VZCZCXRO7002
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1363/01 2510622
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070622Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1837
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001363 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/RSA 
NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU SU
SUBJECT:  UK CONSULTANTS ON DDR:  MISTRUST AND INAEDQUATE CAPACITY 
THREATEN DDR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 1296 
B) KHARTOUM 1071 
C) KHARTOUM 987 
D) KHARTOUM 927 
E) KHARTOUM 517 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Over the past two weeks, a team of UK-funded 
consultants assessed  UN,  GNU, and GoSS capacity to carry out a 
mammoth disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program 
planned to commence in January 2009.  They found that while the GoS 
has sufficient capacity to start the multi-year, multi-million 
dollar program in northern Sudan, the GoSS' DDR team needs 
additional training in order to carry out the program in the south. 
Furthermore, the UN lacks sufficient experienced DDR staff.  The 
consultants expressed concern that there is a glaring lack of trust 
between the northern and southern DDR commissions.  They also are 
concerned that because both the 2009 elections/2011 referendum and 
2009/2012 DDR programs draw upon the same limited UNMIS resources 
that there might be insufficient resources to do both.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) UK consultants Ted Morse and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot 
interviewed GNU, GOSS and UN DDR officials over the past two weeks 
to independently assess the capacity of these organizations to carry 
out the planned DDR activities scheduled to start January 2009.  The 
consultants briefed poloff on August 24 on their preliminary 
findings and said that they intend to use the findings for 
additional discussion with the GNU, GOSS and the UN.  The primary 
question they focused on is whether the various organizations have 
sufficient capacity to start the four-year USD 410 million DDR 
program for 180,000 combatants on January 1, 2009. 
 
THE NORTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR 
------------------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) The Northern Commission on DDR (NCDDR) has sufficient 
capacity to begin the program in January, the consultants said. 
Morse and Gebrehiwot claimed that NCDDR senior management is 
experienced, highly educated and well trained.  They observed that 
the NCDDR includes SAF military personnel, which, according to the 
UK-funded team, is an advantage in planning and executing DDR. 
However, while the Khartoum-based NCDDR top echelon leadership is 
strong, the NCDDR's state-level teams are understaffed and lack 
management talent. 
 
THE SOUTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR 
------------------------------ 
¶4. (SBU) According to Morse and Gebrehiwot, the Southern Commission 
on DDR (SCDDR) lacks sufficient capacity to conduct DDR programs, 
but if provided with a robust training program now, the SCDDR could 
be ready by January. Overall, the SCDDR needs additional trained and 
experienced staff at all levels who are able to conduct the broad 
range of DDR program planning and execution (capacity is a major 
problem plaguing the GOSS across the board).  Plagued by turnover, 
the SCDDR would benefit from the recruitment of top-level 
professional technical managers who are experienced in planning and 
operating large programs. 
 
THE UN DDR PROGRAM 
------------------ 
¶5. (SBU) The UN DDR program, which is split into DPKO-operated 
programs and UNDP programs, does not have sufficient capacity on the 
UNDP side to plan DDR programs, but can develop them if sufficient 
qualified staff are recruited and trained, claimed the UK-funded 
team.  While UN leadership is capable, UN efforts are undermined by 
lack of sufficient staff and a high turnover rate. The UN has said 
it will recruit a sufficient number of staff by January, but new 
staff, even if technically competent, will need local area training. 
 Morse and Gebrehiwot pointed out that the UN must recruit 
experienced financial staff to establish a financial system for the 
anticipated large number of transactions associated with the hiring 
of 1,000 caseworkers, multi-million dollar contracts with an 
estimated 200 NGOs, and payments to 52,000 beneficiaries. 
 
OBSTACLES IDENTIFIED 
-------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) The consultants observed that, not surprisingly, a degree 
of tension and mistrust exists arisen between the SCDDR and the 
NCDDR.  The Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), a key organizing 
body with a mandate to develop clear roles, responsibilities and 
procedures for the commissions, has not met in three years. 
According to the Morse and Gebrehiwot, the lack of a neutral 
technical coordinating body has made the SCDDR skeptical that the 
Khartoum-based NCDDR dominates the planning process and marginalizes 
the Juba-based SCDDR. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001363  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The consultants said that while DPKO has adequate funding 
for the disarmament and demobilization aspects of DDR, UNDP does not 
have sufficient funding for its part of the re-integration programs. 
 UNDP and DPKO appear to have planned their programs separately from 
each other.  Furthermore, the two DDR commissions and the UN (both 
DPKO and UNDP) are forcing top-down planning in local offices 
without regard for local needs.  The result is a classic case of bad 
planning: the UN has imported thousands of office trailers for local 
DDR offices, but state-level DDR offices have not yet secured land 
for the trailers. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
---------------- 
¶8. (SBU) Based on their preliminary findings, the UK-funded team 
will recommend that there should be a tripartite north-south-UN DDR 
workshop on the planning process to deal with tangible deficiencies. 
The consultants suggested that developing a trusting north-south 
relationship is important and that any relationship-building program 
should include the TCC, whose participation is critical.  With 
regards to level of trust between the northern and southern DDR 
commissions, the consultants said that "if you want someone to agree 
with you on the execution, they need to be there for the planning." 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UK-funded team suggested that additional local level 
commitment would further the goals of both northern and southern DDR 
programs.  They suggested that veteran groups be more involved and 
that localities aggressively take part in planning DDR programs. 
"The variation of local needs are  too great for top-down planning 
to work effectively," said one consultant who gave the example that 
some southern states have 100,000 soldiers who want to do farming, 
while other states might have only 200 farmers.  "Besides, more 
local planning would go a long way to reduce southern mistrust." 
 
POSSIBLE CHALLENGE: SIMULATANEOUS ELECTIONS AND DDR 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶10. (SBU) The consultants said that the multi-year 2009-2012 DDR 
program and the anticipated 2009 elections and 2011 referendum 
follow parallel timelines.  They expressed concern that given 
existing shortfalls in capacity, the near simultaneous resource 
requirements will exceed UNMIS limited capacity to support both DDR 
and the elections and referendum programs at the same time. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶11. (SBU) Concerns linked to Sudan's DDR program include not only 
the classic north-south reluctance to commit to the implementation 
of the program, but are compounded by the South's lack of capacity 
to carry out the program effectively and the UN's lack of 
preparedness and inter-agency coordination to manage the program 
appropriately.  The UK-funded team's assessment has highlighted only 
a few of the daunting obstacles facing the start of this massive, 
costly effort.  In order to address some of the logistical and 
capacity issues that exist, enhanced donor support is needed, which 
in the wake of the June 25 DDR donor appeal (ref C) conference, has 
not yet materialized.  This team's latest report will likely be used 
for another appeal for donor DDR support. 
 
FERNANDEZ