VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0851 2531123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091123Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8646

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/RD/SCA, DS/DSS/ITA AND SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COLOMBO EAC MEETING 09/03/2008 IN WAKE OF 
08/30/2008 BOMBING IN PETTAH DISTRICT, COLOMBO 11 
 
REF: RSO COLOMBO SPOT REPORT DATED 08/30/2008 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: AmEmbassy Colombo convened a meeting of the 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on September 3, 2008 to 
discuss post's security posture in light of the bombing 
incident that occurred on August 30, 2008 in the Pettah 
district, Colombo 11. The detonation of an improvised 
explosive device (IED) occurred at approximately 1230 hours 
local time (0300 EDT on the same date) and injured 43 people. 
The EAC concurred that the actual threat did not, at this 
juncture, warrant revisions to post's security posture or the 
security advice to the general American community. End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 3, 2008, AmEmbassy Colombo convened an 
EAC meeting.  Present for the meeting were the Acting Deputy 
Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Political 
Officer, Economic Officer, Public Affairs Officer, Consular 
Officer, Management Officer, International Broadcasting 
Bureau Station Manager, USAID Acting Director, Officer in 
Charge of the Office of Defense Cooperation, Defense Attache 
Office's Operations Coordinator and the Marine Security Guard 
Detachment Commander. The agenda items for the meeting were: 
 
-- The IED detonation in Pettah on August 30 
 
-- Post's security posture in light of the incident 
 
¶3. (SBU) On August 30, 2008, an IED detonated on Olcott 
Mawatha (or Olcott Avenue), in Pettah, Colombo 11, 
approximately two miles away from, and north of, the U.S. 
Embassy. RSO's police sources, as well as local media 
outlets, reported that the IED was hidden in a vendor's 
stall. Police sources told the RSO that investigators had 
discovered pieces of cardboard and a 9 volt battery at the 
crime scene, leading to speculation that the device had been 
a time delayed/detonated parcel bomb. The explosion injured 
43 people, three critically, but no deaths were reported. 
Police blamed LTTE for the explosion, though the LTTE did not 
claim responsibility. RSO's police sources speculated, 
immediately after the incident, that the terrorist group was 
trying to demonstrate that it still has the capability of 
striking in one of the busiest commercial districts of 
Colombo, despite the heavy security presence throughout the 
city. Police sources averred that using such a small amount 
of explosive material (approximately 75 - 100 grams) could 
cause injuries while minimizing the likelihood of deaths. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The EAC discussed other possible motives that had 
cropped up in the days after the bombing. POL commented that 
some sources were speculating that the LTTE was not involved 
at all; rather, the incident was part of a plan to chase 
street vendors from the area. Other sources conjectured that 
rival street vendors were attempting to rid the area of 
competitors. Regardless of the true source or motives for the 
explosion, the EAC concurred that the incident did not 
represent a change or escalation in the threat to the 
official or expatriate American communities. The EAC agreed 
that the true threat remains being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time - i.e. in proximity to an LTTE attack on a GSL 
military, political, economic or law enforcement target, and 
thus becoming an unintended victim of the attack. The EAC 
agreed that this attack did not represent a change in LTTE 
tactics, if indeed LTTE perpetrated the incident. Therefore, 
there was nothing new to report to either the official or 
expatriate American communities. Accordingly, the EAC decided 
that it was not necessary, at this time, to either revise 
post's security posture or amend the security advice that 
post provides to the general American community. 
 
¶5. (U) Post will continue to monitor the security environment 
and report further developments septel. POC for this message 
is RSO Michael V. Perkins, who may be contacted at 
94.11.249.8885, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post 1 after regular 
business hours), or via email at perkinsmv@state.gov 
(unclassified email), or perkinsmv@state.sgov.gov (classified 
email). 
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