VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0883/01 2620616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180616Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8689
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 3457
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 6265
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2283
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2946
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0808
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J332/J52//
RHMFIUU/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000883 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SAA 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR RTHAYER AND BDEEMER 
BANGKOK FOR DCHA/OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WBERGER 
USMISSION GENEVA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE
 
SUBJECT:  HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SRI LANKA'S NORTHERN PROVINCE: 
UPDATE AND THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:   As the Sri Lankan military makes headway into the 
Northern Province, UN Agencies and INGOs have been requested by the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to pull back to Vavuniya as their 
safety and security cannot be guaranteed.  As a result, the security 
and humanitarian situation for civilians has become precarious.  The 
Ambassador, who already attends monthly Consultative Committee on 
Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) meetings, will begin to attend weekly 
CCHA meetings to focus on the situation in the Vanni, the jungle 
area north of Vavuniya.  Meanwhile, USAID is engaged in meetings 
with UN agencies, ICRC and INGO partners in Colombo but additional 
assistance will be needed from USAID and State to further assess the 
situation on the ground and to inform Post's decisions with regard 
to the best interventions for USG support.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND:  GSL STAGING FOR AN ASSAULT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The conflict between the military and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has reached new heights in Sri Lanka's 
North, by all accounts, with mounting pressure in the Vanni region 
and the announcement by the GSL that the safety of agencies can no 
longer be guaranteed. According to UN sources, fierce fighting has 
been reported in several areas of the southeastern forward defense 
line in the Mullaitivu District and along the A32 Mannar-Pooneryn 
road in Kilinochchi, while an increasing number of air strikes and 
aerial bombardments also took place - resulting in more population 
movements further into the Vanni.  The UN reports that the latest 
displacement took place out of Kilinochchi's Puthumurippu and 
surrounding Uttupulam and Konavil areas and along the coastal areas 
of Mullaitivu's Maritime Pattu division. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Restrictions in movement are severely impeding the ability 
of UN agencies to gather information; however, it is estimated that 
more than 17,000 families (67,600 persons) have fled their homes in 
the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts since military operations 
were stepped up at the end of June 2008.  The UN reports that some 
internally displaced families are receiving some support in several 
divisions of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts, while many others 
have been forced to move several times to escape ground battles and 
shelling along the shifting frontlines. According to GSL and UN 
estimates, with the recent movements, there are now more than 40,000 
newly displaced families (160,000) in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu 
Districts since April 2006. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) As the hostilities close in on the LTTE heartland, and 
following recent statements by the GSL that the safety of 
humanitarian workers can no longer be guaranteed, UN agencies are 
now relocating out of the Vanni.  Last week, shells landed 
approximately one kilometer from the World Food Program (WFP) 
compound.  As a result, all UN/INGO movements from Omanthai into the 
Vanni were halted following a GSL directive. Subsequently a curfew 
was imposed while UN movements out of Kilinochchi city were also 
restricted. The relocation process is set to be complete by 
September 20, 2008, after which possibly only two local UN senior 
staff will remain in Kilinochchi as liaison officers. 
 
IMPEDIMENTS TO DELIVERY OF 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UN agencies and their NGO and INGO partners were notified 
on September 8 that they had until September 17 to evacuate the 
Vanni, as the GSL could no longer ensure their safety.  The UN 
agencies are working on a personnel and equipment draw down which 
has all staff leaving by September 17, except for the two liaison 
officers and the heads of offices, who would remain until September 
20 to support national staff who are unable to leave.  These dates 
are subject to change as there have been some difficulties for the 
UN with the move.  People in the area have been protesting and 
holding up the convoys in Kilinochchi city.  Thus far, the UN has 
been unsuccessful in negotiating safe passage out of the Vanni from 
the LTTE for their national staff and dependents who are from the 
Vanni.  The UN's position is that all of their staff, international 
and local, should be treated as international representatives of the 
 
UN.  The LTTE has instituted a pass system whereby Vanni residents 
need to receive a pass to leave LTTE controlled areas.  Receipt of 
the pass is dependent upon the individual leaving with the LTTE the 
name of a resident family member who would guarantee that 
individual's return.  The UN local staff who have not received 
passes either do not want to leave the name of a family member with 
the LTTE or they are not willing to leave behind family at all. 
While some local UN staff resident in the Vanni have left through 
this pass system, UNOCHA stated that there remain fewer than 30 
staff with 80 dependents.  If they are still unable to depart the 
Vanni by September 17, those staff will be given a letter on UN 
letterhead stating they are UN staff and should be guaranteed safe 
passage out of the Vanni.  The Ambassador and the USAID Mission 
Director met with the GSL on September 12 to discuss the situation 
and to work together to ensure the IDPs who are unable to move from 
the area will continue to receive food, shelter and support.  There 
are currently approximately 160,000 IDPs in the Kilinochchi area who 
are unable to move freely to a safer area. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) WFP operating in the Vanni has food stores and supplies 
that will be left behind during the evacuation.  The current plan is 
for the GSL Government Agent (GA) in the Vanni to take over the 
stocks and continue to disburse the supplies to the internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  The GSL stated that it is capable of 
delivering and monitoring this assistance because he had done so in 
the East (note: it was mainly UN agencies, and their partner INGOs, 
and the ICRC who delivered the assistance to the East).  While the 
WFP has commodities both from USAID's Food for Peace Program (FFP), 
as well as from other donors, 80 percent of the rice needed is 
purchased on the local market in the Vanni.  UN Agencies, however, 
report that an estimated thirty percent of the rice-producing areas 
in the Vanni are no longer accessible as a result of the conflict. 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The ICRC will continue working in the Vanni from either 
Kilinochchi or Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK), with the approval of the 
GSL.  The ICRC may be forced to leave Kilinochchi for its own 
safety; however, the ICRC is still discussing this with the GSL. 
Currently, the Red Cross is operational in Kilinochchi, PTK, 
Omanthai and Vavuniya.  The ICRC checks with both the GSL and LTTE 
daily on movements to ensure its employees safety. World Vision is 
currently still providing water to 3,000 IDPs in Kilinochchi within 
a 4 kilometer radius of the city.  World Vision is unsure how long 
supplies will last and whether it will continue to stay in the 
Kilinochchi area for as long as possible -- in spite of GSL requests 
to the contrary. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Protection of IDPs:  UNHCR reports that it is deeply 
concerned about the safety of the general population, including the 
many displaced families in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts. 
 UNHCR is urging both the GSL and the LTTE to take every possible 
measure to safeguard and provide them with safe passage out of the 
Vanni.  UNHCR reports that restrictions continue on the 
transportation of humanitarian supplies into the Vanni.  Further 
restrictions, particularly on shelter materials, are expected in 
light of the GSL's concerns regarding LTTE appropriation of 
materials and the GSL's plans to evacuate the civilian population. 
UNHCR continues to advocate with the GSL to ease restrictions on the 
transportation of humanitarian materials to the Vanni. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) UNHCR reports that IDPs moving into the Kilinochchi 
District are living in schools and other public buildings.  Many 
buildings are full and a large number of families are living in the 
open under trees.  Displacement is causing financial strain on many 
families with reports of families selling assistance to pay for 
transport to safer places.  The Ambassador and USAID Mission 
Director met with President Rajapaksa's senior advisor, Basil 
Rajapaksa, on September 12 to discuss USG concerns over the plight 
of the IDPs and to deliver the news that unless the WFP is able to 
monitor the commodities from FFP, future U.S. shipments of 
commodities for the Vanni are in jeopardy. 
 
USG COUNTRY TEAM SCENARIO PLANNING 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Post (including State, USAID and DOD representatives) is 
developing a three-phase plan of possible USG-supported 
interventions and resources to address the plight of the IDPs in the 
Vanni in the short-, medium- and long-term.  Phase 1 (short-term) is 
for immediate emergency relief intervention.  Some current resources 
are identified at Post, but additional resources will be needed from 
other USG sources.  Post continues to stay in constant contact with 
other donors, UN agencies, ICRC, and INGOs to coordinate resources 
and to share information.  Depending on how the fighting in the 
Vanni develops, phase 1 could take place over the next 6 to 8 
months.  Post's desktop review of phase 1 needs, which need to be 
reviewed by OFDA, FFP, and State/PRM, include:  a review of the food 
stocks and future needs for the Vanni under various planning 
scenarios, demining funding, cash for work programs and additional 
support to the UN Common Humanitarian Assistance Program (UNCHAP) 
for water and sanitation, protection, psychosocial services, and 
temporary shelter. 
 
¶11.  Phases 2 and 3 address stabilization (e.g., protection, 
livelihoods - especially for women headed households, 
disarmament/demobilization/reintegration, civilian-military 
relations, health and education services, small scale 
infrastructure, among other areas) and sustainable development 
(e.g., long term agriculture growth, private sector investment, 
infrastructure, reintegration, local government technical 
assistance, among other areas), respectively.  Post will also pursue 
assistance for those resources once phase 1 is underway. There is 
expected to be some overlap in the phases, as we have witnessed in 
the East, with water and sanitation, livelihoods (especially for 
households headed by women) and protection work still needed. 
 
ACTION REQUESTED 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Post requests that USAID/OFDA, USAID/FFP, and State/PRM 
review their resources to identify potential funds to continue to 
support the ICRC, UNCHAP, and the USAID umbrella grant mechanism, in 
phases 1 and 2.  Post thanks USAID/OFDA for providing on the ground 
support to assist country team with the scenario planning, to 
maintain regular contact with UN/ICRC and INGO agencies in the 
affected areas and in Colombo, and to identify further needs 
requiring USG support during phase 1. 
 
BLAKE