VZCZCXRO2251
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0757/01 2571337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131337Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8422
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000757 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report September 12: 
            Aftermath of CNDP Withdrawal Declaration 
 
REF:        KINSHASA 756 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  On September 12 the MONUC military facilitated 
CNDP withdrawal from recently-occupied areas, giving CNDP an 
ultimatum of 12:00 September 13 to make a complete withdrawal.  EU 
Special Envoy van de Geer will meet CNDP at Kimoka September 13. 
FARDC's willingness to make a reciprocal gesture (withdrawal from 
points occupied August 28-29 and PARECO's incursions) remains an 
open question.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The declaration by CNDP (reftel) on the evening of 
September 11 of a unilateral withdrawal from recently occupied areas 
ushered a much quieter day in North Kivu militarily than had been 
the case for the previous two weeks.  The only exchange of fire 
noted by North Kivu brigade occurred in the hills above Kirotshe 
(south of Sake), which unfortunately coincided with the visit of 
Minister of Defense Chikez and the governor of North Kivu, who 
sought to make a road tour (to demonstrate government control over 
an area that had been briefly in CNDP hands).  The governor stated 
publicly that the firing was an assassination attempt by CNDP and 
showed CNDP's bad faith, although the exchange of fire apparently 
occurred several kilometers from where the minister and governor 
were located. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe and his staff on 
September 12 gave a briefing to EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer 
(just arrived in Goma for a five-day visit) and the facilitation 
team.  He said that the day opened with an order from Force 
Commander General Gaye to the North Kivu brigade to generate space 
and security for the withdrawal of CNDP forces.  CNDP was to be 
given until 12:00 September 13 to make a complete withdrawal from 
all areas occupied in the recent fighting.  (The principal zone of 
withdrawal is the Katsiru-Nyanzale-Kibirizi-Kayala sector to the 
north, with possibly some CNDP elements remaining in the south, and 
one CNDP forward position in the Rutshuru corridor.)  Cunliffe said 
that some of the CNDP field commanders were showing "resentment" at 
the declaration of withdrawal and might cause difficulties.  The 
situation in Kibirizi remained particularly unclear.  North Kivu 
brigade had given free passage to CNDP trucks heading south with 
casualties and equipment.  Cunliffe noted that a "massive" internal 
displacement issue remained.  "Medecins Sans Frontieres," in a 
September 12 press release, estimated that as many as 250,000 people 
had been re-displaced or newly displaced in the recent fighting. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Cunliffe said that he was in frequent meetings with the 
new FARDC Kivus commander, General Lukama (formerly only in charge 
of the anti-FDLR operation, now both anti-FDLR and Kivus), stressing 
to him that it was essential FARDC fully reciprocate the CNDP 
withdrawal.  The MONUC military spokesman had earlier in the day, he 
said, given an Okapi interview underlining MONUC's "expectation" and 
"insistence" that FARDC reciprocate.  Cunliffe said that FARDC's 
occupation of Ntamugenga and Mutabo in the Rutshuru buffer zone 
remained at the heart of the upsurge in fighting since late August. 
However, he said, he was not sanguine that FARDC would cooperate. 
Philip Winter, deputy to Eastern Coordinator Alpha Sow, said that 
Sow had been meeting Chikez also with the object of assuring FARDC's 
return to original positions and an embrace of the Goma agreement as 
the only way forward. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Cunliffe said that, if CNDP withdrew as promised, MONUC 
would attempt immediately to begin military-to-military 
disengagement talks.  He hoped to be able to helicopter two CNDP 
military officers from Kimoka to the MONUC-controlled Goma air 
terminal on the afternoon of September 14.  He had already broached 
this idea with General Lukama.  If CNDP agreed, technical military 
talks on buffer zones (or, he said, more accurately "zones of 
separation"), would start in earnest, using maps being prepared by 
MONUC.  No political officials from either CNDP or FARDC would be 
permitted in the talks, which would be restricted to military issues 
such as present military positions and range of weapons and not 
enter upon subjects such as property rights or humanitarian 
corridors. (Note:  This focus is narrower than contemplated in the 
ad hoc working groups on disengagement that were to have begun work 
on August 28.)  Cunliffe said that General Gaye was returning to 
Goma September 13 to refine these plans. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Cunliffe said that MONUC now had confirmation of a serious 
confrontation September 11 between CNDP and FDLR, also involving the 
31st battalion (recently trained by MONUC for combating FDLR) and 
PARECO.  It occurred five kms. to the west of Kayala (from which 
North Kivu brigade had evicted CNDP).  CNDP suffered "significant 
casualties," as well as 8-10 killed at Kirotshe by MONUC.  Cunliffe 
speculated that this reverse may have been a factor in CNDP's 
unilateral declaration of withdrawal.  He said that the 
second-in-command of the 31st battalion had been killed.  FARDC's 
 
KINSHASA 00000757  002 OF 002 
 
 
23rd battalion (also trained for action against FDLR) had been put 
in readiness, also to be used against CNDP. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Van de Geer said that he would be meeting a CNDP team at 
Kimoka the next morning, with the object of seeking a political 
commitment from CNDP to return to the Joint Technical Commission and 
Goma/Amani process.  The government at the highest levels in 
Kinshasa had urged him to meet the CNDP and see Nkunda if possible. 
He said he would urge CNDP to participate in the 
military-to-military talks on September 14 at the Goma air terminal. 
 He would see Chikez and underline the vital importance of FARDC's 
reciprocity, despite the angry mood of the populace and the 
government's sensitivities about sovereignty.  Van de Geer regretted 
that it had been necessary for the MONUC military to take action 
against CNDP, as he was certain that FARDC had provoked CNDP, but 
CNDP had far overreached and there had been no alternative.  He 
hoped that this military action would have now opened diplomatic 
space. 
 
GARVELINK