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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1420, KHARTOUM EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS EMBASSY SANA'A ATTACK AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1420 2008-09-19 13:57 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
ÐÏࡱá>þÿ	:
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001420 
 
BT 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR M, DS, SPG, AF, AND S/ES-S/O 
USAID FOR AA/AF 
CAIRO FOR LEGAT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC AEMR PTER AMGT PGOV SU
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS EMBASSY SANA'A ATTACK AND 
ATTENDANCE AT GRANVILLE/ABBAS TRIAL 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Khartoum's Emergency Action Committee 
(EAC) convened on September 18 to review the details of the 
September 17 terrorist attack on Embassy Sana'a, to evaluate any 
possible connections to Sudan, and to determine if our security 
posture can be increased to better defend against this type of an 
attack.  The EAC also discussed the scheduled murder trial sessions 
on 9/21 and 9/22 for the five Sudanese men charged in the January 1 
assassination of John Granville and Abdelrahman Abbas.  The EAC 
recommended to the Charge' d'Affaires (CDA) that American employees 
not attend, and that the Embassy be represented by Foreign Service 
National (FSN) employee observers.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) Embassy Khartoum's EAC convened on September 18, 2008 to 
discuss the September 17 terrorist attack on Embassy Sana'a and the 
Granville/Abbas murder trial sessions scheduled for September 21 and 
22.  The EAC was chaired by the DCM and included representatives 
from CONS, POEC, DLO, PAO, RAO, RSO, and USAID.  The RSO presented 
information about the terrorist attack on Embassy Sana'a from DS 
reports and analysis.  With the exception of one investigative lead 
passed to the RSO from Legat Cairo, there does not appear to be any 
connection between the attack and either Sudan or Sudanese 
nationals.  Embassy name checks conducted for Legat Cairo were 
negative. 
 
3.  (SBU) The EAC discussed the Embassy's current security posture, 
recognized the inadequate and unsafe Chancery, explored ways to 
harden this facility, other embassy buildings and residences, and 
recommended improving  the randomization of employee travel.  The 
RSO briefed the EAC on the upcoming Integrated Mobile Training Team 
(I/MTT) visit tentatively scheduled for 0ctober 13 through November 
26, and stressed the importance of mandatory participation by all 
Mission employees.  The EAC discussed ways to improve procedural 
security to mitigate the risks of inadequate physical security and 
setback, and how motorpool operations can be improved to provide 
better randomization and unpredictability of employee commutes. 
 
4.  (SBU) The EAC meeting concluded with a discussion of the murder 
trial of the five Sudanese nationals charged with the January 1 
killing of USAID officer John Granville and his driver, Abdelrahman 
Abbas.  Given the high public profile and time/place predictability 
of the trial, the continued terrorist threat, and the absence of 
pedestrian identification and security screening at the courthouse, 
the EAC unanimously agreed to recommend to the CDA that Americans 
not attend.  The CDA concurred with the EAC's recommendation and 
agreed that the Embassy should be represented by FSNs observers. 
The EAC will reconvene near the conclusion of the trial to determine 
the appropriate level of representation when the verdict is 
announced. 
FERNANDEZ