VZCZCXRO2741
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0759/01 2590939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 150939Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8427
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000759 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Kabila reaffirms commitment to Amani Process 
            at September 14 Goma meeting with ambassadors 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  President Kabila came for an infrequent visit to 
Goma September 13 following CNDP's unilateral declaration of 
withdrawal and summoned P-5 ambassadors for a tour d'horizon 
September 14.  Kabila was clear in his support for the Amani process 
which, it was announced at the meeting, has been extended for one 
year.  He regretted recent anti-MONUC actions by the populace and 
stated that MONUC had his complete support.  He said he wanted 
immediate action on disengagement and put the burden of getting CNDP 
on board entirely with the international facilitation.  He said 
disengagement lines should be placed where forces were now located 
(implying that FARDC would not withdraw from positions FARDC 
occupies in the Rutshuru buffer zone).  He said he wanted to 
continue to build military pressure on FDLR, but combating CNDP was 
the priority.  Earlier, EU Special Envoy van de Geer had a testy 
call from Nkunda, who said he was not interested in participation in 
talks with the FARDC or government, and would "think about" a 
face-to-face meeting with van de Geer.  Nkunda asked for an inquiry 
into FDLR atrocities at Ngungu, where MONUC plans an operation to 
drive out PARECO/FDLR on September 15.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) President Kabila arrived in Goma September 13 for the 
first time in many months, buoyed by MONUC's military actions 
against CNDP and CNDP's unilateral withdrawal from areas occupied 
September 5-11.  He summoned SRSG Doss, Force Commander Gaye, EU 
Special Envoy van de Geer, and ambassadors from U.S., Russia, China, 
and Tanzania (for the AU), as well as EU resident rep for a meeting 
September 14.  France and UK were represented at the level of Charge 
d'Affaires.  (Note:  Noticeably absent was a representative from 
Belgium; a diplomatic contact told us the Congolese invited the P-5, 
instead of the more usual P-3+2, as a way to exclude the former 
colonial power.  End note.)  GDRC attendees included National 
Assembly President Kamerhe, Minister of Interior Kalume, Minister of 
Defense Chikez, Advisors Tshibanda and Chissambo, Amani Coordinator 
Malu Malu, North Kivu Governor Paluku, Chief of Army Staff Kayembe, 
Advisor Ngwej, Joint Commission Co-Chair Etumba, FARDC eastern 
forces commander General Lukama, and humanitarian advisor Machako. 
In typical style, Kabila avoided a bold or clear policy statement, 
instead turning to his advisors and to Doss and van de Geer for a 
round-up before making his own comments. 
 
Amani Process extended for one year 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Malu Malu spoke first, giving a review of the history of 
the Amani program.  He lamented that it had bogged down but said it 
had showed promise of life August 26 when CNDP had attended meetings 
of the Joint Technical Commission.  The Commission had agreed to 
establish ad hoc working groups on disengagement, but the North Kivu 
group was stillborn with the outbreak of fighting August 28 (for 
which Malu Malu entirely blamed CNDP), as CNDP had once again 
boycotted the proceedings.  Malu Malu said that the Amani program 
had been formally renewed for one year by decree signed earlier in 
the day. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Etumba gave his own review of Amani, firmly pinning blame 
on CNDP but noting that the FRF in South Kivu had come on board and 
that the South Kivu working group had made progress.  Machako gave a 
disjointed presentation on the humanitarian consequences of the 
recent fighting, claiming there were 150,000 new or re-displaced 
IDP's (OCHA puts the figure at 90-100,000). 
 
¶5.  (SBU) SRSG Doss said that every crisis could present an 
opportunity:  the present outbreak, with MONUC's response, could 
provide the opportunity for progress on disengagement.  He urged all 
sides to return their forces to previous positions (i.e., to include 
FARDC), and he urged greater flexibility and imagination on the part 
of FARDC (i.e., in particular, Etumba).  He said that Nairobi was as 
important as Goma and it was essential that the government not 
relent in putting increasing pressure on FDLR.  He urged pursuit of 
an energized DDR program for non-contact armed groups. 
 
EU Special Envoy met September 13 with CNDP 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Van de Geer focused his remarks on the CNDP, noting that 
the special envoys had not had a face-to-face meeting with Nkunda in 
two months.  He said the facilitation team had met a middle-grade 
CNDP team (note: for four and a half hours) the previous day at 
Kimoka.  There, he said, he had made three proposals:  (1) CNDP to 
engage in direct military-to-military talks with FARDC to begin 
September 14 (note: Van de Geer told CNDP that General Lukama said 
he would be willing to go to Kimoka); (2) CNDP to go back to 
meetings of the ad hoc working groups and Joint Commission, as early 
as September 15; and (3) Nkunda to meet van de Geer and the 
facilitation team within the next three days.  The CNDP team in 
 
KINSHASA 00000759  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
response, he said, had been lukewarm on the first, negative on the 
second, and noncommittal on the third.  Van de Geer conveyed the 
demands made by the CNDP team:  release of 68 claimed new prisoners 
arrested in Goma since August 28 plus action on the list of 
prisoners previously presented to the government; return of FARDC to 
previous positions (to include not only new positions occupied in 
the Rutshuru corridor, but the return of several FARDC brigades and 
battalions to areas where they had been before being called forward 
against CNDP in the recent fighting); MONUC to secure and protect 
areas from which CNDP was now in the process of withdrawing (to 
prevent exactions by FARDC, FDLR, Mai Mai); and de-linking of FARDC 
and FDLR.  (Van de Geer did not reveal the first demand the CNDP 
team had made -- rejection of the Amani program and a call for a new 
structure "conformable with the Acte d'Engagement.") 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Chikez, in a short but sharp statement, criticized the 
international facilitation for not being clearer and more effective 
with the CNDP and for disrespecting the sovereignty of the state by 
calling for FARDC withdrawal.  Noncommittal, Kabila turned to van de 
Geer to respond to Chikez.  Van de Geer said that, in fact, the 
special envoys had been very tough with Nkunda - so tough that they 
had lost direct contact with him.  In the meeting with CNDP at a 
lower level the previous day at Kimoka, the envoys had been very 
clear and direct. 
 
Kabila reaffirms commitment to Amani 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At last Kabila spoke.  He said that there was no other way 
forward but the Amani program.  He was dedicated to Amani and 
inflexible on the point.  The population of the Kivus was demanding 
results from it.  The first step, he said, was disengagement of 
armed forces.  It was essential to get down to the real work of 
disengagement right away, not in two weeks or two months, but 
tomorrow.  Kabila said that disengagement should be in the positions 
where the armed forces were now located (Note:  this formulation 
would suggest an unwillingness to reciprocate CNDP's withdrawal to 
previous positions.  End note.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Kabila said he had tried everything with Nkunda, even the 
"Numbi affair" (mixage), but nothing had worked.  Nkunda was a 
criminal.  Nkunda, Bosco, and Makenga were a band of "little 
criminals."  However, Kabila said, the CNDP was the partner in the 
peace process and there was no alternative to dealing with it.  It 
was essential to get immediately to work on disengagement, otherwise 
Nkunda would gather strength and seek an occasion to attack again in 
a few weeks or months and the process would again be back to square 
one.  Disengagement was only the beginning of a much larger process 
involving integration into FARDC or demobilization/reintegration. 
(Note:  Kabila indicated that demobilization could take place in 
North Kivu, an apparent concession.  End note). 
 
Kabila urges continued contact with Nkunda 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Kabila said that the international community must keep 
trying to contact Nkunda or - if he were dead or sick or pushed 
aside - with whoever was in charge in the CNDP.  He was worried 
about the lack of contact with Nkunda.  It was up to the 
international facilitation to get Nkunda on board.  (Note:  Kabila 
evinced no responsibility to contact Nkunda.  End note.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) Kabila regretted the recent difficulties MONUC had 
encountered with the local populace (blocking movement, stoning 
convoys).  He said that MONUC had his complete support and that the 
government had not manipulated the populace against MONUC.  However, 
he admitted that there were "extremists in some areas" (unspecified) 
who were capable of stirring up the populace.  The best way to 
handle the populace was for the government and MONUC to work closely 
together to make Amani work and reestablish the authority of the 
state. 
 
We will go against FDLR when "Nkunda Affair" resolved 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Kabila said that he was committed to the Nairobi process 
and would continue to increase pressure on the FDLR.  However, 
coping with the military offensive by the CNDP in recent days had 
become the highest priority.  Kabila said it was unreasonable to ask 
DRC to launch operations against FDLR when Nkunda was attacking the 
main roads leading to Goma.  Once the "Nkunda affair" was resolved, 
DRC could turn its whole attention to FDLR. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The meeting concluded with remarks by SRSG Doss 
underlining that MONUC could not be effective without the 
 
KINSHASA 00000759  003 OF 003 
 
 
government's full support.  He agreed that the first priority was 
disengagement and it needed to be quick, but there were complex 
details to work out.  To this end, he was staying over in Goma to 
work with Force Commander General Gaye and MONUC military to 
elaborate a disengagement proposal to cover all conflict areas with 
the CNDP. 
 
Van der Geer reports on call from Nkunda 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In a follow-up discussion among the facilitation team, 
van de Geer said that he had received a call from Nkunda earlier in 
the day.  Nkunda, he said, was nervous and aggressive.  Nkunda told 
him, "You are not being helpful" (not clear if "you" meant van de 
Geer personally or the whole facilitation effort).  He said he was 
not interested in talks with the government.  He repeated some of 
the threatening language of the September 11 declaration (if one 
shot is fired, we put a "decisive end to any future threat"; this 
was the second withdrawal under pressure and it would be the last 
one, etc.).  Van de Geer told him that such telephonic contact was a 
poor form of communication and they needed to sit face to face. 
Nkunda said he would think about it and call back the next day.  He 
had one specific request, for an inquiry into what he called FDLR 
atrocities in Ngungu.  (Note:  North Kivu brigade reports 16,000 
IDP's have gathered around the South African helicopter base near 
Ngungu, fleeing from what the brigade calls PARECO's occupation and 
looting of Ngungu, in the southwestern-most reach of CNDP terrain, 
where MONUC had previously established one of three small 
mutually-agreed buffer zones.).  SRSG Doss revealed to the 
facilitation team that the North Kivu brigade would launch an attack 
on PARECO/FDLR tomorrow, September 15, at Ngungu to reestablish 
previous lines. 
 
Facilitation meets to discuss 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The facilitation team received a late SMS message from 
CNDP official Kambasu Ngeve September 14:  "The Political Direction 
of CNDP asserts that the government must first show a gesture of 
good will before any meeting occurs." 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Among the facilitation team, with Doss, General Gaye, and 
van de Geer present, there was consensus that there might be little 
progress with Nkunda or CNDP for the being, even if there were a 
concession by FARDC on withdrawing from positions taken in late 
August in the Rutshuru buffer zone.  The facilitation team disagreed 
whether pressure could or should be put on the government to make 
such a concession, in the light of the horrendous overreaching by 
CNDP, with resultant massive humanitarian consequences (not to 
mention discrediting of the CNDP politically and militarily).  Gaye 
argued it would be fruitless for MONUC to propose that FARDC 
withdraw from Ntamugenga and Mutabo, positions that were militarily 
untenable but which had become politically sacred.  Doss 
countermanded him.  He said he would instruct MONUC to outline a 
disengagement proposal based on sensible positions on the ground, 
which would include FARDC withdrawal from Ntamugenga and Mutabo and 
(most acute from a demilitarization point of view) mutual pull-back 
of both sides from Rugari (where confrontation lines are narrowest, 
and closest to the Rutshuru highway). 
 
Brief re-cap of events August 29 - September 13 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) At an earlier briefing for Doss, van de Geer, and the 
facilitation team, North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General 
Rawat summarized the military situation as follows:  FARDC provoked 
CNDP by stealing cattle in the Rutshuru area but CNDP was the first 
to attack in the early hours of August 28, when it captured FARDC's 
outpost at Kanombe.  FARDC retaliated by taking Mutabo August 28 and 
Ntamugenga August 29.  The CNDP attacks north- and south-ward 
beginning September 5 ultimately culminated in MONUC's use of force 
to expel CNDP from Kayala and Kirotshe and CNDP's unilateral 
withdrawal September 11.  In the northern area, CNDP has withdrawn 
600 men, carrying rifles, machine guns, and mortars.  There were 
still CNDP soldiers present around Mirangi, apparently not aware of 
the unilateral ceasefire, and MONUC has given them an additional 24 
hours to clear out.  In the Kibirizi area, withdrawal of 110 cadres 
was now taking place, delayed at first because of lack of FARDC 
cooperation.  CNDP (50 cadres with rifles, machine guns, and 
mortars) finally withdrew from Kanombe, the position captured at the 
beginning of the fighting August 28, yesterday September 13. 
 
GARVELINK