VZCZCXRO2586
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1451/01 2701425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261425Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1979
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001451 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
REF: A) STATE 100304 
B) KHARTOUM 1312 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID officials still believe that sixty-percent 
deployment is possible by the end of 2008, and eighty-percent is 
achievable by the end of March 2009.  However, for this to happen, 
all former AMIS battalions must rotate at full strength and several 
new battalions have to be willing to "light deploy" at the super 
camps to provide security and then later shift to other locations as 
needed.  The key obstacle to deployment remains the transportation 
of containers with TCC equipment.  UNAMID officials are eager to 
take advantage of the US offer of airlift for the containers, which 
is a higher priority than the transportation of troops.  The 
challenge with the US offer will be managing new backlogs at the 
airports.  The Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions are willing to 
self-deploy, and UNAMID supports this, but DPKO must be convinced. 
Thai and Nepalese troops are expected before the end of the year. 
UNAMID universally noted that the GOS has been fully supportive of 
deployment efforts by extending airport hours, opening Geneina 
airport to UNAMID transport flights, clearing over 600 visas, and 
providing security escorts to convoys every 24 hours.  TCC 
helicopters are desperately needed, especially troop transport 
helicopters that can be used to investigate and respond to reports 
of fighting.  The current contracted helicopters are not viable 
given insurance issues follwing the firing on of several UNAMID 
aircraft in the last two weeks.  UNAMID remains split over which 
group attacked and killed 7 UNAMID peacekeepers on July 7 west of 
Shangil Tobaya, but the consensus appears to be turning toward 
SLA/Unity despite a lack of clear evidence.  It appears unlikely 
that UNAMID will reach a definitive conclusion and/or announce a 
determination of responsibility. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The following UNAMID officials provided information for 
this report during meetings with polchief September 23-24 in El 
Fasher: 
 
- Force Commander General Agwai 
 
- Deputy Force Commander General Karenzi 
 
- Deputy JSR for Operations Medilli 
 
- JSR Chief of Staff Alstrom 
 
- Chief of Plans Colonel Stafford 
 
- Deputy Director of Mission Support Weiszegger 
 
 
Deployment Timeline 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Although slightly less optimistic than during meetings in 
late August (ref c), UNAMID officials still maintain that 
eighty-percent deployment of TCC contingents is possible by the end 
of March 2009 (11,000 additional troops).  Conservative estimates 
for deployment by the end of 2008 remain at roughly sixty-percent 
(5000 additional troops).  Deployment is dependent on the arrival of 
contingent-owned equipment (COE - ie. Containers,) which has finally 
begun to move from Obeid to Nyala and from Port Sudan directly into 
Darfur thanks to several new shipping contracts.  Mission Support 
Deputy Director Weiszegger reported that 400 "shipping units" 
(containers, vehicles, and other large shipments) had been moved 
over the last week alone, by road and by rail.  D/JSR Medilli 
estimated that between 45 and 60 days would be required to clear the 
entire backlog of approximately 4000 units.  Medilli said that the 
US offer of airlift is "most welcome," but UNAMID planners will 
continue with their current projections based on overland transport 
with the existing contracts.  Medilli said that although contractors 
are not performing as well as he would like, there have been 
significant improvements in logistics over the last two months 
thanks to UNAMID's new shipping contracts.  He noted that UNAMID 
suffered due to poor planning at the outset of the mission "by 
people who had no idea of local conditions and no knowledge of the 
local market." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Military Planning Chief Colonel Stafford said that the 
target of almost sixty-percent deployment by the end of 2008 is a 
realistic estimate given current constraints.  He provided a 
detailed planning schedule (which post will scan and forward to 
AF/SPG, IO, and USUN) that shows approximately 5000 additional 
troops arriving by the end of 2008 (including the plussed-up 
rotating former AMIS battalions) and a total of 11,000 additional 
troops (including the 5000) arriving before the end of March 2008. 
Stafford noted that not only the shipment of COE but also the 
adequate preparation of camps is required before new troops arrive, 
 
KHARTOUM 00001451  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
though he said most troops should be willing to deploy to a "brown 
patch" where the ground has been leveled, a security perimeter and 
established with fencing, and basic infrastructure such as water 
tanks and latrines with septic tanks installed.  The TCCs can 
install their own tents and other facilities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Stafford said that the plussed-up former AMIS battalions 
will all deploy to the same locations initially, and that current 
camps can accommodate the influx of additional troops without 
additional construction. 
 
Self Deployment 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Both Stafford and Weiszegger were aware of the Ethiopian 
offer to self-deploy.  Stafford pointed out that if the offer is 
just to self-deploy troops, it is almost useless as the COE would 
still have to be transported before the arrival of the troops - and 
it is currently enroute.  However both Stafford and Weiszegger 
seemed to believe that if the offer included some COE such as 
rations, basic equipment and some vehicles, the offer could be quite 
valuable and suggested that it should be pushed along with DPKO. 
Stafford noted that the Ethiopian offer of self-deployment only gets 
them as far as Darfur and they would still need to be deployed by 
UNAMID within Darfur, so the offer is not a panacea in the sense of 
being able to get troops into the field quickly.  Both Stafford and 
Weiszegger noted that it is easy for the UN to deploy troops by 
plane into Darfur from abroad as well; the difficult part is 
transporting their COE.  Weiszegger noted that the Egyptians are 
already self-deploying, and had driven 72 of their own vehicles from 
Obeid to Um Kadada over the weekend. 
 
Light Deployment and Supercamps 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) D/JSR Medilli is still pushing hard for the concept of 
"light deployment," not just to pump up numbers of boots on the 
ground before the end of the year, but also to provide security at 
the new supercamps.  FC Agwai said that light deployment at 
supercamps would be fine if there were adequate conditions to 
accommodate them, but Agwai did not support light deployment at 
other locations.  He cited the UNAMID camp at Kulbus as a good 
example of a camp that did not have adequate conditions (soldiers 
are too cramped, beds are too close together, and there are not 
enough toilets) and pointed to poor morale as a result.  DFC Karenzi 
was more supportive of the light deployment concept, not only at the 
supercamps but also at other locations.  Karenzi's view is that all 
UNAMID troops should be field-ready and should be able to deploy 
with just the basic necessities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Medilli and Weiszegger both said that PAE has been making 
good progress at all three supercamps (Fasher, Nyala, Geneina) but 
will not complete them before departing Sudan for good when their 
contract ends in mid-December.  However the camps are being 
constructed in blocks and parts of all three supercamps will be in 
use by the middle to end of October.  Nyala is the supercamp with 
the most problems, as part of the camp where tents were due to be 
placed is flooded, and PAE has had to redesign the project.  Medilli 
said that UNAMID still does not have a plan for back-filling for PAE 
when it leaves.  The basic plan is to hire all of PAE's local staff 
and even some of the expat staff if possible, while also hiring some 
additional local companies and using TCC engineers to oversee some 
aspects of the projects.  However the issue of overall project 
oversight, planning, and management is the biggest challenge, and 
UNAMID still does not have a plan in place to address this gap. 
 
US Offer of Airlift 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) All UNAMID officials expressed strong support for the US 
offer of airlift and hoped that it could be provided as soon as 
possible.  FC Agwai noted that the offer was "better late than 
never" since the extreme challenges of moving COE of six months ago 
have begun to be addressed.  Medilli said that an offer to help move 
COE is more useful than an offer to move troops, as the former is 
much more difficult and critical at this stage of deployment than 
the latter.  Medilli also noted that airlift will create additional 
challenges and bottlenecks as the airports and UNAMID can only 
accommodate so many flights and so much cargo in a given day.  There 
is storage at the supercamp, but trucks will need to be arranged, as 
well as cargo handling at the airports.  (Comment: When the US 
begins to discuss specific plans for the airlift operations, in 
addition to carefully mapping out which shipments should be given 
priority given deployment timelines, an offer to provide forklifts 
or other cargo handling equipment even if on a temporary basis to 
accompany the flights may be essential. End comment.) 
 
KHARTOUM 00001451  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
Support from the GOS 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) UNAMID officials universally praised the GOS for recent 
cooperation with deployment.  Airports are now open from 7 am to 7 
pm, the Geneina airport is in use even for large cargo planes, and 
while one month ago there was a back-log of 700 visas, now there are 
only 75 pending visas, according to Weiszegger.  However, visas for 
US military officers now require approval from the intelligence 
services, according to information that UNAMID has received from the 
MFA.  UNAMID has observed that staff from four countries - the US, 
UK, Canada, and Denmark - routinely experience long delays receiving 
visas as part of UNAMID.  Australian staff also sometimes experience 
long delays. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Following the Kalma camp massacre, the GOS established a 
high-level security committee to coordinate with UNAMID, including 
the Ministers of Interior and Defense.  COS Alstrom noted that 
UNAMID now has a police liaison officer embedded with the Central 
Reserve Police (CRP - a NISS police force) in Khartoum to coordinate 
on IDP policing and escorts for UNAMID convoys.  Alstrom said that 
the GOS is now providing CRP escorts every 24 hours without fail and 
showed polchief photos of CRP officers helping UNAMID dig convoy 
trucks out of the mud enroute from El Obeid to El Fasher.  "These 
guys aren't just along for the ride, they're helping us get the 
equipment into Darfur," Alstrom rejoiced.  Alstrom noted as well 
that IDPs in Kalma Camp and Zam Zam Camp, previously hesitant to 
accept UNAMID police, now are eager to have a 24-hour UNAMID police 
presence.  UNAMID is now providing 24-hour police presence in Kalma 
but not in any other location due to a lack of FPUs (only 1 of 19 
FPUs - the Bangladeshi FPU in Nyala - is currently deployed). 
 
Helicopters 
----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) FC Agwai urged that TCC helicopter assets be identified 
immediately.  He noted that several UNAMID helicopters have been 
shot at in the last month, most notably last week when UNAMID 
attempted to investigate the fighting between GOS and SLM/Minawi 
forces north of El Fasher.  Agwai said it is increasingly difficult 
for UNAMID to investigate reports of attacks or fighting due to the 
lack of TCC helicopters and the increase in the number of incidents 
of firings upon UNAMID's current contracted air assets.  Agwai said 
that it may soon be no longer possible to use the current contracted 
helicopters for anything other than transport, as questions have 
reportedly been raised by the insurers of the helicopters, given the 
shooting incidents.  Agwai noted that this would not be a problem 
with TCC helicopters.  Agwai expressed a strong preference for TCC 
troop transport helicopters rather than attack helicopters.  He said 
attack helicopters would rarely be used, and what UNAMID needs are 
basic transport helicopters that can be used to support overland 
patrols and investigate incidents.  Agwai said night vision 
capability is not required since "in the land of the blind, the 
one-eyed man is king."  COS Alstrom also noted that the JSR 
increasingly feels that the lack of TCC helicopters limits the range 
of patrols, as UNAMID will likely be reticent to send troops on 
patrols over long distances since it is difficult to reach them 
without adequate air assets them if they come under attack (as 
happened July 7 outside of Shangil Tobay). 
 
 
July 7 Attack 
------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While UNAMID has not reached a definitive determination 
regarding which armed group perpetrated the heinous attack on UNAMID 
forces outside of Shangil Tobay on July 7, the consensus appears to 
be leaning toward placing blame on SLA/Unity.  FC Agwai told 
polchief that he personally believes "based on all the evidence I 
have seen" that it was SLA/U.  Agwai noted that JSR Adada told him 
about CDA Fernandez' suspicion in July that it was SLA/U, but Agwai 
said he had seen additional information from various rebel groups 
since then pointing the finger at SLA/U.  Agwai said that an 
investigation had just been concluded, but that the results would 
likely not be announced since the conclusions were not definitive. 
He noted that DFC Karenzi still believes that it was GOS forces 
along with janjaweed, based on the strong belief of his own 
(Rwandan) soldiers who came under attack.  Agwai said that he is 
also convinced that it was SLA/U troops that attacked AMIS at 
Haskanita in 2007 "based on the evidence," but also based on his 
personal observation of SLA/U soldiers wearing clothing several 
months later that could only have come from the Nigerian battalion. 
 
¶14. (SBU) DFC Karenzi said he is still convinced that it was 
government troops, partly because of the information from the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001451  004 OF 004 
 
 
Rwandan soldiers at the battle site (sustained attack, high caliber 
weapons, dark green uniforms) but also because the MFA U/S Mutrif 
Siddiq "seemed to know too much" about the attack when he met with 
UNAMID and provided the government's information on why it was 
likely SLA/U.  COS Alstrom said he had never seen morale among 
troops so high as it was along the Rwandans after the attack when 
they performed a war dance for JSR Adada at a memorial for the death 
of their fallen colleagues.  He said the Rwandans obviously 
acquitted themselves well in battle and had beaten back the 
attackers - which is considered by all other UNAMID troops to be a 
success story, and has been instrumental in giving the Rwandan 
troops in UNAMID increased prestige and respect. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) UNAMID is gradually transforming itself into a capable 
logistical machine with a number of key staff (Medilli, Alstrom, 
Weiszegger) who are highly qualified,  and have put the mission on a 
course to achieve some gains in deployment by the end of the year. 
The loss of PAE will be significant.  UN/DFS needs to provide some 
civilian engineering managers to the operation to begin working 
alongside PAE on an urgent basis, as there is currently no one in 
UNAMID nor on the local economy who is capable of managing such a 
large contracting/construction operation.  Despite the fact that the 
work being performed is fairly basic, there are still key management 
and engineering decisions that must be handled correctly, as shown 
in PAE's apparent mistake in planning ad designing the lay-out of 
the Nyala supercamp.  The offer of US airlift has generated 
significant excitement, but must be planned carefully as quickly as 
possible to maximize its benefit and avoid creating additional 
bottlenecks. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Polchief also had constructive meetings with Civil 
Affairs, JMAC, and UNDSS, which will be reported septel.  These 
sections appear to have some capable staff and are gradually getting 
up to speed.  Civil Affairs is planning to bring in experts to 
conduct workshops on land rights and compensation, among other 
issues.  JMAC appeared to have relatively timely and insightful 
information about the locations and strengths of rebel movements, as 
well as recent alliances (which were mostly known to Embassy 
Khartoum and have been reported).  Perhaps understandably, the JMST 
office remains almost vacant with only a couple of staff who were 
ill-informed about the Chief Mediator's plans.  Of particular 
concern, all contacts cited in this cable noted the severe weakness 
of the UNAMID political section in providing adequate support to the 
JSR and the mission as a whole.  The UNAMID political section is 
currently headed by DDDC Chief Abdul Mohammed, who eventually should 
return to that role once a permanent UNAMID political chief is 
assigned.  UN/DPKO should be encouraged to assign a capable 
political chief to UNAMID as soon as possible. 
 
FERNANDEZ