VZCZCXRO0728
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1387/01 2551415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111415Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1882
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 001387 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NYALA AND KALMA CAMP UPDATE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1377 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: CDA Fernandez traveled to Nyala on September 9-10 
to meet with officials from the GOS and UNAMID, IDP leaders and 
humanitarian actors in the wake of the killing of dozens of IDPs in 
Kalma camp by GOS forces. The unrepentant Wali of South Darfur 
heaped scorn on the residents of Kalma camp while exhibiting no 
remorse for the massacre of women and children. UNAMID officials 
pointed to Kalma killings as evidence that its force is needed more 
than ever, and urged for donors and supporters to increase troop and 
logistical commitments. Meanwhile, sheikhs in Kalma camp denied that 
the presence of weapons there, and welcomed UNAMID's impending 24-7 
police presence in the camp with open arms. On the humanitarian 
side, officials from the South Darfur HAC denied they were anything 
but a facilitator, instead charging local NGOs with being 
uncooperative and even subversive. Humanitarian actors painted a 
drastically different picture, stating that harassment and obstacles 
have continued to increase in recent months. Combined with the 
flooding in Kalma camp and pervasive violence throughout the region, 
August has been among the most difficult months in recent memory, 
they said. Baggara Rizeigat (the sole Arab tribe to abstain from 
fighting in Darfur's violence) leaders asked for greater American 
engagement with the troubled region's Arab population. End Summary. 
 
SOUTH DARFUR WALI UNREPENTANT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) CDA Fernandez began the meeting with South Darfur Wali 
(Governor) Ali Mahmud by noting our long standing interest in events 
in Kalma IDP camp, the second largest  in the state. CDA had already 
requested a visit to Nyala and Kalma, even before the August 25 
killings, in order to investigate reports that the GOS was blocking 
delivery of fuel to the camp required to run water pumps. Since that 
request the killings have occurred and we are very angry at what we 
considered a crime and a massacre by government forces against 
civilians.  The United States wanted to see accountability and 
clarification of this very regrettable event. 
 
¶3. (SBU) An unrepentant Mahmud launched into a long tirade against 
Kalma Camp and its inhabitants.  There are weapons and drugs 
("bango" which is the local hashish) in the camp and it has become a 
refuge for all sorts of criminality: vehicles and livestock are 
stolen in Nyala and dismembered in the camp.  The weapons are coming 
in from the rebels. Kalma is a threat to the railroad tracks (just 
outside the camp) running from Khartoum, to the road network, 
communications and airport in Nyala. "There are over 80,000 people 
in the camp, what would happen if they marched on any of these 
sites?" he asked. There were 25 open criminal cases against people 
in Kalma Camp and a judge had blessed the operation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The goal of the August 25 operation was "merely to search 
for prohibited items."  UNAMID had been informed of the operation 
and was asked to participate in the search with the force which was 
"only made up of local police."  There was an exchange of fire and 
some people were hurt and killed.  Police were also wounded by the 
demonstrators and you can visit them in the hospital. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CDA responded that he was surprised that the Governor 
seemed to be concentrating on a list of accusations against the camp 
and not the loss of human life. This was a massacre and the 
government is responsible. Even if there are criminals or weapons in 
the camp, this does not excuse killing people.  The Sudanese 
Government should be transparent about Kalma and certainly should 
not have gone into the camp by itself.   CDA and other US officials 
had warned the GOS (including the Wali) in October-November 2007 
about just such a possibility, and not going into the camp by force 
and seeking for divide it by force. At the time the GOS agreed that 
steps in Kalma would be coordinated with the UN and donors. This had 
not happened. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mahmud said that the Government regretted the loss of life. 
49 victims were receiving the best of care (6 in Khartoum and 43 in 
Nyala) completely free of charge. The people of the camp were 
completely free to come and go as they please now. The fuel problem 
was solved. The local police were now at a point one kilometer away 
from the camp. As for transparency, the US Embassy had sent in 
someone named Eric (POL/ECON officer Eric Barbee) shortly after the 
incident who had met with some unknown persons and also with the 
SPLM, the next day the SPLM withdrew from state government.  Mahmud 
added that if the Government "had really wanted to kill people on 
purpose, the death toll would have been much higher and it could 
have also used airpower."  The GOS could not force UNAMID to 
participate but it had every right to enforce law and order in 
Darfur as it saw fit. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001387  002 OF 005 
 
 
HAC DECRIES NGO UNCOOPERATIVENESS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) After his meeting with the Wali, CDA Fernandez met with 
representatives of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) of 
South Darfur led by its Secretary General Nagm Eldeem Al Hadi. Al 
Hadi seconded the notion that the restrictions on the delivery of 
fuel to Kalma camp had been lifted, claiming that this happened as a 
result of a comprehensive discussion between the HAC, National 
Security and humanitarian community. He stated that NGOs were now 
slated to receive the agreed-upon 14 barrels per week to power the 
camp's water pumps. When pressed by CDA Fernandez, he reluctantly 
acknowledged that there was no evidence that fuel had been siphoned 
off to rebels, admitting that leakage or common theft was more 
likely. CDA Fernandez expressed satisfaction that the fuel issue had 
been resolved, and queried Al Hadi as to any other restrictions on 
NGO camp material. Al Hadi asserted that "since I arrived, we've 
never restricted anything to the camps, we merely ask for 
clarification of the project." This assertion was strongly disputed 
by NGO representatives in subsequent meetings. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Al Hadi lamented the fact that NGOs continue to mistrust 
the HAC and refuse to cooperate with its initiatives. He stated that 
the flow of IDPs to Al Salaam Camp could be curbed if NGOs would 
deliver food to the drought-stricken areas from which the new 
entrants are arriving, but that that NGOs refuse to do this. "They 
claim it's not in their mandate," he said. "This type of mentality 
frustrates us," noting that he himself comes from an NGO background. 
(Note: Al Hadi was allegedly dismissed with the International Rescue 
Committee for financial improprieties. End Note).  He expressed 
similar frustrations at lack of NGO support to relocate of IDPs from 
Kalma camp, noting that maintaining so many residents in the 
flood-prone camp is a recipe for continued disaster. CDA Fernandez 
replied that the issue was largely one of mistrust and urged the HAC 
that any action undertaken in Kalma should be done in concert with 
the international community as HAC and the current Wali had promised 
to do in late 2007. (Note: The GOS desire to disperse Kalma camp has 
been well-known. End Note.)  Al Hadi questioned why the 
international community remained "obsessed" with Kalma camp, and 
stated that some in the GOS believe that humanitarian workers are 
fermenting dissent among its residents. CDA noted that Kalma was 
highly politicized but strongly denied that humanitarian workers 
were engaging in any political activities. It is the regime which 
obsesses about Kalma because of SLM leader Abdul Wahid Nur's 
strength there. Al Hadi was at the airport to see the Americans off 
and CDA bluntly emphasized to the HAC "you need to back off on Kalma 
and never do this again. Don't go in without the UN or international 
community." 
 
RAPIDLY DETERIORATING ENVIRONMENT FOR NGOS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) CDA Fernandez met with Fernando Arroyo, Team Leader of the 
Nyala Field Office of UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), who expressed alarm at the rapid deteriorating 
environment for humanitarian operations in South Darfur. He stated 
that recent HAC inspections of NGOs, while relatively unobtrusive in 
North and West Darfur, were "a nightmare" in South Darfur (Ref A). 
Expatriate humanitarian workers were subjected to police-style 
solitary interrogations for up to eight hours with coarse language 
and threats of violence and expulsion, he said, noting that South 
Darfur HAC Secretary General Al Hadi was particularly abusive. In 
conjunction with the interrogations, Fernando asserted that HAC 
officials had forcibly gained access to sensitive computer files in 
NGO offices, including depositions from victims of sexual- and 
gender-based violence in which the accused were affiliates of 
National Security (NISS). These trends were extremely worrying, he 
said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Arroyo stated that the August 25 killings at Kalma camp 
occurred during the HAC inspection of NGOs, noting that the camp was 
half empty of humanitarian staff. Combined with the weakened state 
of the camp due to flooding, he speculated that "perhaps the 
government saw a window of opportunity" to launch a raid. Arroyo 
noted that while "there are no saints" in Kalma camp, there were 
numerous questions about the government's actions, not least of 
which was why two-thirds of the dead were women and children. He 
noted that humanitarians were refused access to the camp for several 
days, and that 60 to 70 "technicals" remained around the camp for 
several days, though fears of another attack never materialized. On 
a positive note, he stated that "I hear the wounded are being 
treated very decently and humanely." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Arroyo also informed CDA Fernandez that he has recently 
been declared persona non grata by the Wali of South Darfur 
 
KHARTOUM 00001387  003 OF 005 
 
 
(Arroyo's predecessor had also been expelled by the state's 
officials). The situation arose when HAC had requested agencies to 
assist the voluntary returnees in the village of Amakassara in South 
Darfur. One NGO partner who requested a travel permit to assist the 
UN assessment was denied the permit however the UN partners traveled 
for the assessment. Arroyo stated the UN partners were stopped at 
the checkpoint by national security officials and forced to return 
to Nyala Arroyo wrote a letter of protest to the HAC commissioner 
mentioning this refusal to facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance was a violation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
with the GNU. (Note: The UN maintains that under SOFA, all of its 
staff may work and travel throughout Sudan without the permits 
required for NGO movement. End Note.) He stated that his letter, 
along with a string of false accusations, was used as an excuse to 
declare him persona non-grata. Arroyo stated that OCHA has 
threatened the GOS not to replace him if he is PNG'd, and given 
heightened sensitivities following the August 25 killings at Kalma 
and the ICC controversy he is reasonably confident that he'll 
eventually be allowed to remain. Arroyo felt he has support of the 
South Darfur's Deputy Wali, whom he credited with single-handedly 
resolving the Kalma camp fuel issue, to push back against his 
expulsion. At the same time, he lamented that such positive 
relations did not occur with the HAC. "Humanitarians shouldn't be 
discussing issues with politicians," he said. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Arroyo stated that one NGO was evacuating staff from a 
remote area of South Darfur back to Nyala as the result of a GOS 
military offensive in east Jebel Marra. He stated that he'd heard 
rumors that SLA/Abdul-Wahid, SLA-Unity and JEM/Collective Leadership 
(formerly URF) forces had united locally to repel the government 
attacks, and that the fighting was spreading south. Two other NGO 
partners also have quietly evacuated Shearia area due to recent 
increased insecurity and attacks on compounds. The recent fighting 
is just the latest threat to the NGO community he said, and combined 
with continued attacks on humanitarian workers, vehicles and 
compounds it is pushing danger indicators and stress of humanitarian 
workers to new levels. "In four years in Darfur, this is the closest 
we've ever come to an agreement on redlines or thresholds," he said. 
Violence and HAC harassment have dealt a "massive, massive blow" to 
the NGO morale in South Darfur, he said. Depending on how the GOS 
reacts to a potential ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir, 
the NGO community may have no choice but to "switch off the lights 
and go home." 
 
¶13. (SBU) Following his meeting with OCHA, CDA Fernandez meet with 
South Darfur representatives of IRC, CHF, UNICEF, OXFAM, WVI and 
CARE, who echoed many of Arroyo's concerns. The consensus was that 
August was among most difficult months for NGOs in South Darfur 
recent history. The flooding in Kalma camp destroyed the majority of 
water and sanitation infrastructure, particularly latrines, as well 
as foodstuffs and other materials. They noted that while they had 
finally received the full allowance of fuel delivery to operate 
water pumps in the camp, they were increasingly facing bureaucratic 
impediments to the delivery of building materials. In order to 
rebuild sanitation facilities destroyed by the flood "We're going to 
be bringing in huge quantities of materials in the coming months", 
stated one partner. "I hope this is not a precursor of what's to 
come." They urged CDA Fernandez to continue to pressure the 
government to curb bureaucratic impediments and stop harassment of 
NGOs, noting that it was enough work just to keep Kalma from 
self-destructing. "With 30 births a week in the camp we're barely 
hanging on as it is." They also observed a changing demographic in 
South Darfur in South Darfur, as foreign migrants from Chad and 
Libya repopulate areas whose inhabitants move into camps. CDA 
Fernandez noted that such migrations occur spontaneously but in some 
cases are abetted by the GOS and their proxies in countries like 
Chad. 
 
KALMA KILLINGS SHOWS NEED FOR FULL UNAMID DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) On the morning of September 10, CDA Fernandez was briefed 
by UNAMID's team in South Darfur on the August 25 events at Kalma 
Camp and the status of UNAMID operations in South Darfur. Ismail 
Zain, UNAMID Human Rights Officer in South Darfur, confirmed that at 
05:00 on August 25, Kalma camp was surrounded by approximately 1,000 
heavily armed military personnel, and the shooting began at 
approximately 08:30. He stated that he was able to visit Kalma camp 
on August 26 on the following day, and asserted that 30 people were 
killed on site, including 13 men, 10 women (one of whom was 
pregnant) and seven children. A 75 year old woman died while trying 
to flee, and two people died of injuries at Nyala teaching hospital, 
bringing the total death count to 33. He stated that UNAMID was 
unable to confirm the presence of arms in Kalma camp, nor was UNAMID 
able to confirm rumors that women and children were being used as 
 
KHARTOUM 00001387  004 OF 005 
 
 
human shields (these are two charges made by Sudanese authorities 
about the incident). Marcel Akpovo, UNAMID Human Rights Officer and 
Acting Head of Office in South Darfur, was dismissively told by a 
local police commissioner that only 5 to 6 IDPs had been killed in 
Kalma, and that 7 police officers had been wounded by IDP sticks, 
stones and knives. UNAMID's Deputy Police Commissioner in Nyala 
noted that UNAMID received notice of the GOS incursion into Kalma in 
the form of a letter delivered to UNAMID headquarters in Nyala (in 
Arabic) at 07:00 on August 25, approximately 1.5 hours before the 
shooting began. He said he desperately tried to get in touch with 
GOS liaison officers but to no avail. He said that despite the 
delivery time by GoS authorities, the letter authorizing the weapons 
search by the court was dated on August 21 and the large government 
force had begun to gather at the site at 5 AM so the issue of "the 
GOS letter delivered to UNAMID" was a regime fig leaf to cover up a 
unilateral action against the camp. 
 
¶15. (SBU) While expressing dismay at the killings, UNAMID 
representatives expressed hope that Kalma would underscore how 
critical its mission and presence is in South Darfur. A UNAMID Civil 
Affairs officer went so far as to call it "a blessing in disguise," 
noting how the killings raised UNAMID's profile not only among NGOs 
but IDPs in Kalma, many of whom were previously skeptics. He stated 
that several IDPs told him "if you were not here, we'd have all been 
wiped out." Akpovo added that Kalma has "sent a powerful political 
message to the world about the importance of UNAMID" that needs to 
be seized by its UNAMID leadership, donors and supporters to push 
for more funding, troops and logistical commitments. UNAMID is 
"very, very handicapped," he said. "If we are going to succeed here, 
we're going to need more troops and more police." 
 
CDA VISIT TO KALMA CAMP 
----------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The morning of September 10, CDA Fernandez traveled with a 
UNAMID escort along the waterlogged roads to 93,000 person camp, 
accompanied by the newly arrived Bangladeshi FPU (Formed Police 
Unit) Commander, Brigadier Muhammad Mesba Nebi. In a very unusual 
occurrence, the convoy was waived through both security checkpoints. 
A newly erected GOS police camp was seen approximately 1 kilometer 
from the camp, comprised of 12 or so tents and at least one 
"technical". The convoy passed the nearly complete new UNAMID Police 
Headquarters at the foot of the camp, which was an impressive 
structure. Upon arriving in the camp, CDA Fernandez and the 
Bangladeshi FPU commander were warmly welcomed by Kalma camp 
sheikhs. The sheikhs broadly asserted that government accusations of 
weapons in Kalma camp were lies, and that Kalma camp contained 
neither rebels nor aspiring politicians, just IDPs. They welcomed 
the presence of UNAMID and urged a 24-7 police protection force, 
which the commissioner asserted would go into force as soon as the 
police headquarters construction was completed in a matter of days. 
"Without you, the government would have finished with us along time 
ago," said one, urging that UNAMID strengthen its presence. 
 
¶17. (SBU) CDA and party then returned to UNAMID HQ for meetings with 
Baggara (cattle-herding) Rizeigat leaders. The large and well-armed 
Southern Rizeigat, whose land lies around the town of Ed Daien, are 
the single largest Arab tribe in Darfur not drawn into the 
government-encouraged violence against Darfur's African population. 
CDA told the leaders that the U.S. wants good, close relations with 
Darfur's Arabs and does not hold them responsible for the actions of 
a few, this is especially true of the Baggara Rizeigat "who did the 
right thing" in Darfur over the past years. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The leaders welcomed American outreach and said that "all 
the people of Darfur are oppressed" but won't get their rights by 
fighting. The biggest enemy in Darfur is ignorance. The Arabs were 
uneducated and receive no services or development assistance from 
Khartoum. "The devil descended between the tribes of Darfur" because 
of ignorance. Even though they are "defenders of peace," the 
Rizeigat are under tremendous pressure from the regime and from 
other tribes - 48 tribes currently have a presence on Rizeigat land. 
The Bergo, Zagawa, Bergid and Tama (all African farmers) have 
squatted on Rizeigat land and even though the Rizeigat haven't 
fought them or expelled them, this is a major problem because of the 
lack of services and natural resources. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Comment: There is no doubt that the Kalma massacre was not 
the action of a rogue, unsupervised commander acting on his own. 
This was a major operation, carefully planned - at least at the 
state level - to abuse and terrify IDPs. The laughable claim of the 
regime of wanting this to be a joint operation with UNAMID is a 
farce. The difficulties for NGOs created the Kalma killings, 
flooding, violence and hostile treatment by government authorities 
have caused a potentially devastating blow to humanitarian morale. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001387  005 OF 005 
 
 
These constraints have forced partners to scale back operations in 
South Darfur. With no political solution in sight and a possible ICC 
arrest warrant of President Bashir on the horizon, there is an acute 
possibility that this withdrawal could multiply, with dire 
consequences for the thousands of residents of Darfur's IDP camps. 
Certainly in South Darfur, there is no NCP "charm offensive" to gain 
favor for ICC deferral but the regime's usual mix of shameless 
dishonesty, constant violence and corrupt incompetence. At the very 
least, an urgent accounting of responsibility for the Kalma massacre 
should be a small but insistent demand of policymakers in dealing 
with Sudan. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ