VZCZCXRO1316
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0751/01 2560804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120804Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8414
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000751 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:   Goma Report September 11 - MONUC Goes 
            on the Offensive, CNDP Withdraws 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Reflecting a marked change of MONUC's military 
posture, Force Commander General Gaye told the facilitation team 
September 11 that MONUC would use force as necessary to push CNDP 
back to previous lines.  By the end of the day, North Kivu brigade 
said it had evicted CNDP from two points earlier occupied (Kirotshe 
and Kayala) to the north and south of previous lines.  CNDP declared 
an immediate and unilateral withdrawal from all positions taken in 
the past few days.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) MONUC Force Commander, General Babucar Gaye, present in 
Goma September 10-11 on a farewell tour, told the facilitation team 
on the morning of September 11 that MONUC was prepared to use force 
as necessary to ensure CNDP's withdrawal to previously-held lines. 
He clarified that use of force by MONUC would not be dependent on 
such factors as had been present at Nyanzale (pre-existing FARDC 
battalion headquarters and MONUC base) to justify force.  He said 
that there would be no use of force against FARDC, in the event of 
FARDC violation of ceasefire or intrusion into agreed buffer zones 
("Kabila would immediately send us out of the country").  He cited 
key factors in this change of policy as being the weakness of the 
FARDC and the rising anti-MONUC sentiment of the populace, as well 
as the success of MONUC's firm actions in Nyanzale.  Questioned 
about the FARDC's dispatch of two anti-FDLR battalions trained by 
MONUC to the area around Kanyabayonga to deal with CNDP, Gaye said 
that such redeployment by FARDC, while it had negative implications 
for the operation against FDLR, was a predictable consequence of 
CNDP's forays so far from its previous lines.  (Note: Similarly, 
MONUC has also been using its companies attached to FARDC's 
anti-FDLR battalions to reinforce its own positions.) 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to briefings by North and South Kivu brigades, 
at opening of day September 11 CNDP was significantly present in the 
area of Kirotshe, where the South African base had been caught in 
the midst of heavy cross fire between CNDP and Mai Mai Cobra for 
much of September 10.  The towns of Bweramana and Minova, in South 
Kivu, had suffered intense shelling in the course of September 10, 
with 500-1000 IDP's pouring into Minova and with even the police and 
civil administration seeking refuge at the South Kivu brigade base 
there.  The North Kivu brigade helicopter base at Ngungu reported 
that PARECO had pushed CNDP out of Ngungu, with 5,000 IDPs reaching 
the base.  PARECO/Mai Mai had also attacked the CNDP "at last light" 
September 10 at Bihambwe, the furthest-west village under CNDP 
control on the Sake-Masisi road.  At opening of September 11 there 
continued to be a significant presence of CNDP at Kayala, 20 kms. 
south of Kanyabayonga, and there was also a presence at Kisheshe, a 
similar distance from the Rutshuru-Kanyabayonga highway at Mabenga. 
North Kivu brigade confirmed that there had been a CNDP-FDLR 
skirmish west of Kayala. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Deputy Chief of Staff Col. James Cunliffe briefed the 
facilitation team at 16:00 September 11.  He confirmed that the 
Force Commander had signed an order earlier in the day for MONUC 
military to use force as necessary against CNDP and other armed 
groups (but not FARDC) to force them to return to positions held on 
January 23.  (Note: It is not clear why the emphasis was on January 
23, the date of signature of the Actes d'Engagement in Goma, rather 
than August 27, the day before the present cycle of military 
activity.)  Cunliffe said that MONUC was elaborating a plan with 
daily targets of action against the CNDP until it returned to 
previous positions.  MONUC would, he said, use non-lethal means as 
much as possible.  Failing verbal warnings, MONUC would use warning 
shots and then lethal force.  Once CNDP was forced back to its 
former positions, MONUC military would pursue the second phase with 
CNDP, i.e., to determine formal buffer zones along the whole of the 
CNDP periphery.  (There are now only three small buffer zones, 
signed onto by CNDP, at Ngungu, Muheto, and Tongo.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Cunliffe said that North Kivu brigade had had military 
contact, including some use of lethal force, during the day with 
CNDP at two locations, Kirotshe and Kayala, and CNDP had been 
evicted from these two places.  Cunliffe said that MONUC would not 
reveal its plans for future targeting of CNDP.  North Kivu brigade 
had used BMPs, firing four rounds from their main guns, against CNDP 
at Kayala.  He said that FARDC claimed that there was a column of 
CNDP moving from the area of Kisheshe by way of Kirumba toward the 
Rutshuru-Kanyabayonga highway, and North Kivu brigade was now 
undertaking "heavy patrolling" in the area of Mabenga, including 
dispatch of two BMPs from Mutabo. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) At the end of the day, CDNP under the signature of Laurent 
Nkunda issued a "Unilateral Withdrawal of the CNDP" (text and 
translation to follow septel), stipulating that the withdrawal was 
immediate from all positions taken on all fronts since the 
resumption of hostilities in the past few days.  It warned that CNDP 
would not tolerate any provocation from FARDC or armed groups, "even 
 
KINSHASA 00000751  002 OF 002 
 
 
a single bullet."   Note:  The formulation, "past few days" ("de ces 
derniers jours"), is unclear, and may or may not mean the status quo 
ante August 28.  The declaration does not touch on FARDC withdrawal 
from points it occupied in the Rutshuru corridor buffer zone.  CNDP 
leaves itself room for resumption of hostilities in the event of bad 
behavior by FARDC, PARECO, or other armed groups.  End note. 
 
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