VZCZCXRO7761
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1427/01 2651425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211425Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1939
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001427 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: THE NUBA MOUNTAINS:  WHERE INSECURITY AND INTEGRATION ARE A 
WAY OF LIFE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1309 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
¶1. (SBU) Poloffs traveled to Kadugli, Southern Kordofan, the heart 
of the Nuba Mountains, on 13-16 September.  Southern Kordofan state, 
which shares its own CPA protocol with Blue Nile State, faces a 
number of unique challenges, one being the integration of 
formerly-controlled SPLA areas into the NCP-run federal and state 
administration.  Integration of the SPLA police with the federal 
police began in July in Southern Kordofan.  While UNMIS claims 
integration is proceeding smoothly, SPLM leaders in the area 
questioned the NCP and the SPLM's commitment to the effort. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Southern Kordofan bears the brunt of NCP complaints about 
lack of SPLA redeployment, with thousands of Nuba SPLA remaining 
north of the January 1, 1956 border in Southern Kordofan despite 
attempts to redeploy them south of the border to Lake Abiad.  While 
the SAF 31st brigade did redeploy out of Abyei, there is still 
concern about a growing SAF presence northwest of Abyei that are 
within striking distance of the volatile region. Furthermore, all 
parties (UNMIS, NCP, and SPLM) claim that the lack of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is a cause for concern in 
the state, particularly for SPLA forces that have not been 
integrated or redeployed.  Finally, the well-known presence of other 
armed groups (OAGs - primarily PDF forces armed by the SAF but also 
some former SPLA forces) running amok in the area significantly adds 
to the state's insecurity and increasing fearfulness  and ill ease 
among its residents. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: POLICE INTEGRATION 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) Situated on a large compound noticeably removed from the 
town of Kadugli, UNMIS Sector IV military personnel, totaling 1626, 
(Egyptian battalion, Indian Air Support, and Bangladeshi Police) 
claim the chief insecurity concerns in Southern Kordofan include: 
low capacity of the police, lack of disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR), increasing SAF troop levels at Kharasana 
(outside the interim borders of Abyei), and the movement of armed 
SPLA troops from Lake Abiad back and forth to the Nuba Mountains. 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNMIS milobs claim that integration of SPLA police from the 
formerly SPLA-controlled areas such as Kauda and Julud, which began 
in July, is going smoothly and that there is "no reluctance" from 
the former SPLM areas to integrate (reftel).  So far, 1500 SPLA 
police have been recruited and are being trained in Khartoum, Wad 
Medani, and Kadugli.  An additional 1500 SPLA police have been 
rejected for integration by the federal police, largely on medical 
grounds.  Milobs claim that while the police integration project is 
moving ahead, there is uncertainty about what to do with the 1500 
SPLA police that are out of a job.  According to the milobs, many 
are returning to their homes with their weapons.  Milobs claim that 
GoS police have moved into former SPLA-controlled areas.  Although 
there have been no major incidents between civilians and GoS police, 
milobs say that the lack of trust between civilians and the police 
hampers the effectiveness of the GoS police in SPLA areas. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Recently-returned Deputy Governor of Southern Kordofan 
Daniel Kodi (SPLM), who just spent over two months outside of Sudan 
for medical reasons, tells a different story.  Integration in the 
state is "not going well at all." It is not a matter of integration, 
but absorption," he said. Where do we put the 1500 former SPLA 
police who  have been rejected by the federal police?  Kodi lashed 
out at the possibility of deploying former SPLA police outside of 
the state of Southern Kordofan.  "This is a violation of the CPA," 
he said. Those training in Kadugli are living in tents, have a small 
training place and few facilities.  The GoS Police will delay the 
training process and frustrate the new recruits, he claimed. 
Furthermore, all SPLA police are being inducted as new recruits 
without regard to their former rank.  This is unacceptable, said 
Kodi, and some may choose to return to the formerly SPLA-controlled 
areas. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Southern Kordofan Minister of 
Finance Ahmed Saeed (SPLM) said that while police integration is a 
"significant step" for the state, he is concerned that some people 
are not taking integration seriously.  Integration is the NCP's way 
of gaining access to the formerly-controlled SPLA areas, claimed 
Saeed.  For integration to work, both the NCP and the SPLM need to 
be committed to it, he said. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00001427  002 OF 003 
 
 
REDEPLOYMENT, YES - BUT WILL IT LAST? 
-------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) According to Egyptian military observers, the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF) maintain two regular infantry divisions in 
Southern Kordofan State - the 5th division in Kadugli and the 14th 
division in Dilling.  The divisions are spread out across 189 
locations in Southern Kordofan.  Milobs expressed concern about the 
growing presence of SAF troops around the area of Kharasana, on the 
border of Southern Kordofan and Unity State.  The SAF deployed its 
85th brigade to the area after the April clashes between the 
Misseriya and the Dinka which left the town in ruins.  The SAF has 
not permitted UNMIS access to the area to verify SAF's growing troop 
levels.  UNMIS believes the build-up of SAF troops in Kharasana is a 
strategic move by NCP, given Kharasana's proximity to Abyei.  Deputy 
Speaker of the Southern Kordofan Legislative Assembly Saddig Mansour 
(SPLM) lamented the fact that the SAF has not reduced its forces to 
a "peacetime level" in Southern Kordofan, as mandated by the CPA. 
The SAF is spread in strategic areas across Southern Kordofan, said 
Mansour, and continues to occupy schools and hospitals. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In October of 2007, the SPLA claimed that it had 22,601 
troops in the Nuba Mountains area.  According to UNMIS milobs, the 
SPLA's 4th front began redeployment to Lake Abiad, on the border 
with Southern Kordofan and Unity State, south of the January 1, 1956 
border, in December 2007.  The SPLA did not allow UNMIS to verify 
its forces at Lake Abiad until July 2008.  At that time, the SPLA 
claimed it had 6000 of its 22,601 troops at Lake Abiad, but UNMIS 
only counted 3878.  An additional 3000 SPLA troops were absorbed by 
the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) in Southern Kordofan.  According to 
UNMIS, 15,723 SPLA troops are currently unaccounted for in the Nuba 
Mountains area. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In a separate meeting with Southern Kordofan Minister of 
Finance Ahmed Saeed (SPLM), Saeed noted that the removal of the SPLA 
brigade to Lake Abiad has left SPLM areas feeling "very vulnerable" 
in the SPLA's absence.  Furthermore, UNMIS confirmed there is 
significant movement of armed SPLA troops from Lake Abiad back and 
forth to the Nuba Mountains.  UNMIS claims that the brigade's 
deployment south of the January 1, 1956 border is almost an 
impossible situation because the fighters consider themselves 
Nubans, not Southerners, and therefore feel that they belong in the 
Nuba Mountains area. Speaker of the Southern Kordofan State 
Legislative Assembly, Ibrahim M-Balandia (NCP) said that Lake Abiad 
is not a "healthy environment" for the SPLA troops and "we (the NCP) 
expect them all to flee" and return to the Nuba Mountains. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PRESENCE OF OTHER ARMED GROUPS (OAGS) 
-------------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) In addition to the NCP's Popular Defense Force (PDF), 
which UNMIS confirmed is armed and moving around the state in large 
numbers, there is concern about other armed groups (OAGs) that have 
the potential to disrupt the fragile peace in Southern Kordofan. 
Southern Kordofan Minister of Finance Ahmed Saeed (SPLM) described 
the existence of two SPLM splinter groups; one led by former SPLA 
General Telephon Kuku and the other by former PDF fighter Al Baloola 
(to be reported septel).  According to Saeed, these groups are 
composed of disgruntled SPLA fighters angered by the lack of peace 
dividends that the CPA has brought to Southern Kordofan. The groups 
claim they will "raise arms" if the rights of the Nuba are not 
respected.  When asked about the splinter groups, UNMIS milobs claim 
that they have not been able to verify the existence of such groups. 
 Such statements are only rumors, milobs said. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Furthermore, traditional leaders, civil society, and 
Southern Kordofan government figures expressed concern about the 
NCP's arming of Arab tribes in Southern Kordofan.  Whereas Arab and 
African tribes and herders and agriculturalists used to coexist 
peacefully in the Nuba Mountains, the arming of Arab tribes and the 
squeeze for precious resources have led to fatal skirmishes, 
particularly between the Hawazma and the Nuba, in recent months. 
Many, including Deputy Governor Daniel Kodi, claim that the NCP arms 
Arab tribes in order to intentionally destabilize the state. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
¶12. (SBU) Although it occurred three years late, the integration of 
SPLA police into the national police force has raised the hope of 
many that CPA implementation is taking place in Southern Kordofan. 
Not surprisingly, the SPLM in Southern Kordofan is extremely 
skeptical of the integration and fatalistic about its ability to 
succeed.  Growing pains in the process are to be expected, 
particularly if the SPLA police are deployed outside of Southern 
 
KHARTOUM 00001427  003 OF 003 
 
 
Kordofan.  Of greater concern, however, is the fate of the 1500 SPLA 
police who were rejected for integration that UNMIS believes are 
currently sitting at home armed and unemployed.  The concern is 
compounded by the roughly 15,000 "missing" SPLA troops who never 
made it to Lake Abiad, have defected since arriving at Lake Abiad, 
or routinely move back and forth from Lake Abiad to the Nuba 
Mountains. Full defection of the SPLA force from Lake Abiad to the 
Nuba Mountains will spell disaster for the redeployment initiative 
and leaves the Nuba Mountains area susceptible to violent SAF/SPLA 
clashes. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The presence of OAGs in Southern Kordofan is a worrisome 
reality not only for the citizens of that area, but also for the 
fragile peace on the ground. The NCP's tactic of arming one tribe 
against another, as it has done in Darfur and southern Sudan, has 
fomented bad blood and hostility among groups in the Southern 
Kordofan area. Given the strong desire of most Nubans to see a 
revision in the CPA that would provide them an autonomous region, 
and the rejection by the NCP of such a prospect, there is a very 
real possibility of armed conflict in the Nuba Mountains before or 
after the 2011 referendum.  The people in this region feel abandoned 
by the SPLM and manipulated by the NCP, and do not wish to be part 
of the North, having been subjugated by northern armies and militias 
for decades.  Such conflict could be avoided if the NCP offered the 
Nuba communities security guarantees, provided better educational 
and health services, and integrated the 1500 remaining SPLA police 
into the GNU police.  The CPA parties also need to negotiate a plan 
for integrating the thousands of SPLA forces into the northern army 
with rights to be based in their home areas, though this is likely 
to be unpalatable to the NCP.  Such a discussion is long overdue if 
the CPA parties wish to avoid seeing an all-out conflict, similar to 
the May fighting in Abyei, break out in the Nuba Mountains during 
the lead-up to elections and the referendum. 
 
FERNANDEZ