VZCZCXRO2109
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0805/01 2700752
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260752Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8495
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report for September 25: 
            Humanitarian Round-Up 
 
Following report was submitted by USG employees (USAID/OFDA) on site 
in the eastern Congo: 
 
¶1.  Summary:  Of 100,000 civilians displaced or re-displaced (50 
percent) in the Petit Nord in the first two weeks of September, 65 
percent had returned by the third week.  Ngungu was the main 
exception.  Humanitarian workers are beginning to return to the area 
(keeping apart of MONUC except where escorts are essential), but so 
far for evaluating the situation rather than resuming distributions. 
 End summary. 
 
¶2.  OCHA North Kivu director Patrick Lavand'homme offered the 
following overview of the humanitarian situation in North Kivu, in a 
conversation on the evening of September 24. 
 
¶3.  OCHA estimates that fighting in late August and the first two 
weeks of September produced 100,000 IDPs, of whom 50 percent were 
already displaced.  These IDPs came from every direction: North in a 
broad area from Kashuga to Katsiru, Nyanzale, Kibirizi, and Kikuku, 
south in the Ngungu to Numbi area, east especially around 
Ntamugenga, and west around Bihambwe. 
 
¶4.  This figure of 100,000 did not include the displacement that 
resulted from fighting in the western sector, around Masisi, in the 
third week of September.  However, the IDPs there (including the 
clearing out of the IDP camps at Lushebere and Bungwi) had largely 
returned to their homes or camps within a day or two after CNDP 
ended its attack on September 19. 
 
¶5.  OCHA estimates that 65 percent of this 100,000 had returned to 
their homes or camps, in much the same pattern as occurred around 
Masisi, i.e., out and in surprisingly quickly.  For example, 25,000 
persons were on the move in the direction of Kanyabayonga and Kaina 
after the CNDP's northward thrust beginning September 5, but within 
a week OCHA calculated the number at only 1500.  This pattern of 
quick flight and quick return stands in contrast to the pattern of 
last December and January, when civilians who fled largely did not 
return. 
 
¶6.  The major exception to quick return is the area of Ngungu, where 
the IDPs that have clustered around the MONUC base are refusing to 
go back.  One possible explanation is that, while MONUC persuaded 
(without use of force against) PARECO to leave Ngungu town, PARECO 
remains threateningly close to Ngungu.  Another is that the populace 
equally fears the CNDP. 
 
¶7.  Most of the humanitarian workers pulled out of rural Petit Nord 
during the first two weeks of September, meaning that distribution 
of food and health, hygiene, and water-sanitation efforts came to a 
stop for 500,000 people.  MSF and Mercy Corps remained in Rutshuru 
but otherwise the humanitarians pulled out.  More than ten health 
centers were looted, mainly by the FARDC (although one truck 
delivering medicine to Masisi was looted by CNDP last week). 
Several humanitarian trucks were requisitioned by FARDC and by CNDP 
to transport troops.  Premiere Urgence attempted a food distribution 
with six trucks in the northern area (Kibirizi) on September 7, but 
fleeing and angry FARDC soldiers stirred up the populace, who 
blocked the convoy, which also had trouble on its return getting 
past the IDP camp at Kibumba.  MSF was stoned at Sake (apparently 
because MSF was mistaken for MONUC), and a WFP convoy came close to 
the same fate in Goma (but fortunately was able to explain to crowds 
that WFP was not MONUC).  In MONUC's attempted overland evacuation 
of OCHA and NGOs from Minova, the road south was blocked by the 
local populace, stirred up against MONUC.  ACF staff were able to 
make their way south with an escort by moving cautiously from 
village to village. 
 
¶8.  In the fourth week of September, humanitarian access began to 
recommence, but only tentatively and for purposes of evaluation of 
needs rather than distribution (much greater logistics involved in 
the latter).  OCHA and NGOs came to the conclusion that any effort 
to regain humanitarian space would be better accomplished without 
MONUC escort or presence (given increased popular animosity toward 
MONUC), except in clearly dangerous areas.  Thus, for example, when 
NGOs evacuated Masisi on September 20, it was necessary to use a 
MONUC escort for the overland return to Goma (the road crossing 
conflict lines twice). 
 
¶9.  OCHA and NGOs retain channels of communication to CNDP, which 
are essential to any effort to maintain assistance to the IDPs in 
the Mweso-Kitchanga area (largely displaced from Kashuga), but these 
can become erratic and even be cut off completely during offensives 
by either side.  MSF at the hospital at Mweso was anxious September 
24 about the FARDC buildup nearby at Katsiro, but MONUC assured MSF 
that a FARDC attack on Mweso was unlikely, and in fact, FARDC 
attacked at points to the east. 
 
KINSHASA 00000805  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶10.  Rutshuru appears to be relatively accessible, despite the 
artillery barrage that took place at Rugari and the hold-up of IRC 
in broad daylight on the main road south of Rutshuru September 24. 
(Note:  OCHA staff encountered Col. Delphin near Rugari on September 
¶24.  He informed them that this barrage into the hills was being 
conducted to forestall any effort by CNDP to cut off FARDC's supply 
lines along the Rutshuru road.  End note.)  The camps at Masisi 
center and Lushebere and Bugwi are worrying because the food 
distribution was due two weeks ago.  There is no humanitarian or 
other access to Bunagana sector, including even by ICRC to the 
hospital at Rwanguba (where there could be CNDP casualties), after 
the closure of the road at Burai.  OCHA will investigate whether 
access might be possible from the Ugandan side.  (Note: Such a move 
would need to be closely coordinated with the government, as FARDC 
might overreact if it sensed that the border-closing edicts were 
being bypassed and it had not been informed.  End note.) 
 
¶11.  In Walikale territory, there is concern about the populace in 
the Kibua area (midway between Walikale and Masisi), after the 21st 
and 11th battalions (trained by MONUC to combat FDLR) were 
redeployed forward into the Petit Nord.  The populace had been at 
first resistant to the presence of these battalions, having become 
accustomed to FDLR, but in fact the battalions behaved well and the 
populace came to accept them.  Now the populace is worried that if 
85th brigade, based in Walikale, does not act, FDLR or renegade 
FARDC units will reoccupy the area and wreak retribution. 
 
¶12.  Lavand'homme concluded that the situation in the Petit Nord 
remains too unstable to give a complete green light to recommenced 
distributions, despite urgency in some cases. 
 
BROCK