Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1438, WHERE ARE DARFUR'S HIJACKED CARS AND TRUCKS?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM1438.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1438 2008-09-23 05:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9007
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1438/01 2670531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230531Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1961
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001438 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WHERE ARE DARFUR'S HIJACKED CARS AND TRUCKS? 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Darfur's hijacking is a complex phenomenon, 
according to UNAMID, INGOs, and local contacts based in El-Fasher 
and Nyala.  Most sources placed the majority of the blame on many 
different rebel movements, with one contact describing a 
transportation chain through SLM/MM and SLA/Unity-controlled areas 
from southeast to northwest Darfur.  Most contacts claimed that 
vehicles are sold in Chad and Libya at a fraction of their value. 
See para 15 for recommendations on reducing the number of hijacked 
cars and trucks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TYPES 
- - - 
2.  (SBU) UNAMID, SLM/Minnawi, and INGO contacts all stated that 
large transportation trucks and Toyota Landcruisers are the two 
types of vehicles almost exclusively hijacked.  However, vehicles 
ranging from motorcycles, bicycles, or even sewage trucks have all 
been hijacked in Darfur.  (Note:  On September 11, 2008 the UN News 
Center reported that a sewage truck was hijacked outside of 
El-Fasher. The report does not mention whether the truck was full at 
the time.  End Note.) World Vision's local employee At Tayyeb 
Muhammad said that with respect to personal vehicles, the only type 
of vehicle ever stolen is the Toyota Landcruiser in one of its many 
forms (buffalo, pickup, four door, etc.) (Note:  Muhammad is a local 
security advisor for World Vision in Nyala and will soon become an 
employee for the Embassy's Regional Security Office.  End Note.) 
 
PRICE 
- - - 
3.  (SBU)  Most contacts stated that Landcruisers are sold in Chad 
and Libya at a fraction of their value.  Sources stated that 
depending on condition and age, Lancruisers are sold in Chad for a 
price between 2500 to 7500 USD. At-Tayyeb Muhammad told poloff that 
a hijacked vehicle is worth more in Chad than in Sudan, as "no one 
cares if you have a stolen vehicle there, and no one will ever ask 
you for registration or a license."  He joked that Chadians view the 
Sudanese border as a "free trade zone." UN Security officers told 
emboffs that large trucks are sold for between forty to seventy 
thousand dollars in Chad or Libya. Larger trucks are often traded 
for Landcruisers, which are often then used by the rebel movements. 
 
REBEL INVOLVEMENT 
- - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU) UN Security in El-Fasher believes that SLM/MM and 
SLM/Unity are largely responsible for the banditry, while UN 
Security in Nyala noted that all major rebel movements are involved. 
UN Security in Nyala estimated that rebels or individuals with 
connections to the movements steal 60 percent of all vehicles. 
Almost all rebel groups, including disaffected Arab militias, are 
often behind many of the carjackings.  UN Security sources stated 
that JEM has carried out some carjackings, though to a lesser extent 
than other movements. (Note:  The GoS accused JEM of using cars 
stolen from the humanitarian community in the May 10 Omdurman 
attack, putting several of these vehicles on display in Omdurman. 
End note.)  SLM/MM contacts in Nyala admitted that isolated 
individuals in their movement "have only once or twice stolen cars." 
SLM/MM's Issam Hama of the South Darfur Legislative Council told 
poloff on September 17 that "no one can hijack a car in the city 
unless he is protected by the GoS" alleging that most of the 
highjacking in Nyala takes place in the north of the city where the 
Border Intelligence Force and Central Reserve Police have a 
significant presence.   (Note: This week two vehicles owned by the 
Humanitarian Affairs Commission were reportedly stolen in Nyala, 
underscoring that the GOS is not always aware of or behind a 
carjacking. End Note.) 
 
SLM/UNITY TRANSPORTATION CHAIN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU) UN Security in El Fasher believes that SLM/Unity has a 
"transportation chain" of areas under its control in southeast 
Darfur and moving in a northwesterly direction toward the Chad and 
Libyan borders (near the following towns/villages:  Sigeir Um Sa, 
Shaqq Al Gama, Tarny North, Disc, Onyo.) The majority of stolen 
vehicles are eventually transported and sold in Chad and Libya, as 
"the rebels are aware of international perception, and they do not 
want to earn the reputation as a gang of robbers," stated one UN 
Security source.  This constitutes a change, noted this contact, as 
"several years ago almost all of the vehicles that were looted were 
not sold, but used by the rebel movements."  This contact noted that 
he has not been able to verify rumors that there is a 
rebel-controlled "chop shop" outside of Sarif Umra near the border 
with North and West Darfur. 
 
BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN INTERNATIONALS AND THEIVES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU)  A WFP Security Officer based in Nyala stated that the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001438  002 OF 004 
 
 
situation for carjacking in Nyala has grown from "bad to worse" in 
the last three years.  According to him, in the early stages of the 
conflict, bandits targeted Sudanese civilians and targets of 
opportunity. Now, robbers have become more discriminating and 
sophisticated, "graduating from petty theft and looking for good 
durable vehicles that expatriates drive."  The humanitarian 
community has responded by taking fewer trips out of the cities and 
renting vehicles for these longer excursions.  Some INGOs, such as 
World Vision, have even locked up their Landcruisers, favoring local 
transportation within Darfur's cities. Some ambitious robbers have 
recognized this change and are now attempting to break into INGO 
compounds to steal vehicles. In response, some INGOs are considering 
sending their "mothballed" non-rented Landcruisers back to Khartoum 
or other parts of Sudan to remove the temptation and put the assets 
to use elsewhere under safer conditions. 
 
WFP CONVOYS AND TRUCKS 
- - - - - - - -  - - - - 
7.  (SBU) WFP contacts in Nyala stated that the rate of 
"truck-jackings" has risen in 2008.  According to these contacts, 
three of WFP's trucks have already been stolen in September (trucks 
and drivers were recovered), and two in August are still missing 
along with their drivers.  Sources stated that rebels often steal 
trucks after they have been unloaded, as they are lighter and more 
maneuverable.  WFP added that abductions associated with the 
carjackings are very concerning, especially as there are over 40 
commercially-contracted drivers still missing.  WFP contacts stated 
that approximately thirty of their drivers subcontracted from 
another company recently went on strike, demanding better 
compensation given this increased threat.  WFP sources stated that 
some of WFP's trucks have been targeted because of the goods that 
they carry. Hijackers have intentionally targeted trucks carrying 
high-value and resale cargo such as sugar, but have left behind 
lower-value cargo such as sorghum. 
 
CONVOY PROTECTION HELPS, BUT THEY ARE TOO FEW AND TOO LARGE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - 
8.  (SBU)  WFP contacts stated that GoS protection for WFP convoys 
is more effective than none at all, but that the GoS will only 
provide protection for massive convoys of 500 to 700 trucks.  (Note: 
 The GoS has previously stated that the minimum number of cars 
required for convoy protection would be 100, but WFP contacts 
repeatedly discussed much higher convoy numbers, which may have more 
to do with the limited number of escort rotations provided by the 
GoS rather than a set, minimum vehicle requirement. End Note.) 
According to WFP contacts, these gigantic convoys have spread out 
over as many as 40 kilometers and take an incredible effort to 
coordinate.  WFP says that trucks have waited for weeks in locations 
outside of Darfur to join one of these large convoys.  This is 
particularly problematic on the dangerous Nyala-Geneina route, where 
escorts may only travel 2 times per month.  Additionally, as South 
Darfur has established a requirement that all commercial trucks must 
travel with police escorts, there are reports of convoys traveling 
from West and North Darfur and being required to stop at the South 
Darfur border to wait for protection.  "Although the convoys are 
effective, we simply cannot wait for the GoS to respond to our 
requests," noted WFP contacts.  WFP also stated that when trucks 
break down in the convoy, they are left behind and inevitably 
hijacked.  (Note: Under current escort operations, WFP is managing 
to get in only a fraction of the commodities required on a monthly 
basis, usually around just  60 percent of the necessary food 
dispatches, which has resulted in several months of reduced rations 
for IDPs and other conflict-affected populations.  End Note.) 
 
TRACKING SYSTEMS 
- - - - - - - - - 
9.  (SBU) GPS tracking systems have had mixed success in assisting 
vehicle recovery efforts, as many hijackers have immediately 
dismantled their systems after stealing the vehicles.  On the rare 
occasion when the systems have not been promptly dismantled, this 
technology has provided information about the final destination of 
some of the trucks. Limited data from tracking systems has revealed 
that rebel-held East Jebel Marra, Sudan; Bahai, Chad; and Libya are 
all common destinations for stolen vehicles. 
 
SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
10.  (SBU)  Another UN Security officer told poloff on September 16 
that there is an extensive carjacking network throughout all of 
Darfur.  "People have all the time in the world on their hands, and 
can sit outside of any office or base and inform their colleagues in 
the field when a convoy leaves," noted this officer.  Continuing, 
this officer described Sudanese as incredibly communicative and 
curious people who are constantly passing information, both with 
good and bad intentions. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001438  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
CARJACKING WITHIN DARFUR'S MAJOR CITIES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
11.  (SBU)  World Vision's Muhammad claimed that carjacking inside 
Darfur's towns and cities starts as a purely commercial activity. 
Although this criminal activity may have ties to rebel movements, 
those involved in the initial hijacking "are only in it for the 
money."  Within the city, it is common for those involved to use tuk 
tuks (motorized tricycles) for their initial attack.  Once the car 
is taken, occasionally a Landcruiser is brought to a "chop shop" in 
the city where it is dismantled and sold for parts.  More likely, 
according to Muhammad, the car is taken at least ten kilometers 
outside of town to a designated meeting place where the criminal 
sells the car.  According to Muhammad, the carjacker is occasionally 
paid with a motorcycle for return to the city.  Outside of Nyala, 
Muhammad claimed that there are two major locations where robbers 
bring cars before transportation to Chad or Libya or delivery to 
rebel controlled areas.  According to Muhammad, SLM/MM controls a 
stolen vehicle depot in Khorabeche, while a semi-autonomous Arab 
militia group (led by Janjaweed warlord Hamati or one of his 
commanders who have splintered from his group) controls another 
depot in Yara, approximately 50 kilometers west of Nyala.  Muhammad 
claimed that he spoke to one Sudanese man whose car was hijacked. 
This individual reportedly followed his attackers all the way to 
Yara in another car, and then re-purchased his vehicle for 
approximately 5,000 USD. 
 
CHECKPOINTS INEFFECTIVE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
12.  (SBU)  Muhammad stated that checkpoints outside of Darfur's 
cities have not cut down on the number of carjackings for two major 
reasons. Police and other paramilitary forces managing the 
checkpoints are corrupt and easily bribed.  Moreover, Landcruisers 
can easily turn off onto unpaved tracks and bypass checkpoints or 
paved roads altogether. 
 
SOUTH DARFUR PARTICULARLY BAD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
13.  (SBU)  According to UN Security in Nyala, South Darfur ranks 
highest in carjackings in all three states. 85 vehicles have already 
been hijacked in 2008 (approximately 20 UN, 30 contractors, and 30 
INGO vehicles).  Despite a summer lull in carjackings, this activity 
is again on the rise with eight incidents this month in South 
Darfur. UN Security noted that GoS deployment to South Darfur has 
improved security in some areas, as exemplified by the Nyala-Ed 
Daien road.  UN Security also stated that planned GoS deployment to 
the Menawashi has been delayed. 
 
S. DARFUR COORDINATION COMMITTEE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
14.  (SBU)  According to UNAMID Civil Affair's Ali Hassan, a 
high-level delegation from UNAMID addressed the issue of carjackings 
with senior GoS officials including Nafie Ali Nafie and Salah Gosh 
on September 10.  (Note:  Hassan scoffed at the GoS's justification 
of staging widespread attacks in order to clean up the banditry and 
carjacking in North Darfur.  End Note.)  Following this meeting and 
further complaints from Hassan at the state-level, a committee 
composed of NISS, Police, and UNAMID was formed in South Darfur to 
combat hijackings.  In their first meeting on September 16, GoS 
officials pledged to increase patrols outside UNAMID and INGO 
residential areas, particularly during the early evening.  NISS and 
the police will also dispatch plain-clothes police and agents to 
collect intelligence about the carjacking trade.  Hasssan was 
hopeful that these procedures will make a positive difference in 
reducing carjackings, specifically noting the importance of better 
intelligence on hijackings.  For its part, UNAMID pledged to quickly 
inform the GoS of security incidents, provide better security 
information to its staff, and consider moving to compound housing in 
Nyala closer to work locations. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
- - - - - - - - 
15.  (SBU) Contacts were quick to lump car and truck hijacking in 
the same category, but carjacking within cities should be 
differentiated from robberies conducted on Darfur's long and 
isolated roads.  Given the heavy military and police presence in 
Darfur's three major cities, there is no reason that the number of 
incidents cannot be significantly reduced if there is a good faith 
effort by the GoS and improved coordination between UNAMID, INGOs, 
and the GoS. Committees (such as the one already in South Darfur) 
should be established at the state level in North and West Darfur. 
Another committee for all three states should also be formed for 
standardizing convoy protection, sharing intelligence, and improving 
overall coordination.  Other creative options should be considered 
such as: using new (and less easily dismantled) tracking and 
 
KHARTOUM 00001438  004 OF 004 
 
 
beaconing devices, though the GoS may resist allowing the use of 
such equipment; marking vehicles with permanent and distinct 
identification and ownership information; painting cars with 
distinct colors and patterns for use only within cities (as was done 
in Liberia and other conflict areas); stronger border monitoring, 
especially outside of El-Geneina. We will continue to stress the 
importance of this issue to GoS, rebel, and UNAMID contacts and work 
to combat this illegal trade that feeds off Darfur's misery. 
 
16. (SBU) Chiefs of Missions from donor countries (US, Canada, UK, 
France, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and EU) 
met on September 22 to discuss this phenomenon and agreed on the 
need to gather more information, identify criminal networks, and 
find creative ways to provide disincentives for this hijacking. COMs 
were also conscious that INGOs and the UN are very concerned that no 
action be taken that makes a bad situation even worse. 
 
17.  (SBU)  Embassy Khartoum welcomes any additional light Embassies 
Ndjamena and Tripoli can shed on this subject. 
 
FERNANDEZ