VZCZCXRO6933
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0775/01 2631410
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191410Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8450
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000775 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Government approves, begins implementation of 
            MONUC's non-negotiable Plan for Disengagement; 
            CNDP remains obdurate 
 
REFTEL:     Kinshasa 759 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  MONUC, with support from the international 
facilitation (U.S., EU), unveiled September 18 to the GDRC a North 
Kivu disengagement plan which the government has accepted and begun 
to implement.  The plan calls for withdrawal from forward positions 
occupied August 28-29.  Implementation of the plan's initial phase 
(reaffirmation of the cease-fire) began September 18 ("D Day").  The 
plan is non-negotiable and thus will not be submitted to armed 
groups for their approval, although the Government is willing to 
discuss certain technical aspects of its implementation.  At a 
meeting with the facilitation team at Kimoka September 17, CNDP 
refused any military discussions except in the wider context of 
direct talks with the government on a new structure to replace the 
Amani program.  End summary. 
 
MONUC's Disengagement Plan 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a series of meetings with senior government officials, 
including with President Kabila on the afternoon of September 17, 
SRSG Doss and MONUC military-political staff, in close collaboration 
with the EU (special envoy Van de Geer) and the U.S. (Embassy 
Kinshasa DCM Brock) elaborated a draft plan for disengagement in 
North Kivu (i.e., all areas of conflict involving the CNDP).  The 
plan had been requested by Kabila at a meeting in Goma with MONUC 
and P-5 ambassadors on September 14 (reftel).  Doss, again with the 
EU and U.S., presented a refined plan to a government team led by 
National Assembly President Vitale Kamerhe on September 18.  The 
government issued a statement the same day endorsing the MONUC plan 
and announcing its implementation immediately by reaffirming the 
ceasefire (the plan's first phase).  Copies of the plan and its 
timetable have been e-mailed to the Department (AF/C and Front 
Office) to embassies Kigali and Kampala. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Details such as exact width and location of the separation 
zones are yet to be worked out (MONUC and FARDC are to begin 
preparation of a "master map" on September 22).  MONUC recommends a 
five-kilometer zone around villages and three kilometers around key 
axes, but there will be flexibility for lesser widths in other areas 
depending on the terrain.  (Note:  A narrower zone, for example one 
kilometer as recommended by Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe, 
would be much easier for North Kivu brigade's limited forces to 
monitor, but effective separation will require wider zones at least 
around towns and roads.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The plan calls for withdrawal of forces sequentially from 
east to south to west to north.  At "D-Day" (September 18) plus 4 
(i.e., September 22) redeployment is to begin in the eastern 
(Rutshuru corridor) area, to include FARDC withdrawal from positions 
occupied August 28-29 in the previously informal buffer zone 
(Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherero).  According to the plan's 
timetable, redeployment (withdrawal) is then to occur in three-day 
increments in the south (Ngungu area), the west (between Masisi and 
Kirolirwe/Kitchanga), and the north (Mweso to Bambu to Tongo). 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The plan calls for FARDC battalions trained by 55 
MONUC for action against FDLR (some of which were recently diverted 
for action against CNDP) to return to previous positions, and these 
are to resume anti-FDLR operations ("Operation Kimia") by D plus 16 
(i.e., October 4). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The plan, under the title "Comprehensive Plan for 
Disengagement in North Kivu," includes actions beyond strict 
disengagement (separation of forces).  The summary which MONUC 
presented to the government September 18 introduced a "Phase 2" 
calling for construction of regroupment centers with eventual DDR 
and brassage.  The calendar, however, recognizes that no such 
centers have been built. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In the discussion September 18 between the GDRC, MONUC and 
the international facilitation SRSG Doss stressed that the FDLR 
track remained urgently important and that the Operation Kimia 
battalions of the FARDC should return to their initial mission as 
soon as possible.  He contemplated that MONUC would produce daily 
reports on ceasefire violations, pending establishment of an 
independent monitoring mechanism.  Brock said the U.S. would work 
closely with MONUC and the GDRC to help design and staff the 
monitoring mechanism.  Doss said sanctions against ceasefire 
violators could involve use of force, although MONUC would employ 
persuasion whenever possible.  (Force Commander General Gaye noted 
that attack helicopters, which had not been used in recent action 
against CNDP, were available for compelling compliance with zones of 
separation.)  Doss said he would push for DDR where feasible. 
 
KINSHASA 00000775  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Kamerhe said the government was "very satisfied" with the 
plan.  In its general principles, the plan was non-negotiable, he 
said, just as the Amani program in its general principles was 
non-negotiable, although there could be flexibility with CNDP on 
technical aspects or other details.  Responding to the CNDP demand 
that the government show good will, Kamerhe said that in fact the 
government was doing much, including committing to withdraw from 
Ntamugenga, Mutabo, and Kisherere, which he said MONUC must occupy 
upon FARDC's withdrawal.  On amnesty, Kamerhe said that the National 
Assembly had approved a draft law but the Senate would not do so as 
long as the CNDP continued its attacks.  Hostilities must end also 
for progress to be made on returning IDP's or refugees to their 
homes.  DRC had committed five million dollars to IDP return, as 
well as 6.5 million dollars to building "regroupment centers. 
Kamerhe noted that the big question remained how to get the CNDP on 
board. 
 
CNDP Obdurate 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Earlier on September 17 the international facilitation 
team, led by EU Special Envoy van de Geer and enlarged by a MONUC 
military officer, traveled to Kimoka (neutral zone north of Sake) to 
convey to CNDP the outlines of MONUC's draft plan for disengagement. 
 (Note:  The team had some concern about its safety, as the FARDC 
had brought heavy armaments into the area September 16 and had been 
firing from near Sake into the hills near Kirotshe, but this 
activity had ceased.  End note.)  The CNDP team, led by Kambasu 
Ngeve, was over two hours late, and van de Geer had to depart before 
CNDP arrived.  Van de Geer later joined SRSG and DCM Brock for a 
meeting with President Kabila.  Van de Geer told Kabila that the 
international facilitation appeared to have hit an impasse with CNDP 
and that the government needed to make its own efforts in contacting 
CNDP.  Brock told the president that Nkunda was refusing to speak to 
Tim Shortley, special advisor to Assistant Secretary Frazer for 
Conflict Resolution, and had even accused Shortley of "no longer 
working for the U.S. Government but working instead for the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo."  Kabila and his 
entourage (including National Assembly president, ministers of 
Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense, and senior FARDC officers) 
reacted with hearty laughter. 
 
¶10.   (SBU) Kambasu told the facilitation team that MONUC's draft 
plan, in its general principles, did not appear to differ much from 
CNDP's overall vision.  CNDP had previously called for a 
four-kilometer zone of separation, while this plan appeared to call 
for three to five.  However, he and other members of the CNDP 
insisted that this plan could only be considered "in the context of 
a new structure."  CNDP had signed the Acte d'Engagement and not the 
Amani program, and it rejected the Amani program and called for a 
new framework ("cadre").  CNDP could not agree to even military 
discussions without direct dialogue with the government to define a 
new political structure.  CNDP in the past few days had been 
repeatedly attacked by FARDC and its proxy forces in the 
Ngungu/Kirtoshe area, and now FARDC and its proxies were attacking 
at Rubaya, Kahundu, and Katoyi (three points along CNDP's western 
"frontier"). 
 
¶11.  (SBU) CNDP continued that it had received no response to the 
demands it presented in the meeting with van de Geer and the 
facilitation team on September 13 (new framework, freeing new and 
old prisoners, unacceptable declarations by Minister of Defense and 
others, return of FARDC to previous positions, MONUC protecting 
areas from which CNDP withdraws, and FDLR battalions reinforcing 
FARDC).  Kambasu complained that he felt "offended" that the 
facilitation was so insistent on meeting a Tutsi such as Nkunda, and 
he said that CNDP might reach a point of not recognizing the 
government.  The facilitation team attempted, without success, to 
persuade this CNDP team that a completely new structure was out of 
the question but that there was much flexibility within it (as 
evidenced by CNDP's agreement August 26 to limited working groups on 
disengagement) and that the government had made a very positive 
gesture in the offer of direct military talks at Kimoka. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) After this meeting, CNDP member Bisimwa called Deputy 
Eastern Coordinator Ladjouzi to confirm that CNDP rejected any talks 
that did not take place within a "new cadre."  He asserted that 
MONUC was no longer acceptable as mediator and that Kimoka was no 
longer acceptable as a neutral location for bilateral talks (due to 
FARDC's recent move of heavy machinery into Sake).  On September 18, 
CNDP member Muiti called poloff to say that CNDP urgently wanted to 
engage in talks with the government "within another cadre," with the 
U.S. as preferred mediator, in Nairobi or Addis Ababa.  He said that 
 
KINSHASA 00000775  003 OF 003 
 
 
FARDC was "heavily bombarding" CNDP in its western sector and CNDP 
urgently wanted these attacks to be stopped.  He said CNDP had 
captured an FDLR fighter which it could present.  (In its military 
briefing on the afternoon of September 18, North Kivu brigade 
confirmed that there had been "some firing" northeast of Masisi 
during the day, which had produced a movement of "many IDPs" toward 
Mushake.) 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Meanwhile, on instructions from Kabila, Amani Coordinator 
Malu Malu tapped Bizima Karaha and Emmanuel Kamanzi (prominent loyal 
Congolese Tutsis with connections to CNDP) to make contact with CNDP 
and set up a direct government-CNDP meeting to discuss the 
disengagement plan.  As of COB September 18, there was no indication 
that Karaha and Kamanzi had succeeded in setting up such a meeting. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) At MONUC's daily military briefing at 16:00 September 18, 
the facilitation was informed that MONUC force commander Gaye would 
return to Goma over the weekend and would seek to hold separate 
consultations on the disengagement plan with CNDP, PARECO and other 
armed groups, as well as continuing consultations with FARDC. 
Assembly President Kamerhe and the other key ministers, as well as 
SRSG Doss, are expected to return to Goma on September 22 to 
announce the formal launch of the plan (though actual "D day" in 
relation to the plan's calendar was today, September 18), then 
proceed to Bukavu on Septebmer 23 for a meeting of the Amani 
Steering Committee focused on South Kivu demilitarization and 
disengagement.  International Facilitation representatives at those 
meetings will include the EU (Jean-Michel Dupont) and the U.S. (DCM 
Brock). 
 
GARVELINK