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Viewing cable 08LAGOS376, NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH GOVERNORS FORUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08LAGOS376 2008-09-24 07:37 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Lagos
VZCZCXRO0214
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHOS #0376/01 2680737
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240737Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0181
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 9834
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH AFB UK
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 000376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA 
STATE PASS NSC FOR BOBBY PITTMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH GOVERNORS FORUM 
LEADER SARAKI ON YAR'ADUA'S HEALTH, CABINET RESHUFFLE, AND 
EX-GOVERNOR IBORI 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1898 
     B. ABUJA 1595 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBIN R. SANDERS Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: During Ambassador,s first trip to Kwara 
State in western Nigeria, she had an opportunity to have 
several meetings with Kwara State Governor and head of the 
powerful Governor,s Forum (GF), Bukola Saraki September 
21-22.  He met with the Ambassador just after finishing a 
3-hour session with Yar,Adua, where he said they were 
"finishing up touches on personalities in the next cabinet." 
In the hour long one-on-one with Ambassador, Saraki reviewed 
the current state of play in Nigerian Northern and national 
politics, President Yar,Adua,s health issues and the impact 
on the atmosphere in Nigeria, the upcoming cabinet reshuffle 
and Niger Delta issues, and made comments about some of the 
key people around the President such as National Security 
Advisor Muktar, and (in response to the Ambassador,s 
questions) about the President,s Aide de Camp (ADC).  Saraki 
is in his mid-forties, a medical doctor, dynamic, and hails 
from a strong, powerful family, rumored to have made their 
wealth in oil, which has controlled Kwara State off and on 
for generations. Under his leadership, the GF, in combination 
with other northern governors including the Governors of 
Kaduna, Borno, Kano (although not from the ruling PDP), and 
Katsina, have become the new power entity within the North. 
 
 
2. (C) Saraki and these younger Northern governors believe 
that they have demonstrated their prowess over the last eight 
months as they have gotten President Yar,Adua to respond to 
many of their requests, including, they believe, controlling 
the PDP and blocking both former Presidents Obasanjo and 
Babingida from seating their candidates as PDP chairmen. On 
the southern side, in addition to the Governor of Lagos, 
Niger Delta Governors of Rivers and Bayelsa States also have 
come into their own, influencing issues for their region by 
virtue of their access to President Yar,Adua. Saraki noted 
in the meeting that most governors like Yar,Adua "because he 
does not meddle in their State affairs, quite different from 
former President Obasanjo."  In addition to this background, 
Saraki made comments on the state of play in politics, the 
upcoming cabinet reshuffle, personalities around Yar,Adua, 
and ex-Delta governor James Ibori as he relates to the EFCC 
and the U.S. position on the EFCC. 
 
Ibori, the EFCC, and U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Governor Saraki began our discussion with the words 
"let's be frank," as he opened up about the sentiments of the 
President and his inner circle (which includes Saraki) on the 
U.S. posture on the EFCC.  He noted that overall neither the 
President nor any of his key advisors are too keen on how the 
U.S. has approached this issue, underscoring that we needed 
to get the bilateral relationship back on track. He added 
that the main challenge is "not so much the USG concerns 
about the EFCC and it doing better -- we  get that and 
appreciate that -- but the way that we were talked to, as 
well as the closing down any dialogue with EFCC chairwoman 
and not giving her a chance, is what bothers us.  "The Brits 
feel like you do on the EFCC and wanting to see results on 
key cases, but they have gone about it in a much better 
manner so that we are willing to listen to them." Ambassador 
pushed back, pointing out that without progress on cases such 
as that of ex-governor Ibori, there is probably not any 
likelihood that our posture would change, but that she would 
dialogue with him and others to continue to push for these 
prosecutions to be done in a transparent manner, with action 
that would bring Ibori and his ilk to justice. 
 
4. (C) The Ambassador then asked Saraki point blank what 
Ibori had on the President that prevents him from being more 
forceful on seeing this through.  Saraki said because we have 
had good chats over the last several months that he would be 
straightforward.  He stated that there is no way that 
Yar,Adua would ever "pick up the phone to try to influence 
the EFCC or Chairwoman Waziri." Despite what the 
international community might think, Yar'Adua is committed to 
the rule of law, but Ibori contributed financially in a big 
way to his campaign -- everyone knows this.  So the President 
is not in a political position to ban Ibori from some limited 
access to him.  The Ibori situation is a problem for the 
President and he knows it and is doing his best to convince 
Ibori to hand himself over to the British authorities so that 
the country can move on. "We are all trying to convince Ibori 
that this is the best option for the country and the 
President, but Ibori is not on board yet to do this," he 
concluded. "Meanwhile, he added, the USG and the rest of the 
international community need to appreciate that Yar'Adua is 
not going to do anything to interfere with the EFCC 
investigation of Ibori, of any of the other ex-governors, or 
of anyone else who is brought before the EFCC. 
 
5. (C) On Waziri, Saraki claimed that going by her resume 
alone she is highly qualified for the job, personally 
motivated to see these big cases through, and thus should be 
given a chance, instead of cutting the legs out from under 
her.  A dialogue should be maintained even if the USG holds 
off on its training, he emphasized. "Give her six months do 
her job before you condemn her."  Waziri now feels she has an 
EFCC team which is loyal to her and that is not trying to 
undercut her. She has stated that, with this new team, she 
hopes to be able to close some of these big cases soon. 
Ambassador stated that it was unlikely that dialogue could 
continue with Waziri, but wanted to encourage it with others 
in the government on this and other issues. Saraki again 
noted the concern the Nigerian leadership with the tone and 
style (threats, etc.) that were reflected in the recent U.S. 
demarche (Ref B.) 
 
Niger Delta Next Steps 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Ambassador decided to move on and take the Ibori issue 
one step further by asking Saraki if the rumors that the 
government was considering making Ibori the Minister of the 
new Niger Delta Ministry were true.  Saraki laughed, stating 
that the international community has to accept that hyperbole 
is the foundation of the Nigerian press, including blogs like 
Sahara Reporters.  Given that he had just left Yar'Adua's 
three hour meeting on choices for the next cabinet, Saraki 
said that "picking a good candidate for the Niger Delta 
Ministry was what was holding up progress on announcing the 
new Ministers."  The Kwara Governor said that he and others 
working on the new cabinet list had provided the President 
with several criteria for this position: no previous 
involvement in politics, no ex- or current governor; and no 
EFCC skeletons.  "What we are looking for is a technocrat 
from the region, who has credibility among regional leaders 
-- this has not been easy to find," Saraki said. (Note: The 
Saturday, September 20 Vanguard reported that the President 
"was believed" to have picked Albert Okumagba, an ethnic 
Urhobo who is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of BGL 
Limited, an investment banking firm.  Okumagba, like several 
others whose names are being discussed, appears to meet the 
criteria Saraki describes above.  End Note) 
 
7. (C)  On other Niger Delta issues, Saraki informed the 
Ambassador that an informal agreement had been reached with 
the factional Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta People (MEND) to announce a ceasefire until such time 
that all parties to the conflict could find a good candidate 
for the Niger Delta Ministry.  (Note: Two days after the 
Ambassador-Saraki meeting, the Nigerian press reported that 
MEND had agreed to a temporary cease-fire with the goal of 
stemming the violence in River State in particular.  In 
addition Secretary to the Federation (SFG) Ahmed told 
Ambassador September 15 that he would be meeting with Tom 
Polo's people and others to try to find a way to work out a 
deal so that things could  move forward.  End Note.) 
Ambassador mentioned that the United States and the UK had 
worked jointly together on a paper that could support GON 
efforts and that we had delivered an operational assistance 
non-paper to the President back in July. To date, she added, 
we have not gotten a response to the July demarche, while the 
US-UK paper had been delivered to the Foreign Minister and 
the Secretary of the Federal Government.  Right now, Saraki 
said, people are still "smarting" over the U.S. behavior on 
the EFCC, so responses to overtures by the U.S. on the Niger 
Delta are probably lukewarm, Saraki said. "If we make a step 
the U.S. doesn't like on the Niger Delta are you going to 
pull your support, as you did on the EFCC?", he asked. 
Ambassador emphasized that the offers to assist on the Niger 
Delta are genuine. 
 
Powerbrokers Around the President 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Ambassador took further advantage of the frank 
dialogue to ask who, beside Saraki, did the President rely 
upon?  Saraki replied that his loyalty and assistance to the 
President came as a result of his ability to use his GF 
position to block Obasanjo and Babingida's candidate at the 
last PDP convention, held in April 2008. Since then, Yar'Adua 
has continually included him in high level conversations 
about federal government issues, such as the new cabinet 
line-up.  The Kwara State Governor then added the following 
other governors to the list of people who can and do have 
influence with and access to Yar'Adua, noting that the single 
most powerful influence is his wife, Turai.  On the list of 
influential govenors, in Saraki's view, are the Katsina, 
Rivers, Kano, and Kaduna governors. Others include SFG Ahmed 
and Economic Advisor Yakubu. Saraki then asked what the 
Ambassador thought about National Security Advisor Muktar, as 
he did not seem to be doing his job of coordinating the 
government well. Ambassador demurred, saying that she 
understood Muktar had just had heart surgery and that she had 
not seen him in awhile. The Kwara Governor went on to add 
that he felt that Muktar had been ineffective in the 
position, as so many things requiring coordination just 
seemed to fall through the cracks.  On the Muktar heart 
surgery, Saraki added that he seemed to be recovering well 
and was back on the job.  Ambassador then asked about the 
President's Aide de Camp (ADC), wondering whether he was 
considered part of Yar'Adua's inner circle.  Saraki explained 
that the "jury was out on the ADC," given his ties in the 
past as an Obasanjo loyalist.  "Right now those of us close 
to the President are carefully watching the ADC," he 
explained. (Note: Ambassador's encounters with the ADC have 
always left the impression that he is not working in the best 
interest of  the current government. He was promoted to 
colonel under Yar'Adua in early 2008, but also worked in the 
Villa under Obasanjo.  So comments that he is loyal to 
Obasanjo are not surprising. End Note.) 
 
Cabinet Reshuffle, Timing 
------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Saraki told Ambassador that the timing of the cabinet 
reshuffle was imminent. He added in meeting with President 
Yar'Adua earlier September 21 that those in attendance agreed 
that at the upcoming Federal Executive Committee meeting 
(Nigeria's cabinet meeting) that the Ministers who were being 
let go would be announced. (Note: We are assuming that 
Foreign Minister Maduekwe will be staying on as he is 
currently representing the GON and Yar'Adua at the UNGA). 
However, he did not think that the names of all the new 
ministers would be ready at the same time, so those names 
will probably be announced later. The Kwara Governor said 
that the GON could announce Ministers who are fired after the 
September 24 or October 1 FEC meeting. 
 
Yar'Adua's Health and the Supreme Court 
--------------------------------------- 
 
10.   (C) In wrapping up the meeting, the Ambassador asked 
about the state of President Yar'Adua's health and the 
pending Supreme Court decision.  Saraki responded by saying 
"I a medical doctor so I am not going to soft peddle the 
issue; the President has serious health problems."  However, 
he added, "despite his kidney problems, I believe he can 
manage his illness with the right care and regular check-ups. 
This is something the country is going to have to 
understand." The Kwara Governor noted as an example that in 
the three hour session with Yar'Adua on the upcoming cabinet, 
the latter was articulate and had command of the issues.  "He 
is not Obasanjo and not gregarious, but he is able to do the 
job," Saraki stated. On the Supreme Court ruling, the 
Ambassador reminded Saraki that when they last met in July 
2008 he was confident that Yar'Adua would prevail in the high 
court's decision. She was curious given the recent health 
scare if he felt the same today.  The Governor said he did 
not know, but thought the odds were more in the 50-50 range, 
and that the health issue did raise an additional specter of 
concern on the national psyche.  He noted, however, that he 
did not expect the Supreme Court to render a decision until 
probably sometime in January or February 2009.  Press reports 
showed on September 23 that the Supreme Court would begin 
hearing appeals testimony starting September 25. 
 
11. (C) Comment:  All in all Saraki seems to be becoming more 
of a key player on the national level and certainly has the 
ear of Yar'Adua.  He was a lot less optimistic about how the 
Supreme Court would rule than he had been in his previous 
meetings with the Ambassador as health issues of Yar'Adua are 
more paramount on the minds of Nigerians.  Succession 
scenarios on Nigeria's future are playing out with elites 
both in the North and South with bets being taken over 
whether the Northern group would allow VP Jonathan to assume 
a transitional leadership role at all if Yar'Adua became 
incapacitated.  The new cabinet which is scheduled to be 
announced soon is also supposed to reflect more of Yar'Adua's 
small inner circle of friends as he seeks to consolidate his 
power more now than he has in the past, and better control 
his cabinet.  This could be a good thing or bad, depending on 
whether  the wall on access to Yar'Adua gets higher.  It is 
already difficult to get in to see him.  With the decision of 
the Supreme Court weighing heavily on Yar'Adua  coupled with 
trying to manage the country's nervousness over his health, 
he probably sees Saraki's leadership in the Governors' Forum 
as a way to help him within the PDP,  particularly as looming 
health questions continue to arise. 
 
12. Ambassador drafted this cable while at CG Lagos. 
BLAIR