his PAN supporters. 
 
Regrouping and Recentralizing 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) PRI is highlighting recent efforts to rejuvenate the 
party both in structure and image.  PRI congressional deputy 
Samuel Aguilar from Durango State told poloff on August 28 
that the party has undergone an internal restructuring aimed 
at ridding itself of the infighting and power struggles he 
blames for the 2006 loss.  Indeed, several of the changes to 
party statutes approved during the PRI's August 23 National 
Assembly appear designed to redistribute party authority away 
from state governors--which has been blamed by party insiders 
and analysts in part for the party's struggles since 
2000--and to recentralize power in the National Executive 
Committee (CEN).  Some of the new statues include granting 
the CEN the right to approve coalitions made by state-level 
leaders, the ability to oversee the selection of candidates 
to compete in state elections, and the power to collect every 
month five percent of the salaries and expenses paid to PRI 
public servants and elected officials.  PRI Deputy Edmundo 
Ramirez also touted for poloff on September 9 new efforts to 
promote younger leaders and allow them to take on more 
substantive roles in legislative commissions, which he claims 
will help to infuse new energy in the party. 
 
Burnishing Its Image 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to strengthening party command and 
control, PRI is also looking to energize its party dogma and 
better define itself as an attractive alternative to its PAN 
and PRD opponents.  At the August assembly, the party 
unanimously and officially adopted "social democracy" as its 
ideological cornerstone in an attempt to differentiate itself 
from the PAN's conservatism and the PRD's more hardline 
leftist bent.  PRI Senator and Vice President of the Senate's 
Mesa Directiva Francisco Arroyo told poloff on September 11 
that PRI for too long has paid scant attention to defining 
its political stance and is rectifying this ideological 
vacuity prior to the 2009 House of Deputies and six 
gubernatorial elections. 
 
4. (SBU) PRI is also seeking to define itself as the party 
that gets things done or, as its propaganda posters and 
stickers exclaim, "Priistas are working."  Senator Arroyo 
noted that, rightly or wrongly, the Mexican public perceives 
PRI as the party that robs Mexico but governs well.  Aguilar 
said that PRI can play this image against both the PAN and 
the PRD by taking advantage of Mexico's problematic security 
and economic conditions to cast PAN as failing to take 
significant or effective steps to address such woes, and 
highlighting PRD's obstructionist and divisive behavior as 
only blocking necessary reforms.  PRI leaders told poloff 
that they think PRI can win between 200 and 220 seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies next year using this approach, up from 
106 of the 500 Chamber slots they currently hold. 
 
Plans for this Legislative Session 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) PRI, in its efforts to cast itself as the efficient 
and practical political powerbroker, plans to privilege the 
passage of energy reform and security measures during this 
legislative session.  PRI politicians and various political 
analysts believe that some sort of energy reform will be 
passed by the PRI and the PAN this session in the October 
 
MEXICO 00002793  002 OF 003 
 
 
timeframe.  Senator Arroyo also reported that a priority is 
the passage of some security related legislation, such as 
measures to toughen the maximum sentences for kidnapping and 
organized crime.  PRI also is preparing to play hardball on 
the administration's budget proposal, according to both PAN 
and PRI contacts, and will probably demand that the 
government rescind cuts to agricultural programs (ref a and 
b). 
 
6. (SBU) PRI's sharpened public criticism in recent days of 
the Calderon administration's overall security approach (ref 
c) and economic management probably is a bell weather of 
things to come.  Most political commentators suggest that the 
legislature will be more or less productive through October, 
in part because the PRI wants an energy reform feather in its 
cap.  After November, however, PRI and PAN politics in 
particular will become increasingly embattled as both parties 
posture in the run-up to 2009.  PRI already is impugning 
Calderon's economic record by releasing a report in the 
Chamber of Deputies early this month claiming that more than 
1,300,000 Mexicans have immigrated to the United States 
during the first two years of Calderon's presidency, 
representing a "true catastrophe" and a failure by the 
government to provide Mexicans with real employment 
opportunities. 
 
It All Sounds Good on Paper... 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) Despite PRI's claims that it has indeed learned from 
its electoral debacles, the party still is facing challenges 
in adapting to Mexico's changing political realities.  The 
party appears to be as yet unable to specifically define its 
social democratic vision.  When asked by poloff, PRI leaders 
were only able to describe the platform as being "more like 
Europe's than like Chavez's" and "focusing on people." Claims 
that the party is promoting the emergence of young leaders 
may also be overstated--the Embassy's Labor Attache reports 
that younger rank and file PRI and affiliated labor leaders 
continue to be frustrated in their aspirations for upward 
mobility in the party.  Moreover, while PRI has presented a 
relatively united face to the Mexican public, PRI-affiliated 
labor contacts also report that internal jockeying for the 
2012 presidential candidacy has already begun.  State 
governors such as Fidel Herrera Beltran of Veracruz and 
Eduardo Borz Castelo of Sonora are beginning to battle for 
the position along with oft-mentioned Mexico State Governor 
Enrique Pena Nieto and PRI Senate leader Manilo Fabio 
Beltrones. 
 
Comment: A Long Road to 2009 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) PRI is well-positioned about a year out of the 2009 
election season to make gains in the Chamber of Deputies. 
PRI's political machinery--including its current eighteen of 
31 state governorships--is still for the most part in place 
despite its past electoral defeats.  The party's publicly 
unified face presents a sharp contrast to the PRD and, to a 
lesser extent, the PAN.  Party representatives pay at least 
lip service to learning from 2006 to move forward on internal 
restructuring and allow for the reemergence of new leaders, 
which in theory could help improve its image as a party 
responsive to Mexico's changing political environment. 
 
9. (SBU) All the same, a resounding PRI victory in 2009 is 
far from certain at this point.  The party, despite efforts 
to the contrary, has yet to more than vaguely define its 
platform or the meaning of its new social democratic label. 
The party may also have a tough time selling the message that 
it is a political powerbroker "getting things done" if the 
bulk of what it has accomplished has come through voting in 
coalition with the PAN on PAN-proposed legislation. 
Moreover, casting the 2009 votes as a plebiscite on the 
Calderon government could very well backfire--Calderon's 
approval ratings still register above the sixtieth 
percentile.  PRI is ready for a fight, but probably should 
refrain from counting their deputies so far before the 
candidate selection process even starts. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
 
MEXICO 00002793  003 OF 003 
 
 
BASSETT