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Viewing cable 08KABUL2443, ELECTION THEMES: CONSULTATION, CONSENSUS, CHANGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL2443 2008-09-07 09:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO7037
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2443 2510931
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 070931Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5415
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS KABUL 002443 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: ELECTION THEMES: CONSULTATION, CONSENSUS, CHANGE 
 
1.  (SBU) Jandad Khan Spinghar, chief of the Afghan election 
observation organization FEFA, says that in the coming 
election campaign, people are looking for new leaders to 
address three challenges: corruption, security, and ethnic 
conflicts.  As the head of an umbrella organization of 14 
NGOs, Spinghar hears a spectrum of civil society views. What 
people want, he says, is change. 
 
2.  (SBU) "Every problem has its root in the weakness of the 
government," Spinghar laments.  The administration and the 
legislature lack capacity, and this is key.  On the problem 
of security, for example, if the government appeared honest 
and competent, and delivered results on reconstruction, it 
would receive the people's trust, and then their cooperation. 
 This cooperation would increase support for government 
forces and reduce it for the violent alternatives. Instead 
the government is weak, and ends up looking at fault for poor 
security and even the deeply-unpopular coalition force 
civilian casualties. People think, says Spinghar, that a 
strong, honest, competent government would put a stop to 
these tragedies. 
 
3.  Likewise, after the problem of security, Spinghar 
believes the weak capacity of the Independent Elections 
Commission (IEC) is most likely to put voter registration and 
the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections at 
risk.  FEFA's 20-page analysis of the IEC's earlier, pilot 
voter registration project is highly critical of the 
organization: weak capacity, limited public outreach, 
inadequate voter education, lackadaisical security. Spinghar 
sees some of the same problems in the offing now. 
 
-------------------------- 
CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU)  In part reflecting frustration with weak 
institutions, on key issues Spinghar prefers addressing key 
issues through consultation and consensus rather than lively 
political competition. He is exasperated that, on the 
electoral law, the legislature has allowed itself to bog down 
in petty maneuvers to gain more seats for each faction. 
FEFA's carefully-researched case for changes to buttress the 
independence of the IEC and regulate campaign finance fell on 
deaf ears. 
 
5. (SBU)  Spinghar opposes the National Assembly's current 
bid to require legislative approval of the President's 
choices for IEC Commissioners as well.  With legislative 
approval, the "big political groups" would hold sway over the 
Commissioners and the electoral process.  Rather, the 
President should solicit names from civil society groups, 
other political actors, and the international community, then 
himself choose from these lists. 
 
6. (SBU)  Spinghar is leery of consultations with 
traditional, tribal, and religious leaders, whom he believes 
are under the control of the "powerful commanders." 
Nonetheless, he faults the Karzai government for failing to 
"respect Afghan traditions." A Pashtun from Nangarhar who has 
long lived in Kabul, Spinghar combines advocacy for stronger 
roles for civil society and the international community with 
loyalty to Afghan political and social norms. 
WOOD