VZCZCXRO8332
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1434/01 2661415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221415Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1950
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001434 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: OVERVIEW OF DARFUR REBEL POSITIONS, RELATIVE STRENGTH, AND 
POTENTIAL COORDINATION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1232 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In two recent visits to El-Fasher and Nyala, UN 
security provided an overview of Darfur rebel group's positions, 
relative strength, and potential for coordination.  Sources stated 
that areas of control are fluid and prone to change, especially 
following GoS operations in North Darfur and East Jebel Marra.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) (Note:  Representatives of UN Security from several 
different offices in both El-Fasher and Nyala provided four separate 
briefings to poloffs the week of August 24 and September 14. 
Charged with ensuring security for visits to remote rebel locations 
and investigating security incidents, these UN sources are some of 
the most informed and connected observers on the ground in Darfur. 
Sources names and positions are available via siprnet 
communications.  Due to the complexity of Arab transliteration and 
inconsistent spelling in UN Maps, spelling of villages are 
approximate. End Note.) 
 
JEM 
- - - 
¶3.  (SBU) UN sources noted that they expected a JEM attack in Darfur 
building on the May 10 attack on Omdurman.  According to this 
contact, in late May and early June, JEM positioned several hundred 
vehicles in three different locations within striking distance of 
El-Fasher.  "JEM threatened that that they were going to stage 
another attack, and given their locations, it was actually 
surprising that it did not happen," stated this contact.  He 
continued by saying  JEM most likely decided to pursue the political 
track and shortly after, Khalil Ibrahim gave an ultimatum to the GoS 
to negotiate by the end of July, or JEM would return to staging 
attacks.  This UN source said that although JEM may have been in 
discussions with SLA/Unity and SLA/AW in the past several months, 
"they probably just want to use their areas of control as a rest 
stop." One UN contact speculated that recent fighting in far North 
Darfur near Birmaza and Deisa, was designed to block potential 
routes of passage from the north to Khartoum. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  According to another UN Security contact, the Justice and 
Equality Movement is the only serious, organized, and 
politically-coherent rebel movement.  This contact noted that in 
late August, UN Security met senior JEM field commanders on the 
Sudanese border town of Bahai including: JEM Deputy Chief of Staff 
Suleiman Sandal Hagar, Political Consultant Abu Baker Hammid, Chief 
of Staff Tajiman Dino Hagar, JEM's Eritrea Representative Dr. 
Mohammed Ali Mostaf (recently expelled from Cairo after giving a 
lecture on the Omdurman attack,) and Ibrahim Almas Deng (a JEM Dinka 
tribesman from South Sudan).  According to this source, JEM's 
positions in Bahai appeared well supplied and well organized, and 
are reflective of the Chadian-supported movement as a whole.  "Bahai 
now feels like it is in the middle of Dar Zaghawa," noted this 
contact. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  A separate UN source stated that JEM likely retreated 
from the Omdurman attack to Chad, its Darfuri mountain stronghold in 
rugged Jebel Moon, and two other positions.  This source 
specifically mentioned JEM positions in Um Sammango where he claimed 
JEM forces have approximately 100 vehicles. Another group of 
approximately 25 JEM vehicles is allegedly positioned outside of 
Shangil Tobaya, according to UN sources. 
 
SLM/UNITY 
- - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  SLM/Unity may still receive limited supplies from Chad as 
"elements of their movement used to be Chadian President Deby's 
private bodyguard force," stated one UN contact.  Another source 
asserted that SLM/Unity has a lack of political leadership in 
Darfur, which has led to much banditry, disorganization, and the 
absence of command and control structures.  Contacts from the UN and 
the Joint Mediation Support Team had a low opinion of some Unity 
commanders, with one representative calling SLM/Unity's Ali Karbino 
"a thug" and another saying "he does his own thing."  (Note:  Ali 
Karbino is a former commander of SLM who defected from Minnawi a few 
months after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement.  According 
to locally-engaged staff, Karbino has the reputation for being one 
of the fiercest Zaghawa commanders on the frontline of every battle. 
 End Note.)   UN contacts stated that with recent fighting in 
Birmaza and Deisa, the GoS appears to have "secured a foothold in 
some areas previously controlled by SLA/Unity." 
 
SLA/AW 
- - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  The majority of Abdul Wahid Al-Nur's force is based in 
 
KHARTOUM 00001434  002 OF 004 
 
 
Jebel Marra with another group located in remote northeast Darfur, 
according to UN security.  Without a significant number of vehicles, 
SLA/AW relies on transportation by foot, horse, and donkey around 
and near Jebel Marra.  In addition to this area, SLA/AW Northern 
Command operates in a wide area of northeast Darfur (from the 
village of El Helif to Targambot on North Darfur's border with North 
Kordofan).  One UN source stated that he spent a day with one of 
SLA/AW key Northern Command leaders, Suleiman Marjan.  According to 
this source, Marjan (from the Meidob tribe) has less than a dozen 
vehicles, and "it is a bit of stretch" to think that Marjan could 
stage successful attacks on the GoS in North Darfur as was reported 
on August 10 and 11 in international media (reftel).  Despite one UN 
Security officer's skepticism, another stated that he has found 
Marajan to be overall "reliable" and that he provided good security 
for UNAMID visitors.  This contact said  he last saw Marjan near 
Helif (at geocordinates 14043' 25023').  This contacted added that 
SLA/AW has another small force near Zur (located west of Kabkabiya 
at geocoordiantes 13035' 23041') 
 
SLA/MM 
- - - - 
¶8. (SBU)  UN contacts stated that the areas under Minni Minnawi's 
control have shrunk rapidly in 2007 and 2008. According to these 
sources, the GoS supplied and reinforced the SLM/Free Will splinter 
group to attack SLM/MM from late 2007 to mid 2008.  These clashes 
centered around Kafoud, but spread out along supply routes, where a 
struggle over taxation rights occurred between SLM/MM and SLM/Free 
Will.  Another UN contact emphasized that this SLM/Free Will-SLM/MM 
conflict has turned into an ethnic power struggle between the 
Zaghawa and SLM/Free Will's dominant ethnic groups (i.e. the Tunjur 
in North Darfur and the Bergit in the South).  These sources claimed 
that SLM/MM and SLM/Unity (both overwhelmingly Zaghawa movements) 
have worked together to combat these SLM/Free Will attacks, and 
others (as recent as last week) by the Ma'aliya Arab tribe near 
Agabullah (east of Ed Daein).  UN sources appeared dismissive of 
reported security arrangements and demobilization, disarmament, and 
reintegration (DDR) programs in South Darfur.  UN sources also 
reported that much of the Bergit population in South Darfur is 
against this integration of SLM/Free Will into the SAF forces, as it 
will leave many Bergit villages vulnerable to attacks by SLM/MM. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  UN sources stated that Minnawi met Khalil Ibrahim in Chad 
and proposed that JEM and SLM coordinate under Minnawi's leadership, 
"something that was clearly rejected."  Minnawi has lost fighters 
and commanders to rival movements, especially JEM following its much 
celebrated (in Darfur) attack on Omdurman in May 2008, according to 
UN sources. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  UN contacts downplayed recent fighting between SLM/MM 
and the GoS.  For a long time, the GoS has used proxy forces to 
attack SLM/MM positions, and although the GoS now uses its own 
forces in direct attacks, "this is not a major change to the 
government's strategy."  UN sources said that they see GOS/SAF 
deployment to South Darfur as preparation for targeting SLM/MM's 
positions in South Darfur.  According to these sources, the GoS 
recently moved 40 vehicles near Bulbul (west of Nyala) and more to 
Shearia and Haskanita.  UN contacts stated that the GoS also moved 
more of its troops close to SLM/MM positions near Tabit on September 
¶12. 
 
SLA/ABDUL SHAFIE 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU)  UN contacts repeated, but could not confirm, rumors that 
Ahmed Abdul Shafie recently received a new shipment of cars from 
South Sudan.  (One contact speculated that this rumor started with a 
poorly researched UNAMID report that was intercepted by the GoS and 
later propagated to the international community.  Another UN contact 
thought that the report had more credence saying, "The SPLA has long 
had political ambitions in Darfur, and now it is finally starting to 
move into Darfur militarily [through supplying vehicles to Abd Al 
Shafie.]")  Abdul Shafie does have a small force east of Melit 
composed primarily of Bertit and Meidob, led by field commander 
Dicta Salih, asserted UN contacts.  Shafie has another small 
position near Daba Dunga, and is responsible for much of the 
carjacking in these two regions, stated UN contacts. 
 
ARAB TRIBES 
- - - - - - 
¶12. (SBU)  UN contacts described the area around Kabkabiya in North 
Darfur as "a stronghold of disaffected Arab tribes."  The Al-Jund 
Al-Mazloom ("oppressed soldiers") control much of this area, 
occasionally traveling into El-Fasher and clashing with the local 
security forces there.   This UN contact stated that these restless 
Arab militias "completely dominate the area" and have established 
 
KHARTOUM 00001434  003 OF 004 
 
 
checkpoints between Kabkabiya and Tawila.  This source described 
these semi-autonomous Arab tribes as focusing on banditry, and "in 
terms of taking land or fighting against the GoS, they are much less 
motivated than the rebel movements." 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Another UN source stated that the GoS has successfully 
persuaded many of these Arab groups to rejoin government forces 
after a long hiatus.  The GoS has allegedly wooed the Arab tribes 
(and even the Al-Jund Al-Mazloom) by re-supplying and delivering 
money to many of the tribes.  Most contacts asserted that the GoS 
led its attacks on Birmaza, Deisa, and East Jebel Marra with an 
integrated force composed of Arab militia (Janjaweed), Central 
Reserve Police, and regular SAF troops.  (Note:  This corresponds 
with our previous reporting.  End Note.) 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  In South Darfur, break-away groups from former Arab 
opposition leader Mohamed Hamdan ("Hemeti") have a small force of 
approximately six vehicles near Tulus.  Another semi-autonomous Arab 
group controls an area south of Ed Daein and rules with 
approximately 15-20 vehicles, with more forces controlling locations 
near South Darfur's border with Northern Bahr El-Ghazal.  UN sources 
see former Hemeti fighters as responsible for recent security 
incidents near Firdus. 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  UN sources acknowledged that some of the bloodiest 
clashes in 2007 and 2008 have been between regime-armed Arab tribes. 
 One source stated that he has just received reports that this year 
the Abbala (camel-herding) Rizegat have returned south two months 
earlier than usual, and that he expects this change in migration 
could result in significant tribal conflict over land and water. 
 
CHADIAN ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS (CAOG) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶16.  (SBU)  UN sources stated that Chadian Armed Opposition Groups 
(CAOG) have moved from two separate locations to one position north 
of El-Geneina.  (Note:  This also corresponds with previous Embassy 
reports. End Note.)  Chadian armed opposition are responsible for a 
large amount of hijacking and banditry along the Western border, 
stated these sources. 
 
OTHER POSITIONS 
- - - - - - - - 
¶17.  (SBU)  According to UNDSS maps, the following smaller movements 
are located at these corresponding locations. 
 
- SLA/Jabbar Mohamed Bakhit - Tabur Was 
- JEM /Collective Leadership - Miski and between Um Baru and Kutum. 
 
- JEM/Khamis Adam - Sheria 
- SLA/Peace Wing - Mohajirriah, Ma'aliah, and Sharif 
-    SLA/Adam Bakhit and JEM/CL (NMRD) - around Kutum 
 
FUTURE COORDINATION 
- - - - - - - - - - 
¶18.  (SBU)  In addition to widespread reports of coordination 
between SLM/MM and SLA/Unity, a statement appeared on 
Sudaneseonline.com on September 7 calling for rebel unification. 
Adam Ali Shogar, a longtime Zaghawa commander and "General 
Coordinator of SLM/Field Command,"  called  for "political and 
military unification... for the sake of Darfur, its future, and its 
IDPs and refugees."  The statement also calls for a conference 
composed of Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, Khamis Abdullah Abaker, Adam Ali 
Shoggar, and other well-known  SLM leaders including Sharif Harir, 
Suleiman Ibrahim Marjan, and Suleiman Jamous.  (Full text of this 
statement will be sent to SPG and office of the SE.) 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  Rebel and UN contacts appeared dismissive of this 
message.   URF's AlHadi Agabaldour told poloff that the statement as 
a whole is positive, but that URF can "never accept Abdulwahid 
AL-Nur as chairman of SLM."  JEM's Dr. Gibril Fidail (and brother of 
JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim) also told poloff that JEM "will be 
pleased to have a united SLM," however he appeared skeptical that 
SLM will ever be able to achieve unity or "get a response from a 
person like Abdulwahid."  UN contacts responded that statements such 
as these have been made before without any tangible results.  "The 
recent surge of activity by the GoS in Eastern Jebel Marra and the 
north could have the short- term effect of bringing SLA factions 
together, but this would be an act of survival and not unification," 
stated one UN security contact. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶20.  (SBU)  UN contacts elucidated a number of important themes 
which, if accurate, will lead to a more volatile and militarized 
 
KHARTOUM 00001434  004 OF 004 
 
 
Darfur.  Disaffected Arab tribes are returning to the GoS following 
a concerted recruitment effort by the regime.  SLM/MM and SLM/Unity 
coordination is significant, but long-term coordination across other 
rebel lines is unlikely.  SLM/MM's loss of both land and commanders 
in 2007-2008, threatens the movement's very existence in many areas 
of Darfur.  GoS deployment to South Darfur may be used eventually to 
directly attack SLM/MM's positions. These themes and many others 
(including the division of many movements along ethnic lines, 
ongoing Chad-Sudan conflict, and the lack of a single and coherent 
peace process) will continue to drive the violent, volatile, and 
chaotic dynamic in Darfur. 
 
FERNANDEZ