VZCZCXRO4273
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1344/01 2471253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031253Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1803
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001344 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV KDEM MARR ASEC UN AU SU
SUBJECT: SPLM FRUSTRATION GROWS OVER DEMARCATING SUDAN'S NORTH-SOUTH 
BORDER 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1310 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: President Bashir's August 27 public comments have 
put the North-South border demarcation issue at the center of the 
latest SPLM/NCP political impasse.  Senior SPLM officials involved 
in the NCP/SPLM Executive-Committee talks are concerned that border 
demarcation could spark unintentional localized violence, pulling 
SAF and SPLA into conflict with civilians across the nine-state 
region.  With the NCP on the electoral offensive, the GoSS cabinet 
in Juba is divided over the issue - but is nonetheless keenly aware 
of previous mis-steps taken by the SPLM during the similarly 
politically-fraught national census.  Determined not to be held 
captive by Khartoum's bureaucratic defiance of CPA-determined 
funding timelines for the Ad Hoc Technical Border Commission, the 
SPLM established a shadow "political committee" on border 
demarcation to carefully monitor Southern technical representatives' 
interaction with their NCP counterparts. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
BASHIR SACRIFICES COOPERATION TO POLITICAL ADVANTAGE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) President Bashir's public declaration in Juba August 27 
that the demarcation of the 1956 North/South border "will be a 
painful experience for Northerners and Southerners alike" (ref. A) 
broke with an agreed NCP/SPLM strategy to resolve the issue quietly. 
 It also put the future of the 1956 border squarely within the 
hardening SPLM/NCP stalemate over CPA provisions linked to the 2009 
elections.  GoSS Internal Affairs Minister Paul Mayom told ConGen 
Juba PolOff August 30 that Bashir's remarks surprised the SPLM and 
"were ill-considered."  Mayom fears they could undermine continued 
GoSS efforts to disarm the South's civilian population and heighten 
tensions between poorly controlled and heavily armed frontline SAF 
and SPLA units.  According to Mayom, during February's Executive 
Committee talks, the parties had jointly decided to target a public 
sensitization campaign at local communities along the border before 
finalizing the border.  Until then, "mutually disturbing 
geographical discoveries" were to remain under wraps. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Minister for Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development 
Michael Makuei told ConGen PolOff in February that both the NCP and 
SPLM had agreed on the need to "determine a way forward" on 
North/South border demarcation before publicizing the decision. 
Khartoum and Juba agreed to informally suspend political 
deliberations over border demarcation prior to the national census 
and to delay a planned "pegging of the border" beyond its April 2008 
target date.  (NOTE: The Ad Hoc Technical Border Commission, as part 
of its functional duties, was to have marked the borderline with 
stakes to generate community-level discussion - a plan cancelled 
during the joint NCP/SPLM Executive Committee talks held during that 
same period.  END NOTE.)  The Commission's technical work would 
continue, although woefully under-funded by the GNU. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Not only did Bashir's August 27 public comments on the 
long-delayed demarcation undermine this understanding, but also his 
allegations of Southern-induced delays within the Ad Hoc Technical 
Border Commission smacked of NCP political spin, in the view of the 
SPLM.  GoSS Vice President Riek Machar told Consul General August 29 
that he and others took issue with Bashir's characterization.  "We 
replaced our member," the testy Machar noted flatly, "because he 
died. And yet our brother neglected to mention that fact."  Machar 
contends that elections will move forward even if the border remains 
unresolved, emphasizing that "we will not hold elections hostage for 
anything, because we strive to erect a new system in Sudan." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Unless the yet-to-be-formed National Elections Commission 
(NEC) determines that Sudan's existing 270 electoral constituencies 
remain in place during the 2009 elections, few Sudanese politicians 
agree with Machar's assessment, and some UNMIS staff maintain that 
the border must be demarcated before balloting begins.  While the 
1956 border could be finalized after elections, were the NEC to 
adopt existing constituencies, post-election demarcation of the 
border would force gerrymandering that likely would result in a 
not-easily accepted shift in the composition of the National 
Assembly.  "Even with Abel Alier at the helm," Mayom noted to ConGen 
PolOff, "we could not risk that." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
RISK OF CONFLICT: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) On August 30, Mayom maintained that President Bashir's 
"reckless handling and politicization" of border demarcation risks 
dragging the country into a quagmire.  "A few pegs will determine 
 
KHARTOUM 00001344  002 OF 003 
 
 
who can participate in the 2011 Referendum, and who cannot.  Imagine 
on Tuesday being promised freedom and on Wednesday it is stolen from 
you." Mayom believes that these "newly anointed ex-Southerners" 
would take up arms to protest the decision, inviting SAF 
intervention against an uprising "nominally within the North." 
 
¶7. (SBU) In this scenario, reminiscent of this past May's conflict 
in Abyei, the SPLA would be politically and militarily unable to 
stand-by and watch its former citizens attacked and would be drawn 
into the fray, Mayom insisted.  "It would be an instantaneous 
reaction.  We have the troops there, and the SAF in some areas is 
barely an arms-length out of the South."  (COMMENT:  If Mayom's 
scenario is even remotely prescient, Machar's position on border 
demarcation might gain more traction, particularly given Kiir's 
continued refusal to take his people back to war.  However, 
composing an electoral strategy with after-the-fact gerrymandering 
would be well beyond the political capacity of the SPLM.  END 
COMMENT). 
 
--------------------------- 
UNMIS ASSITS WITH SATELLITE 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While the parties' polarization increases, the UNMIS 
Elections Division is seeking to diminish the technical 
uncertainties inherent in delineating and demarcating the 1956 
border by providing the government with high-resolution 
commercial-satellite imagery of the region.  UNMIS Elections Chief 
Ray Kennedy informed the Southern Sudan Elections Donor Group of 
this on August 26.  (NOTE: Although UNMIS intends to provide this to 
both Khartoum and Juba, it is unclear whether the GoSS has received 
the material.  Presidential staffers queried by ConGen PolOff that 
same week were unaware of its existence.  END NOTE.) 
 
----------------------------- 
GOSS ALLEGES NCP MANIPULATION 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Ad-Hoc Technical Border Commission continues 
to be hampered by recent staff changes, insecurity along the South 
Darfur border and within Southern Kordofan, and inconsistent GNU 
funding not unlike those that hobbled the national census.  The 
issue's insertion into NCP/SPLM 2009 election calculations only 
exacerbates already tense political discussions between the parties. 
 Ministers Mayom and Makeui asserted to ConGen PolOff in March that 
the Ad-Hoc Technical Border Commission was circulating a 
"politically motivated, NISS manufactured" near-final map of the 
1956 North/South border which substantially expands "Northern 
territory" at the expense of the South. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Makuei claimed that sizeable areas of the southern states 
of oil-rich Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal were to be transferred to the North, becoming part of White 
Nile, South Darfur, and Southern Kordofan states respectively. 
While Makuei admitted that the Commission had discovered some maps 
that support territory shifts in select locations, he claimed that 
the majority of the proposed land-transfers were politically 
motivated, and supported by maps developed by NISS.  Mayom 
criticized in particular the planned alterations to the state 
boundaries of Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Bahr el Ghazal, 
noting sarcastically that the proposed changes would "conveniently 
award Khartoum full control" over the region's copper belt and 
suspected uranium deposits. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In discussions with CG on August 28, Machar noted that the 
border commission's findings may be challenged via arbitration. 
"Kharsana and Heglig (in Unity State) were both southerner villages 
even during British colonial rule," he maintained.  The Vice 
President contended that the NCP was cherry-picking history, noting 
their push to North/South border 17 miles south of the Kiir River - 
a calculation based on historical grazing areas, not where villages 
once were located. "If they want to play such games, then we should 
argue for Kormuk."  According to Machar, the one-time capital of 
then-SPLA controlled Southern Blue Nile was administered by Malakal, 
capital of the South's Upper Nile state through 1960. 
 
------------------------------ 
. . .AND A KHARTOUM PETRO-GRAB 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) Discussing the controversy with ConGen PolOff August 29, 
UNMIS/Juba officials alleged that the GNU recently has entered into 
unilateral exploratory contracts with Chinese oil corporations along 
the Unity State/Southern Kordofan border, "and now Khartoum must 
 
KHARTOUM 00001344  003 OF 003 
 
 
scramble to make the map safeguard their investment."  Such 
allegations come on top of continued SPLM/NCP wrangling over NCP 
claims that the majority of Unity State's oil field areas, and those 
located in the western portion of Upper Nile state, actually fall 
north of the 1956 border.  (NOTE: One such NCP assertion, that the 
Heglig oil field is part of the North, will be decided as part of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration's deliberations on the boundaries 
of the Abyei region.  GOSS officials have been trying to limit the 
fallout generated by some county commissioners who maintain that 
largely Nuer-inhabited Heglig is a part of Unity state and not the 
disputed oil region. END NOTE.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
GOSS INFIGHTING AND THE GHOST OF CENSUS PAST 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Makuei told PolOff on July 26 that the GOSS Council of 
Ministers had approved Kiir's recommendation to establish a 
"political committee" consisting of Machar, Makuei, Mayom, Minister 
for Energy and Mines John Luk Jok, and Minister for Presidential 
Affairs Luka Biong Deng to monitor the work of Southerners on the 
national commission. 
Southern technical experts, unhappy with the direction of the 
demarcation proceedings and unable to obtain a paper-trail 
justifying precise border decisions, threatened to walk out of the 
Ad Hoc Technical Border Commission in June. Kiir, blind-sided by the 
experts' degree of frustration, appointed the political committee to 
monitor the issue more closely.  Makuei maintains Kiir's surprise 
stemmed from stove-piping of information within the Ministry of 
Presidential Affairs, and he alleged, unintended neglect by an 
overworked Luka Biong Deng. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In particular, Makuei maintained that Biong Deng had paid 
insufficient attention to decisions being taken by the Commission, 
and alleged he was "overly reliant" on the advice of foreign experts 
not associated with the Commission itself (such as Abyei Boundaries 
Commission Panel of Experts Member Douglas Johnson).  In a pattern 
reminiscent of SPLM mis-steps taken ahead of the national census, 
Kiir voiced deep concerns in July about the disconnect between the 
political impact of a geographically altered South and decisions 
being taken by technical experts on the Ad-Hoc Technical Border 
Commission.  (NOTE: Current maps presented to the Commission place 
Kiir's own home area within the North - something that would make 
him ineligible to remain President of the Government of Southern 
Sudan, a "fact" he occasionally utters with relief. END NOTE.) 
Makuei, taking a position similar to VP Machar's, noted to ConGen 
PolOff, "fundamentally, demarcating the border on time will lead us 
nowhere but to war, and the SPLM has been caught sleeping." 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment: With Abyei relatively calm for now, border 
demarcation is on the short list of issues that may serve as a 
flash-point for renewed conflict, and certainly is a source of 
ongoing anxiety for the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile communities 
that may be "lost" to the North if the South secedes.  For this 
reason, and as Makuei himself notes above, the SPLM may have an 
interest in delaying the final determination of the border, to keep 
the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile  "in play" and keep the 
support of these populations as long as possible by leaving their 
situation ambiguous.  This is a risky strategy, however, and leaves 
the SPLM exposed to manipulation, as shown by Bashir's comments.  It 
also complicates districting for elections that neither party may 
actually want.  The fact remains that both sides believe in terra 
irredenta extending far beyond the purported 1956 borders, with the 
NCP seeking to grab resource-rich areas and the SPLM longing to 
incorporate pro-SPLM border populations in a greater South Sudan. In 
the long run, the parties need to be pushed forward toward more 
transparent solutions, such as the UNMIS proposal of using satellite 
photos to assist with mapping and demarcation. 
 
FERNANDEZ