VZCZCXRO1111
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0797/01 2690616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250616Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8484
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000797 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report September 23: 
            Goma quite, FARDC Makes Promises 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Despite FARDC's misbehavior at Sake September 20 
and 22, MinDef promised September 23 that FARDC would withdraw, as 
scheduled in the disengagement plan, from forward positions in the 
Rutshuru corridor beginning September 25.  However, the populace is 
still blocking MONUC in the area.  Meanwhile, FARDC has occupied 
Kashuga, at the far northwest extremity of CNDP territory.  Life 
appeared to return to normal in Goma, with FARDC's artillery quiet 
at Sake.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) September 23 was an unexpectedly quiet day, both in Goma 
and on the military front.  The only significant military 
development to come to light was FARDC's apparent occupation of 
Kashuga, at the far northwestern part of the territory which was 
occupied by CNDP prior to August 28.  Kivus commander General Lukama 
two days earlier had told the North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier 
General Rawat that he "might do something" in the Mweso area as a 
way to relieve CNDP pressure on Masisi and Sake, and MONUC had 
detected a FARDC build-up at Katsiru, from which FARDC might be 
expected to launch an attack against Mweso. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Already on September 22 CNDP complained that FARDC had 
occupied Kashuga, but North Kivu brigade did not send a patrol into 
the area until late on September 23 and still had no absolute 
confirmation.  (Note:  CNDP vacated Kashuga during its advance north 
beginning September 5, apparently because it could not spare its 
forces to continue to hold Kashuga.  Other armed groups -- variously 
thought to be PARECO, Mai Mai Mongol, or FDLR -- had immediately 
filled the vacuum.  After the September 11 unilateral withdrawal by 
CNDP, North Kivu brigade believed that these armed groups had 
departed Kashuga, leaving it looted and largely devoid of 
inhabitants.  End note.)  As the road from Katsiru to Kashuga passes 
through CNDP-controlled territory at Mweso, the FARDC would have had 
to get to Kashuga by foot.  A FARDC presence there may be small, but 
would nonetheless constitute another ceasefire violation by FARDC. 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In a press statement issued at 1630, CNDP spoke of clashes 
in Kashuga, with attacks by the "FARDC/FDLR/ PARECO coalition".  The 
statement goes on to say that either the government has no intention 
of honoring its cease-fire declaration, or its own forces are acting 
in defiance of orders. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Mid-morning September 23 MONUC, led by Rawat, had what it 
considered a "good meeting" with Minister of Defense Chikez, Lukama, 
General Etumba, Abbe Malu Malu, and North Kivu Governor Paluku. 
According to Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe, Chikez 
re-reaffirmed the government's "total adherence" to the ceasefire 
and to the disengagement plan which it had embraced on "D-Day" 
September 18.  He said that he had now issued orders for the army to 
abide by the ceasefire and that those orders should "very soon" be 
filtering their way down the chain of command.  He claimed that 
FARDC would stick closely to the timetable outlined in that plan, 
working intimately with MONUC as partners.  He said that FARDC would 
have to defend itself against imminent attack, but it would put 
itself in "active defensive mode." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Cunliffe said that Rawat stated to Chikez and the others 
that MONUC was "prepared to continue to use force against the armed 
groups (i.e., CNDP) if they do not disengage."  (Note:  This 
formulation would suggest that the North Kivu brigade intends to 
tell CNDP what the disengagement lines will have to be and to force 
CNDP out of positions held prior to August 28, where MONUC 
determines that CNDP's present positions are too threatening.)  The 
most important test case will be at Rugari, the southernmost town on 
the Rutshuru road within Rutshuru territory, where CNDP occupies the 
strategic prominence called Himbi Height a mere kilometer (i.e., 
within easy artillery range) from the road.  MONUC's present plan 
(not yet presented to CNDP) calls for CNDP's withdrawal a further 
three kilometers eastward of Himbi Height. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) According to Cunliffe, Minister of Defense Chikez 
concurred that, as foreseen in the disengagement plan, the first 
disengagement of forces is to occur in the eastern sector (the 
Rutshuru corridor) at D-Day plus seven, i.e., Thursday September 25. 
 Chikez stated that FARDC would withdraw on that day from its 
forward positions at Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero, held since 
August 28-29.  He appeared to agree that FARDC would not await a 
CNDP further withdrawal (for example, from Himbi Height).  (CNDP has 
already withdrawn from the one forward position it occupied on 
August 28, at Kanombe.) 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At the meeting, according to Col. Cunliffe, Rawat raised 
the issue of sensitization of the populace to stop blocking the 
North Kivu brigade and allow it to move forward into the eastern 
 
KINSHASA 00000797  002 OF 002 
 
 
zone of separation.  (North Kivu brigade has been blocked for 
several weeks from moving forward to Ntamugenga, has continued to be 
stoned intermittently by the populace all over Rutshuru area, and on 
September 23 was blocked by the populace from moving beyond Mutabo 
toward the area of Rugarama and Kishebero.)  Rawat called for 
beginning "information operations" (sensitization of the populace) 
simultaneously with FARDC's withdrawal from the zone of separation. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Governor Paluku objected that the populace would "go mad" 
if FARDC attempted to withdraw from (and MONUC attempted to occupy) 
Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero.  We have now learned that MONUC 
plans to dispatch a francophone team to Rutshuru tomorrow September 
24, a day before the scheduled establishment of the eastern zone of 
separation, to try to persuade the fiery territorial administrator, 
local Hutu chief, plus Col. Delphin and Col. Mushimba to ensure 
popular acceptance of the plan.  (Note:  What is not clear is 
whether the populace would be amenable to "sensitization" even if 
these individuals, so active for many weeks in stirring up the 
populace, were assumed to want to comply.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU) September 22's sustained but indiscriminate artillery 
barrage by FARDC against CNDP positions on the escarpment west of 
Sake ceased with nightfall and did not recommence September 23. 
(Note:  We have ascertained that the multi-barreled rocket 
launchers, mortars, tanks, and BMPs that participated in this 
barrage were clustered close to the North Kivu brigade's base at 
Kimoka, with the evident intent of incurring a CNDP riposte which 
would inevitably have harmed the base; however, CNDP did not rise to 
the bait.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) With the absence of military activity at Sake, the 
anxiety level in Goma subsided markedly September 23.  The women who 
led the protest went back to their subsistence lives as mothers and 
market ladies.  The only evidence of the previous day's 
rock-throwing roaming mobs was two entirely gutted, Tutsi-owned gas 
stations on the western road and a greater than usual number of 
boulders and rocks along the side of the road, which the previous 
day had covered the road for two kilometers.  Otherwise, life seemed 
to have returned to what passes for normal in Goma. 
 
BROCK