VZCZCXRO0724
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1386/01 2551414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111414Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1880
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001386 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, IO/PSC 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Deployment 
Update 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 1312 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Self-sufficiency is a key component for 
Troop-Contributing Country (TCC) deployment success as 3,900 
UNAMID-shepherded containers continue to be held up in Port Sudan 
and El Obeid by both internal factors and by the regime.  An 
emphasis on local procurement could decrease expenses and increase 
UNAMID progress.  The possibility of International Criminal Court 
(ICC) indictments continues to weigh heavily as the possibility of 
reprisals against UNAMID could render an already  difficult job 
impossible. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 9, Poloff met with Abdul Aziz "Peter" 
Iskander, Deputy Director UNAMID Liaison Office to discuss ongoing 
UNAMID deployment challenges and compare the Khartoum perspective to 
those of field officers on these issues. 
 
Missing Deployment Goals 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3. (SBU) Iskander agreed with reports from the field (reftel) that 
UNAMID will be unable to reach its end-of-2008 80 percent deployment 
goal, but declined to speculate when that goal would be reached. 
Iskander remarked TCCs lack the capacity or will to put forth more 
troops which will push back deployment goals further.  On a positive 
note, some police forces are deploying with much less difficulty. 
The lack of firearms deems them more acceptable to the GOS and they 
have less equipment to move. 
 
Material and Personnel Movement Problems 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4. (SBU) Experience now demonstrates that countries that provide 
their own equipment and manage movement into Sudan are the most 
successful, according to Iskander, "UNAMID has no capacity to bring 
in equipment."  His suggested deployment method is that each TCC fly 
all equipment via IL76 to the airfield nearest to the deployment 
site and conduct in-processing and Component Owned Equipment count 
at that location.  Iskander posits that the more the U.N. tries to 
implement a standardized process the more the GOS impedes 
processing.  Standardizing the system has worked for the U.N. in 
countries with welcoming and permissive environments, but this is 
not the case in Sudan and the U.N. does not appear to be able to 
adapt. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The container back-log continues. Iskander reported that 
there are 3,900 20-foot ISO shipping containers divided between Port 
Sudan and El Obeid.  At El Obeid, officials arbitrarily request 
cleared shipments to undergo a second clearance process and local 
governors use the process to demonstrate their power at the expense 
of the shipments (Note: This is a common Sudanese bureaucratic 
procedure - diplomats need special permission to travel to Darfur 
and even with a permit can be denied. Material or commercial goods 
which have already cleared customs can be made "to clear customs 
again," NGOs can be and are made to pay special taxes for goods 
intended for IDPs in South Darfur but not in other states. This 
behavior, which extends far beyond UNAMID, is equal parts 
corruption, incompetence and intentional obstructionism. End note). 
Personnel in-processing at Port Sudan also continues to provide 
challenges. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Iskander, a third-party contractor, Agility, 
is successfully moving TCC equipment via rail all the way to Nyala 
in South Darfur, an option UNAMID has not yet considered.  These 
shipments allegedly avoid the Port Sudan customs process and are 
cheaper and faster.  (Note: While it is true that Agility ships 
overland equipment by rail, it still must be landed at Port Sudan, 
so it is unclear how it avoids the customs process there.  Agility 
could not be reached for confirmation.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Iskander said that a bright spot in the UNAMID process is 
Major General Saeifeidin Omer Suliman, the new Director of Customs, 
who has intervened with rapid clearances when requested by UNAMID. 
Three shipments in Port Sudan remain stranded, however.  These 
consist of PAE heavy equipment including tractors and graders.  No 
written documentation spells out PAE's formal status since it lost 
its official standing July 14, so even Major General Suliman cannot 
yet authorize the release (MFA U/S Siddiq, who oversees the UNAMID 
deployment file for the GOS, told CDA that even though PAE's formal 
status ended on July 14, the GOS would give them additional time - 
two months, now ended - to complete their projects.  Without the 
equipment PAE hass fallen behind on their promise to complete 
projects before the 60-day grace period is concluded.  Iskander 
advises PAE to consign the equipment directly to UNAMID, but PAE 
reportedly is reluctant to transfer ownership. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001386  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Iskander feels of the 18 companies which bid on the PAE's 
contract PAE, DynCorp and Agility appear to be the frontrunners, 
with PAE the clear favorite as it would not incur start up or 
deployment costs. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Visas continue to remain problematic for U.S., Canadian, 
Danish and other Western military petitioners as GOS representatives 
provide "sweet talk" but no constructive action. 
 
Procurement:  A Better Way 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10. (SBU) Iskander also recommends UNAMID change its attitude 
towards procurement.  Tires currently procured from Kuwait at (USD) 
$400 each can be acquired locally for half the price without 
compromising standards or incurring shipping and customs times.  The 
financial benefit would make more funding available for other 
programs. Eliminating some third party contractors is another 
procurement strategy which would provide financial benefits.  A well 
qualified Quality Assurance team could provide oversight. 
 
Bureaucracy and Morale 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11. (SBU) According to Iskander, internal bureaucratic impediments 
also hinder the UNAMID Human Resources and financial processes. 
Human Resources actions are slow to process and slow payment for 
contacts and hotels in Port Sudan (some dating form 2005-6) have 
strained relationships between UNAMID and the resources required for 
mission success. 
 
¶12. (SBU) U.N. bureaucracy has also had a negative impact on 
retention and recruitment, as promotions are slow and many 
individuals have been in multiple "stretch" positions for years 
without the benefit of appropriate pay.  Iskander complained that 
nepotism and favoritism plague UN recruitment.  Both of these 
factors have depleted morale and a loss of incentive to remain with 
the U.N. 
 
ICC Indictment and Security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶13. (SBU) While UNAMID has no official source, Iskander said that 
wishful thinking by some in the UN persists that the ICC will hold 
off on indicting President Bashir under U.N. pressure.  Others, 
however, expect ICC action in October, and anticipate an unspecified 
GOS response aimed at UNAMID.  In the mean time, U.N. personnel in 
Sudan remain at a Phase IV security level and do not expect to 
lessen that posture.  Iskander also expressed concern that the 
security level may continue indefinitely as there is no U.N. policy 
on how to scale back to a lower posture. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
¶14. (SBU) UNAMID leadership in Khartoum agrees with the opinion of 
those in the field that deployment goals will not be met and UNAMID 
management of equipment movement continues to be painfully slow and 
confused.  UNAMID will have to demonstrate previously unseen 
flexibility and initiative as it forays into new territories of 
material management and procurement.  Relaxing its focus on the most 
strict reading of regulations and concentrating on practical methods 
of mission accomplishment will be crucial for UNAMID success.  In 
the interim, the U.N. should encourage TCCs to provide their own 
material and handle deployment until such time UNAMID is able to 
revamp its own procedures. 
 
FERNANDEZ