VZCZCXRO5080
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1352/01 2480945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040945Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1816
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001352 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: TURF WARS - RIVAL GOS FORCES CREATE A CHAOTIC AND 
MILITARIZED DARFUR 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Rivalry and competition between government 
security agencies, paramilitary units, and proxy forces have led to 
a chaotic, violent, and militarized environment in Darfur, according 
to multiple and varied sources in North and South Darfur.  These 
contacts (from UNAMID, DPA signatories, and non-signatory rebel 
movements) all stated that although the National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS) has "final say" in the region, this ongoing 
competition has created ever-changing fiefdoms and militarized 
zones.  Sources stated that one of the most prominent conflicts, 
between the Ministry of Defense's Border Intelligence Force and 
NISS's Central Reserve Police resulted in both civilian and military 
deaths on August 28.  END SUMMARY 
 
RIVALRY IN GOS FORCES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  Almost all contacts separately stated that rivalries 
within the Government's security apparatus has created a chaotic, 
militarized, and explosive environment in Darfur. This is in 
addition to a fragmented mosaic of feuding and thieving rebel groups 
rampaging throughout the region.  UNDSS North Darfur Director 
Francis King told poloff that the Khartoum Government "completely 
lost control in Darfur long ago."  King stated that there are many 
different government groups, militias, and paramilitary forces and 
"each of these has a different fiefdom controlled by changing 
military and NISS directors that do not like each other."  NISS 
ultimately is on top of the hierarchy of competing agencies through 
the security committee at the state level, while the local police 
have essentially no weight in policy, strategy, and planning, said 
King.  Khartoum can only manage this chaos, according to King, by 
regularly rotating out these officials and "leaving behind no 
transfer of knowledge."  King emphasized that just as UNAMID 
officials are building a working relationship with NISS and military 
officials in Darfur, Khartoum transfers these individuals to 
different posts to disrupt the working relationship. SLM-Minnawi 
South Darfur leaders (Suliman Nourain, Omar M. Ibrahim, Sam Hama' 
and Muhaya Younis) also separately agreed that "the whole country is 
controlled by NISS." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) UNDSS South Darfur Chief Abdallah Janakat reported to 
poloff that the Central Reserve Police and Border Intelligence 
Forces openly fought in the market of Mershing (70 km north of 
Nyala) on August 28.  Janakat stated that unconfirmed reports state 
that the fight resulted in the deaths of 18 GoS fighters and several 
civilians.   Later UNAMID reported that one Fur civilian was killed 
in the clash and eight others were wounded.  (The report did not 
list GoS casualties.)  The UN also reported that on August 29, the 
Deputy Wali of South Darfur traveled to Mershing and paid blood and 
compensation money for the i.cident to reatIves and pribad lealeRs/ 
 
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Kalma IDP camp).  Janakat's UNDSS colleague in North Darfur, King, 
separately noted that CRP is better equipped and trained than other 
forces in Darfur.  King said in the last several months the CRP have 
received brand new vehicles and weapons and have deployed in 
increasing numbers throughout Darfur. Janakat and many other 
observers emphasized that NISS controls the CRP from Khartoum, 
unlike other forces such as the Border Intelligence Force. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Some former janjaweed have been incorporated into the 
CRP, but it is a highly professional force, noted King.  Kamal Haj 
Daoud, the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator for SLM/MM, told poloff 
that half of the CRP is made up of supposedly more trustworthy 
northerners of the same tribes as the ruling Khartoum elite, while 
the others are Darfur Arabs from where the janjaweed have been 
drawn. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  King stated that some CRP units have been used to provide 
force protection for UNAMID and WFP convoys.  "I spoke with some of 
my UNAMID colleagues and they were very impressed with the CRP's 
reconnaissance - they were scouting ahead, using unpredictable 
patterns, and taking high places in a very professional manner," 
stated King.  King said that after 3 straight days with the CRP, his 
UNAMID colleagues "shared stories around the campfire and many of 
the CRP guys were quite open about their past activities and 
associations [as janjaweed and GoS proxy forces.]" 
 
KHARTOUM 00001352  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
BORDER INTELLIGENCE FORCE AND ITS FINANCIAL STRAIN ON GOS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  According to Daoud, the Border Intelligence Force is a 
less refined force, filled almost entirely with former janjaweed and 
controlled by the Ministry of Defense at the state and local level. 
This force is less well equipped and less disciplined than its NISS 
counterparts, noted both King and Janakat. Janakat stated that the 
integration of the janjaweed into the BIF and other state security 
forces has affected the GoS financially.  Previously, the GoS only 
paid the janjaweed for each operation they conducted, but now these 
fighters receive monthly salaries.  (NOTE:  In the spring of 2008, 
there was fighting between government forces in the El-Fasher market 
between different government forces protesting over a delay in 
payment of monthly salaries.  End Note.)  Janakat also emphasized 
that Arab militias and janjaweed groups previously had flexible 
structures.  When the GoS needed larger militia forces, it could 
contact militia leaders who could easily recruit hundreds of men at 
a time for a one-payment mercenary operation.  Janakat stated that 
now some of these forces are on a continual GoS payroll as Khartoum 
tries to buy their loyalty. 
 
MILITIAS AND ARAB TRIBES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU)  King stated that some areas of Darfur are 
semi-autonomous, left alone as "the stronghold of independent and 
disaffected Arab tribes."  King noted that one such area around 
Kabkabiya is renowned for its banditry and hijacking committed by 
these groups - something the GoS is either unable or unwilling to 
control.  King stated that these groups occasionally come into 
El-Fasher and clash with the GOS security forces.  King emphasized 
that these Arab militias "completely dominate the area" and have 
established private checkpoints between Kabkabiya and Tawila. 
Janakat separately stated that in South Darfur, almost every tribe 
has its own militia.  The GoS has armed many of these tribal 
elements, and when necessary, attempts to play them off one another. 
Much of the bloodiest fighting in Darfur in 2007-2008 has been 
between Arab tribes both heavily armed by Khartoum (the most 
notorious being the range war between the Tarjum and Abbala Rizeigat 
that has claimed hundreds of dead to date). 
 
CHECKPOINTS 
- - - - - - 
¶9.  (SBU)  Janakat stated that travel overland is greatly 
complicated by these competing forces.  For example, stated Janakat, 
the Nyala to Kas road has over seven different check points, three 
of which are operated by the CRP, three others by their rivals in 
the BIF, and one by a semi-autonomous Arab militia group.  Janakat 
said that each of these forces has its own taxation, security, and 
travel regulations, while bringing little security to the roads that 
they control. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  Most observers in Nyala stated that the CRP was 
responsible for the August 25 Kalma Camp attack.  This bodes poorly 
for Darfur, if these units (described as Sudan's most elite and 
well-trained) quickly lost control and indiscriminately fired on a 
lightly armed group of IDP demonstrators.  It is even more 
startling, if as contacts claim, all CRP units (including the unit 
used in Kalma camp) are directed by NISS headquarters in Khartoum, 
and not the local government in Nyala.  As the GoS faces growing 
external pressure in the face of an ICC indictment and internal 
fractures in the GoS may grow, the BIF and CRP will be two security 
forces to watch in the coming months.The GOS must prove that it can 
maintain control over these forces if it hopes to keep its hold on 
power in Darfur, but in reality the regime's grip is tenuous at 
best. It is only the strongest of many armed, ruthless, and 
disaffected elements in the region - a perfect storm of anarchy 
intentionally created by the NCP and now slipping away from its 
ability to manipulate.  If the regime loses control of these forces 
to the extent that they continue to fight each other and disobey 
orders, the chances of an internal struggle within the regime can 
only grow. It also means even more ominous news for Sudan: not that 
the regime won't stop bad behavior in Darfur, but that it no longer 
can, even if it had the political will to do so. 
 
FERNANDEZ