VZCZCXRO5065
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1351/01 2480910
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040910Z SEP 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1813
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001351 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID ASEC KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT:  NEW ABYEI ADMINISTRATOR REVIEWS HIS PLANS WITH CDA 
 
REFS: A. KHARTOUM 524 
  ¶B. KHARTOUM 955 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Newly designated Abyei Administrator Arop Mayak 
told CDA Fernandez that his immediate plans include establishing an 
environment that will permit the IDPs to return soon, reestablishing 
security, and promoting ethnic reconciliation between all the groups 
in the area.  CDA Fernandez assured him of strong U.S. support and 
said that some development projects for the area already have been 
identified, but must await the return of USAID implementing 
partners.  They agreed that the NCP is continuing to try to stir up 
conflict between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya tribes to its own 
advantage.  END SUMMARY. 
 
U.S. Stands Ready to Assist Abyei Administration 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU) On September 2, Charge Fernandez met with Arop Mayak, the 
newly appointed Administrator for Abyei.  The CDA assured Mayak of 
the U.S. commitment to help the new Abyei administration succeed. 
The CDA noted that USAID already had identified some development 
projects for the region before fighting broke out there in May (ref. 
A); for example an all-weather airfield and feeder roads in the 
surrounding countryside.  Some money for these has been identified, 
but implementation must await the return of USAID implementing 
partners, who were forced to evacuate during the May fighting and 
have yet to return.  When the NGOs are able to return, the U.S. can 
begin providing material assistance.  He added that he hopes the 
upcoming U.S. police-training program in Juba can be extended to 
Abyei too.  Mayak said that he believed that it could, and remarked 
that the provisions regarding police were "the only positive part of 
the Abyei Protocol." 
 
First Priority:  Getting People Home 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU) Mayak said that his most important immediate task is IDP 
returns.  He said Abyei IDPs fall into two groups.  First there are 
those most recently displaced by the fighting in May.  These people 
are severely traumatized by their experience and will need some time 
to recover, once they are able to return home. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Mayak noted that a number of measures must be taken before 
these people can go home.  First, remaining unexploded ordinance 
must be removed.  Second, the dead bodies remaining from the May 
fighting must be recovered.  The CDA agreed that if the IDPs 
returned to discover unburied dead it would lead to another 
explosion of anger and possibly more fighting.  Both of these 
measures are well in hand, Mayak asserted. Finally, Mayak continued, 
the SAF, some elements of which remain in Difra, must completely 
evacuate if the returnees are to feel secure.  CDA Fernandez 
remarked that when he visited Abyei with Special Envoy Williamson 
following the fighting, they were assured then that the SAF would be 
gone within "a few days" (a week at the most) so SAF is already two 
to three weeks later in withdrawing fully than GOS officials had 
assured SE Williamson. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The second category of IDPs are those who were displaced 
earlier, during the civil war and earlier, and now want to come 
home, Mayak continued (the first of displacements in Abyei date to 
1965). Most of these want return to their original villages.  This 
will be problematic, as most are from the area north of Abyei town, 
which remains the region most vulnerable to insecurity. 
 
Reestablishing a Secure Environment 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU) Mayak said that after his consultations in Abyei, he will 
order the security forces to redeploy, mostly to the north of the 
town. Mayak, a former SPLA commander, says that he intends to fully 
exercise the Administrator's prerogative to control the JIU and JIPU 
forces in the region to establish security.  He also plans to 
establish a small-arms-free zone in Abyei in order to restore the 
residents' confidence in their security.  CDA Fernandez asked how 
Mayak planned to handle the "Baggara" Misseriya, nomadic Arab 
herdsmen who migrate with their cattle through the Abyei region on 
their way to grasslands farther south and who routinely carry 
weapons.  Mayak said he plans to designate a line north of Abyei, 
beyond which the herdsmen may pass, but only without their arms. 
The Charge commented that this is a sensible idea, but one to which 
the GoS probably would object. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Mayak noted that although there are three traditional 
Misseriya migration routes, one through Unity State and one down to 
Aweil in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal, the NCP continues to emphasize the 
middle route to Abyei because they see it as a way to advance 
Misseriya (and NCP) claims in the contested region, "they don't dare 
 
KHARTOUM 00001351  002 OF 003 
 
 
claim special privileges in Unity or Bahr al-Ghazal." Arap noted 
that as Administrator, he will have authority over all of the 
security forces in his region, both SAF and SPLM.  He plans to order 
both sides to withdraw, to the north and south, respectively.  The 
CDA remarked that he is primarily concerned by the SAF presence, but 
he agreed that it is important to be even-handed. 
 
NCP's Misseriya Trojan Horse 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU) CDA asked where Mayak's NCP-appointed, ethnic-Misseriya 
Deputy Administrator Rahama Al-Nour would be located.  Mayak replied 
that he should be in Abyei itself, but that Al-Nour plans to remain 
in Khartoum for the time being.  Mayak said that the two had met 
earlier that day and that Al-Nour had told him that he wants to move 
to Abyei soon, but is afraid to do so now because of the high-level 
of tension there among the Dinka population. Al-Nour was almost 
killed in May 2008 in Abyei and was only saved through the 
intervention of SPLA General Piang (Luka Biong Deng's half-brother). 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Mayak said he had counseled Al-Nour to remember that he 
will be in Abyei to represent the NCP, not the Misseriya.  He had 
also warned him that none of the other NCP candidates for office in 
Abyei are to be from the Misseriya. CDA Fernandez commented that it 
is good that Al-Nour appears not to be a strong personality.  He 
would have preferred that the Deputy not be a Misseriya, but if it 
has to be one, it is best to have one who is weak.  Mayak remarked 
that the NCP named a Misseriya as Deputy in order to establish that 
Abyei is not just the territory of the Ngok Dinka.  The Charge 
agreed, saying that the appointment is an NCP "Trojan horse."  Mayak 
added that he plans to begin a reconciliation program that will 
embrace all of the region's ethnic groups; Ngok Dinka, Misseriya, 
Nuer, Nuba, Rizeigat - going beyond Abyei's borders and beyond the 
usual Misseriya-Dinka dynamic. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) CDA remarked that the NCP pays attention to what 
foreigners say, and we can leverage that to help Mayak and his team. 
 For example, the appointment of the new Abyei Administration just 
preceded the most recent visit of U.S. Special Envoy Williamson. 
Knowing that the SE is interested in Abyei, the NCP had made a 
special effort to point out to that the Administration was in place. 
 Mayak noted that he is constrained in whom he can work with - he is 
limited to working through only three people, the three members of 
the Presidency: President Bashir, First Vice President Kiir, and VP 
Taha. This is a recipe for gridlock. 
 
Escaping the "Dinka-Misseriya" Trap 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU) Mayak said he plans to go immediately to Abyei for six 
days, then travel to Juba or Khartoum, where he will present the 
list of his Administration appointees for approval.  CDA commented 
that the NCP may use this as an opportunity to try to sneak some 
more Misseriya into the Administration.   He continued that Mayak's 
plan to promote reconciliation between all of the ethnic groups is a 
good idea, especially given recent Misseriya-Nuba tensions in 
Southern Kordofan. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) CDA and Mayak agreed that the NCP works to keep the 
Misseriya focused on the South and Abyei, in order to stir up 
conflict between them and the Ngok Dinka.  The NCP has an 
established pattern of turning one tribe against another to its own 
advantage, then the NCP throws them away.  It is important to get 
the Misseriya to realize that their future lies not to the south, 
but to the north and get them to refocus from Abyei to Kadugli and 
Muglad in Southern Kordofan (ref. b).  This will allow them to 
escape the NCP's "Dinka-Misseriya trap." 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) Mayak made a very good first impression.  He seems to 
have a clear idea of what he wants to do and the energy to get it 
done. He has a clear-eyed, no nonsense understanding of the NCP's 
machinations. Mayak's revelation that SAF remains in Difra, well 
within the interim borders of Abyei and two weeks after their 
(already delayed) departure is a concern although movement in Abyei 
in the rainy season is always difficult.  He has a difficult job 
ahead of him, especially since the NCP and SPLM remain stalled on 
the additional candidates for the interim administration, which will 
make it difficult for Mayak to begin his work.  But in the longer 
term Mayak will have to deal with the volatile politics on the 
ground in the aftermath of the fighting, in the midst of constant 
interference from Khartoum, and to a lesser extent from Juba.  His 
plan to have the annual Misseriya cattle migration being an unarmed 
one is the right idea but may be very difficult to implement - it 
 
KHARTOUM 00001351  003 OF 003 
 
 
could well be one of many Sudanese flashpoints once the rainy season 
ends in October. We will be following his progress closely and seek 
to maximize all forms of US assistance for his new administration. 
 
FERNANDEZ