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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1445, UPDATE ON TAHA-MINNAWI AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1445 2008-09-24 05:17 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0112
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1445/01 2680517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240517Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1970
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001445 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TAHA-MINNAWI AGREEMENT 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1422 
B) KHARTOUM 1433 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On September 23, Muhammad Tijani, a senior SLM/MM 
leader and Minnawi confidant, told poloff  that "so far" he is 
satisfied with the GoS's response to the September 19 agreement 
between Vice President Taha and SLM Chairman Minni Minnawi in 
El-Fasher (ref A).  Muhammad Tijani stated that meetings with 
Intelligence Chief Gosh on September 21 and an expected meeting with 
Minister of Finance Awad Al-Jaz the afternoon of September 23 have 
reassured him of the GoS's desire to implement the agreement.  Also 
on September 23, Minnawi and DPA declaration of commitment (DOCs) 
groups both separately commented on the El-Fasher agreement to the 
Sudanese press. END SUMMARY. 
 
"SO FAR, SO GOOD" 
- - - - - - - - - 
2. (SBU)  Two days after the Taha-Minnawi agreement in El-Fasher, a 
joint SLM-GOS security arrangement committee met in Khartoum on 
Sunday, September 21 according to Head of SLM's DPA Implementation 
Committee, Muhammad Tijani.  Tijani reported that the following 
individuals attended the meeting for SLM:  Ali Hussein Dausa, SLM 
Member of the Parliament; Muhammad Suliman, former General Secretary 
of the TDRA; Muhammad Tijani; and Fadil Sa'id, SLM/MM General 
Secretary of the Security Arrangements Committee.  The GoS was 
represented by: Salah Gosh, head of National Intelligence; Muhammad 
Ahmed Al-Dabbi, chairman of the TDRA's Security Arrangements 
Committee; and Atta Al-Mannan, former Governor of South Darfur. 
(See ref B for CDA's and Polchief's meeting with Al-Mannan.) 
 
3.  (SBU)  Tijani stated that in the two and one-half hour meeting, 
SLM/MM and GoS representatives agreed to form a joint military 
commission based in El-Fasher.  This commission will investigate the 
latest round of fighting near Birmaza, Deisa, and East Jebel Marra. 
The commission in El-Fasher will also observe the ceasefire between 
SLM/MM and the GoS "which has held since Friday, as there has been 
no fighting or bombing."  Tijani stated that the parties also agreed 
to finally establish the six security mechanisms laid out in the DPA 
(e.g. ceasefire commission, joint commission, etc.)  The group 
discussed non-military logistic support for SLM/MM as "our people 
are in a bad shape and need food and shelter."  Tijani noted that 
although an exact figure has not been finalized, SLM/MM previously 
requested a monthly payment of $250,000 from the GoS for 
non-military logistical support for its fighters.  Tijani stated 
that this same group plans on meeting again in Khartoum on Sunday, 
September 28. Tijani noted that the group hopes to agree upon a more 
precise timeline for the formation of these committees in this next 
meeting. 
 
MEETING WITH AL-JAZ 
- - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  Tijani noted that SLM/MM officials in Khartoum would also 
meet the GoS Minister of Finance Awad Al-Jaz on the afternoon of 
September 23 to discuss this and other financial issues.  This 
meeting will also include Atta Al-Mannan, the three Ministers of 
Finance from North, South, and West Darfur, and the head of the 
Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund. 
 
NO RELATION WITH SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  When asked about the relationship between the Sudan 
People's Initiative (reftel B) and this latest push to implement the 
DPA, Tijani appeared dismissive of the former, saying "We have 
discussed this before and there is nothing there to the Sudan 
People's Initiative yet."  Tijani laughed, saying that this is the 
Government's thirty-eighth initiative that "has led to nowhere." 
 
DOUBTS ABOUT TIMELINE AND WHAT WAS NOT COVERED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU) Tijani appeared skeptical of the original timeline of one 
month agreed upon by Taha and Minnawi saying "it could take a lot 
longer than we thought to accomplish what we want."  Tijani stated 
that the September 21 meeting did not cover the following issues: 
protection of IDPs; the creation of joint security patrols along 
major highways; the incorporation of the DPA into the interim 
constitution; the division within SLM/MM and the NCP's role in this. 
Tijani expressed hope that these issues will be covered in future 
meetings. 
 
WHERE IS NAFIE IN ALL OF THIS? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
7.  (SBU) Tijani stated that he is not worried that Vice President 
Taha pushed forward this agreement in Nafie Ali Nafie's absence. 
According to Tijani, Vice President Taha received approval from 
President Bashir for this agreement with Minnawi.  Tijani noted that 
this agreement is also the culmination of SLM/MM's discrete ongoing 
 
KHARTOUM 00001445  002 OF 002 
 
 
dialogue with Atta Al-Mannan which has been proceeding for "some 
time now."  Tijani stated that although Nafie still formally holds 
the Darfur portfolio, elements of the Darfur file have slowly been 
handed off to other senior NCP leaders.  For example, Gosh has taken 
over Darfur security and Atta Al-Mannan now covers all wealth 
sharing issues on Darfur.  "Nafie has had the file for so long and 
nothing has happened, and I think the NCP leadership finally has 
realized that others need to be involved," noted Tijani. 
 
PRESS REPORTS 
- - - - - - - - 
8.  (SBU) Also on September 23, Minni Minnawi reportedly told the 
pro-government "Al-Rai Al-Aam" that his return to Khartoum depends 
on implementation of the September 19 El-Fasher Agreement, but that 
he hopes to return to Khartoum within one month.  Minnawi also noted 
that the El-Fasher agreement is simply a "reinforcement" of the DPA 
and threatened that this is the "last opportunity to implement the 
Abuja agreement."  Minnawi also reportedly commended the first joint 
security committee meeting. Additionally, on September 23, a 
coalition of declaration of commitment (DOCs) groups to the DPA 
issued a press release in support of the El-Fasher Minnawi-Taha 
agreement, but demanded that all DOC groups be included in this 
latest effort to implement the DPA.  (Full text of this statement 
will be sent to AF/SPG and the Office of the SE.) CDA Fernandez 
spoke to Minnawi by satphone on September 22 and Minnawi noted that 
"things were quiet, which is good, but the government hasn't moved 
yet, which is not so good." He had not yet communicated with his 
people in Khartoum on the Gosh and Al-Jaz meetings but was 
cautiously optimistic that there would be progress, "at least in the 
short run." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
9.  (SBU)  Although it is still too early to tell, Tijani's optimism 
was encouraging for several reasons.  First, Tijani was not 
concerned that the agreement resulted simply from an internal NCP 
power struggle, as it was endorsed by President Bashir and resulted 
from an ongoing dialogue with the canny Al-Mannan and many other NCP 
leaders.  Second, Tijani hinted that the GoS demonstrated that it 
values this agreement, as senior officials such as Salah Gosh and 
Awad Al-Jaz have all been immediately available to SLM/MM 
representatives.  Third, Tijani, perhaps somewhat naively, did not 
fear that ICC proceedings solely motivated or could potentially 
upset this newfound goodwill by the GoS.  Although an ICC indictment 
could ultimately kill the agreement, for now we should appreciate 
this rare moment and do all we can to support this fragile spirit of 
cooperation between the GoS and SLM/MM. 
 
FERNANDEZ