VZCZCXRO9345
OO RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0229/01 2541007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101007Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4081
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 1006
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 1204
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 1060
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3551

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000229 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP/MTS, DS, AND CA/OCS/ACS (SCHEFFMAN) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PO AS TT
SUBJECT: LET'S LIFT THE TRAVEL WARNING FOR TIMOR-LESTE 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  Embassy Dili believes that conditions in 
Timor-Leste now warrant revocation of the Department's Travel 
Warning, last revised in July.  Over the course of 2008, 
immediate threats to political and social stability have been 
eliminated or reduced. There have been no major instances of 
communitarian violence in 2008, there is no known terrorist 
threat, and Timor-Leste's external relations with Indonesia and 
its other neighbors are good.  The few large demonstrations held 
in 2008 did not get out of control or endanger bystanders. 
Foreigners are very seldom victims of violent crime. 
Appropriate advice concerning Dili's petty street crime can be 
included in the "Safety and Security" chapter of "Country 
Specific Information" for Timor-Leste at the travel.state.gov 
website.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Embassy Dili recommends that the Department lift its July 
21, 2008 Travel Warning for Timor-Leste.  Although street crime 
is an issue, and there remains a potential for political 
instability and communitarian conflict, post regards Timor-Leste 
as generally safe for Amcit travelers.  In lieu of a Travel 
Warning, necessary safety and security information can be 
provided on the travel.state.gov website.  The following factors 
have influenced post's conclusions: 
 
Immediate Sources of Political Tension Reduced Or Removed 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
 
¶3. (U) A band of fewer than 20 military dissidents, at large 
since the 2006 political crisis, carried out an unsuccessful 
assassination attempt against President Jose Ramos-Horta and 
Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao on February 11, 2008.  The 
rebels' leader, Major Alfredo Alves  Reinado, was killed in the 
attack.  While alive, Reinado provided a rallying point for some 
disaffected political elements, youth, and a group of 
disgruntled ex-military and veterans of the resistance struggle 
known as "the petitioners."  However, his violent and unforeseen 
acts against the country's leaders shocked and alienated these 
erstwhile admirers, and his death eliminated him as a source of 
further destabilization.  The remnants of his band surrendered 
peacefully to the authorities and have been in custody since May. 
 
¶4. (U) Reinado's death and the arrest of his followers led to 
the resolution of the Government of Timor-Leste's (GOTL) 
conflict with the petitioners, thereby removing another 
immediate source of instability.  While they were at large or 
camped at the Aitarak Laran site in Dili, this group of about 
600 men and their families presented a potential threat to 
security.  Following the surrender of Reinado's followers, the 
petitioners became amenable to a settlement.  Over the past 
several months, virtually all the petitioners have accepted GOTL 
payouts, have disbanded their encampment in Dili, and no longer 
pose a security threat. 
 
¶5. (U) The GOTL has also recently made significant progress in 
resettling nearly half of the 100,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) who  were driven from their homes during the 2006 
political crisis.  According to the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity, a total of 23 camps have been closed and more than 
6500 IDP families have received a recovery or a reintegration 
package under the GOTL's resettlement strategy.  IDP camps in 
Dili were sources of low-level criminal activity, sites of 
political agitation, and a public health menace.  Over the last 
few months, the compensation packages, in combination with the 
return of relative political stability and reconciliation 
efforts in the IDPs' hometowns, have led to the evacuation of 
Dili's largest and most volatile camps, including those located 
at Nicolau Lobato Airport, Jardim (Dili Port), National 
Hospital, and Sional (World Bank).  Evacuation of the Dom Bosco 
camp is underway; when this is completed, 24 of the country's 51 
camps will be closed, reducing a major potential source of 
social and political instability. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The level of partisan political confrontation has also 
subsided.  The August 2007 political violence was in fueled in 
part by hard-line supporters of the opposition FRETILIN party, 
who rejected the new government formed after elections in late 
June.  Since then, FRETILIN has ceased agitating for the 
government's ouster, refrained from incendiary rhetoric, and for 
the time being has settled into the role of Parliamentary 
opposition. 
 
Dili Is Less Volatile 
--------------------- 
¶7. (U) Although the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) 
remains a weak and undisciplined force, security in Dili has 
improved in some important regards.  During political violence 
in the 2006 crisis and in August 2007, youth gangs took 
 
DILI 00000229  002 OF 002 
 
 
advantage of the disorder to engage in rock fights and shoot 
metal darts, endangering motorists and passers-by.  However, 
following the February 11 assassination attempts, imposition of 
a strict curfew and creation of an effective joint command 
between the PNTL and Defense Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) 
prevented a recurrence of these episodes.  In fact, street crime 
in all forms dropped off radically during the State of Siege and 
subsequent State of Emergency in the weeks following February 11. 
 
¶8. (U) The effectiveness of the emergency measures seems to have 
influenced conditions subsequent to the lifting of the State of 
Emergency on May 8.  Statistical tracking of criminal activity 
conducted by the UN Police Mission in Timor-Leste indicates a 
reduction in several categories compared with the same period in 
¶2007.  These figures show a decline in the incidence of 
disorderly behavior, arson, group fighting, and homicide.  The 
number of assaults remained constant, as did the number of 
overall arrests. 
 
¶9. (U) Another factor influencing the security climate in Dili 
was the December 2007 creation of the PNTL's Dili Task Force, a 
rapid reaction unit formed in response to an upsurge in crime in 
Dili last year.  Although the Task Force has earned a reputation 
for brutality, its actions have met with the approval of many 
Dili residents for ruthlessly clamping down on gang and thug 
activity.  Gang activity may also be curtailed by a truce signed 
on August 28 between PSHT and 77, Dili's largest martial arts 
groups. 
 
Australian, Portuguese Assessments 
---------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) As a basis for comparison, it is relevant to consider 
travel advisories prepared by the Governments of Australia and 
Portugal, each of which is responsible for sizeable expat 
communities in Timor-Leste.  Australia's assessment of the 
security environment is very similar to the Department's July 21 
travel advisory, and recommends that Australians "reconsider" 
the need to travel to Timor-Leste.  However, its equities in 
Timor-Leste are different from ours, and the GOA will probably 
not relax its advisory for two reasons.  First, because of the 
size of the Australian community (about 1,500, not including 750 
military personnel) any sudden deterioration of conditions would 
create greater demands on the GOA than those that the USG would 
face.  Secondly, the GOA recalls 2006-7 incidents between 
Timorese and the predominantly Australian International 
Stabilization Force (ISF).  Although the ISF is a highly 
disciplined force and there have been no tensions in recent 
months, the GOA is likely concerned by a scenario in which an 
incident between the ISF and Timorese sparks more widespread 
anti-Australian sentiments or actions.  Post believes these 
considerations are of limited applicability to USG 
decision-making. 
 
¶11. (U) The Government of Portugal, by contrast, assesses the 
political situation as "calm" and "stable."  The GOP merely 
provides its approximately 1,500 nationals with advice against 
becoming victims of crime, and urges them to abstain from 
activities of a political nature. 
 
Caveat 
------ 
¶12. (U) In short, Timor-Leste still has latent political and 
social conflicts similar to those in many other developing 
countries; these could again escalate into civil disorder if 
triggered by unforeseeable events. However, post believes that 
major factors contributing to the violence of 2006-7 have 
diminished to the extent that a special travel warning is no 
longer needed.  We do not downplay the importance of sound 
advice to U.S. travelers to Timor-Leste.  While petty crime 
(particularly purse snatchings, burglaries, and vehicle 
break-ins) remains a low-level but persistent problem, 
foreigners are rarely victims of violent crime.  Gun violence is 
practically unheard of.  By any objective measure, AmCits are 
safer in Dili than in Washington, D.C.  Relevant safety and 
security information for travelers should be included in the 
"Safety and Security" chapter of "Country Specific Information" 
for Timor-Leste at the travel.state.gov website. 
RECTOR