VZCZCXRO8131
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2595/01 2661023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221023Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5596
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002595 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT OVERRIDES KARZAI VETOES 
 
REF: KABUL 2245 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The National Assembly's Lower House has 
for the first time overridden several vetoes by President 
Karzai, effectively bringing into law measures on the media, 
land ownership, and the establishment of a constitutional 
implementation commission.  However, problems with achieving 
quorum in parliament, tracking voting patterns, and enforcing 
constitutional checks and balances mean it is unlikely we 
have seen the final word on these laws.  The votes against 
Karzai are also a sign his administration may need to spend 
more time mending relations with Lower House Speaker Yunus 
Qanooni and better maintaining a network of supporters among 
MPs. 
 
First Veto Overrides in Parliament's History 
---------- 
 
¶2.    (SBU) The Lower House voted earlier this month to 
override Karzai vetoes on seven pieces of legislation, 
ranging from high-profile issues on the media and the 
establishment of a constitutional disputes commission, to 
more mundane bills on land ownership and road tolls.  The 
Constitution requires the Lower House to have a two-thirds 
majority of MPs present to override a presidential veto. 
These are the first vetoes successfully overridden in 
parliament's two years of operation. 
 
¶3. During its tenure, the National Assembly has had 
difficulty gathering required quorums to hold votes (reftel), 
lacked political parties capable of building coalitions, and 
conducted votes by either secret ballot or an informal system 
of holding up green (aye) or red (nay) cards.  When votes 
with the colored cards occur, MPs rely on the Speaker's 
visual estimate that there is a winning 50 percent-plus one 
or two-thirds majority.  In most cases, votes are not called 
unless it is apparent there will be a decisive result. 
Confirmation votes for Cabinet ministers and other 
high-ranking officials have secret ballots. 
 
Respecting Checks and Balances 
---------- 
 
¶4.    (SBU) According to the Constitution, a vetoed bill 
automatically becomes law once overridden by the Lower House. 
 However, the parliament moved into new territory this month 
with the overrides and it is unclear how quickly the 
administration will accept its legislative losses.  Minister 
for Parliamentary Affairs Farooq Wardak said there were 
several constitutional "gray areas" concerning balance of 
powers with implications for how the president and 
legislature interact.  Lower House staff also seemed unsure 
how to move ahead.  Although MPs have overridden these vetoed 
bills, technical staff members are unsure how to promulgate 
the legislation to government agencies hostile to some of the 
laws' requirements.  Parliament may need to revisit the laws 
in a few months if the government refuses to implement the 
disputed elements. 
 
Surprise Votes Catch Karzai Off-Guard 
---------- 
 
¶5.    (SBU) Speaker Qanooni strategically held votes on most 
of the vetoed bills on the same day Wardak introduced 
Attorney General nominee Ishaq Aloko for a confirmation 
hearing.  Qanooni knew a confirmation vote would draw enough 
MPs to achieve a quorum, finally giving him the chance to 
clear business that had lingered on the house's agenda for 
months.  Wardak said he didn't get word the override votes 
would take place until a 7 am phone call from Qanooni 
informing him his staff had "added some minor other business 
to the Lower House's agenda" -- just one hour before Wardak 
and Aloko headed to parliament.  Indeed, although Qanooni has 
said votes on the vetoed bills were a priority for him this 
legislative session, they had not been on the Lower House 
agenda that week. 
 
¶6.    (SBU) Wardak said the late notice did not give him 
enough time to prepare a counter-strategy against the votes. 
He was also upset Qanooni took no official count to determine 
 
KABUL 00002595  002 OF 002 
 
 
whether two-thirds of the MPs present had indeed voted 
against the president, although he conceded there was 
"probably" a sufficient majority for each of the votes.  But 
even if Wardak had received more notice, it's unclear what he 
would have done to press his case.  He told PolOff he courts 
MPs to support the president's position on an issue-by-issue 
basis, with no "whip" in parliament or on his staff to count 
supporters ahead of votes. 
 
Underdeveloped Legislative Outreach 
---------- 
 
¶7.    (SBU) The lack of many close votes in parliament has 
made tracking alliances by recorded votes difficult, as has 
parliament's SNTV election system where MPs are elected with 
no party identification.  Furthermore, Karzai has refused to 
join or create a political party of his own, giving up a 
potential advantage to consolidate support from a known 
quantity of MPs.  Wardak acknowledged it has been difficult 
to assemble a lasting coalition in support of the president 
without formal blocs. 
 
A Wake-Up Call for Karzai's Parliament Strategy 
---------- 
 
¶8.    (SBU) This month's vetoes caught Karzai and his 
parliamentary "fixer" Wardak off-guard, but there are still 
several vetoed bills and other legislation Karzai has 
threatened to reject on the Lower House's agenda for the 
remainder of the session.  Qanooni's strategy to bring the 
override votes up on short notice is likely in response to 
Karzai's making law by presidential decree during 
parliamentary recesses.  These circumstances help explain how 
Karzai's often-deficient relations with MPs have hurt his 
support in the Lower House. 
 
¶9. (SBU) However, raising the legalization of foreign forces 
issue has won the president some respite from criticism in 
parliament.  Wardak promises this is just the beginning of a 
more attentive outreach to MPs.  If he hopes to avoid further 
surprises and embarrassments from the Lower House, he and 
Karzai will need to develop a network of supporters that is 
more reliable on routine issues and procedural votes, in 
addition to building a better working relationship with 
Speaker Qanooni. 
DELL