VZCZCXRO3066
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2628/01 2710526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270526Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5642
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002628 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
 
SUBJECT: The Late Nuristan Governor's Unfinished Agenda 
 
(A) KABUL 2348, (B) KABUL 1828 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. Nuristan Governor Hazrat Din was killed in a car accident on 
September 5, only two months after he assumed office (see reftel A). 
Days before his death, Hazrat Din told the PRT's Integrated Command 
Group (PICG) that security in the eastern districts of Nuristan was 
his chief concern.  He wanted to combine provincial government 
authority with local traditional institutions (shuras) to improve 
security (see reftel B).  Hazrat Din was frustrated during the past 
month over the GIRoA's Independent Directorate of Local Governance's 
(IDLG) lack of political and financial support for his efforts.  He 
told the PICG that on September 3, he would ask the IDLG to replace 
Deputy Governor Haji Haleem and two district administrators.  Haleem 
is currently the acting governor in the interim until a new governor 
is announced. 
 
---------------------------- 
Security in Eastern Nuristan 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. Over the past month, Hazrat Din stressed during several meetings 
with the PICG that provincial security was his chief priority for 
Nuristan.  Hazrat Din was particularly concerned about the eastern 
districts of Kamdesh, Waygal, and Bargi Matal.  The governor made 
some limited progress on his vision for local governance (reftel A) 
by establishing a Waygal shura and continuing support for the 
Kamdesh one-hundred man security shura, but told the PICG that he 
was unable to attract sufficient financial support from IDLG for the 
existing bodies or for the creation of additional district shuras. 
The governor asserted that IDLG's slow response to the provincial 
government's request for assistance in Nuristan calls into question 
IDLG's commitment to making the province a priority despite the 
deteriorating security situation in the East. 
 
¶3. On August 23 during a meeting with N2KL Brigade Commander, 
Colonel Spiszer, the late governor requested additional support from 
Coalition Forces (CF) in Bargi Matal.  COL Spiszer agreed to 
continue providing ammunition and supplies through the winter to 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who reportedly have been 
successful at fighting back insurgents attempting to cross into 
Bargi Matal from Pakistan and Kamdesh.  The governor explained that 
despite the successes, access to Bargi Matal through Kamdesh is 
still very difficult, with the road blocked by insurgents.  (NOTE: 
CF delivered ammunition and additional supplies as recently as 
September 6.) 
 
¶4. Hazrat Din described the security situation in Waygal as 
improved, noting that the district shura had made progress but that 
development was badly needed.  However, he said that Coalition 
forces remain unwelcome in the province.  The governor highlighted 
the U.S. military's July 4 airstrike targeting insurgents in 
response to a mortar attack on a U.S. military base as a turning 
point in Waygal, citing civilian casualties as the catalyst for 
anti-CF sentiment in the district.  The governor had committed 
himself to working further with the Waygal shura but insisted that 
immediate IDLG support was critical.  While the late governor 
described the situation as improved -- there were no anti-CF attacks 
in Waygal since CF are not present - there have been attacks 
originating in Waygal that run contrary to security promises made by 
the district shura. 
 
¶5. According to Hazrat Din, Kamdesh was the most challenging 
security problem, according to Hazrat Din.  He cited a secure 
Kamdesh as vital to solving security problems in the rest of the 
province, noting that security in Waygal is directly affected by 
insurgents coming from Pakistan through Kamdesh.  The governor had 
planned to continue work with the one-hundred man security shura, 
but stressed that without more IDLG (or CF) support the shura's 
progress will continue to be minimal.  Acting Governor Haji Haleem 
worked extensively with the Kamdesh security shura but was largely 
ineffective.  His intervention is unlikely to bring additional 
results. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Changes in the Provincial Government 
 
KABUL 00002628  002 OF 002 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. Governor Hazrat Din stressed to the PICG several times during the 
past two months that the Deputy Governor was undermining his 
authority and quietly supporting the return of former Governor 
Tamim, and that Haleem was responsible for increasing ethnic 
tensions in the region by expelling fifty-seven Pashtun police from 
Parun.  Hazrat Din told the PRT on September 1 that on September 3 
he planne to ask IDLG Director Popal to replace Haleem.  Hazrat Din 
said he was considering Jamal Hudi, an MFA official originally from 
Bargi Matal for the job.  Haleem, a member of the dominant 
Nuristani Kata tribe, is well connected both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as a former Hizb-I Islami Gulbudden (HIG) commander. 
Traditionally, the Kata have held the key leadership positions in 
Nuristan.  Hazrat Din, a member of the minority Wamai tribe, was 
likely to appoint another Kata official in order to avoid potential 
feelings of disenfranchisement from that community. 
 
¶7. Hazrat Din informed the PICG that he would ask Popal to also 
replace the district governors for Waygal (Zia Rahman) and Kamdesh 
(Anayatullah), both of whom he judged as completely ineffective and 
incapable of working with local shuras.  During the PRT's September 
1-2 visit to Parun, several members of the governor's staff 
indicated that they were considering resigning.  They cited the 
governor's conservatism as the key reason, noting that he insisted 
on directing the religious practices of is staff.  Separately, the 
governor told the PCG that he intended to replace several members 
of the staff due to a lack of competence.  The late governor's staff 
was hired by former Governor Tamim, and many are closely allied with 
the Deputy Governor.  Hazrat Din's death may mean that the staff 
will stay on to assist Haleem during his time as acting governor. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. Hazrat Din was committed to his position and the people of 
Nuristan.  In addition to a keen understanding of the complex 
reality of Nuristani security and politics, a new governor will need 
to accomplish two key tasks in order to succeed: (1) effectively 
lobby the IDLG for resources and (2) carefully balance provincial 
government authority with traditional local institutions.  Hazrat 
Din's vision for district shuras may not survive the succession, but 
a new governor will need to address the key issues that led Hazrat 
Din to adopt that model. 
 
¶9. The PICG met with Hazrat Din six times between August 22 and 
September 3.  This cable provides the key elements drawn from those 
conversations, as well as from meetings with other local government 
officials. 
 
DELL