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DE RUEHLM #0849/01 2530826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090826Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8640
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3443
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6240
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2250
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 8671
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6095
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2920
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0789

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000849 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND PRM 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR MHESS, KLUU AND RTHAYER 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKIN AND MNIMMS 
BANGKOK FOR DCHA/OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WBERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PGOV EAID CE
SUBJECT: GSL ORDERS ALL INGOS AND UN OUT OF VANNI FOR 
SECURITY REASONS 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the September 8 Consultative Committee 
of Humanitarian Affairs (CCHA), the Government of Sri Lanka 
confirmed that all UN and international NGO expatriate staff 
will have to leave the LTTE-controlled areas effective 
immediately with their key equipment (vehicles, 
communications, computers, etc) due to security reasons.  The 
ICRC will be allowed to stay because of the GSL's Geneva 
Convention obligations.  The Government said it was no longer 
safe for the UN and INGOs to be in the Vanni and said the 
Government Agents (GAs) will now assume responsibility for 
distributing all relief to internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in LTTE-controlled areas.  The Government of Sri Lanka 
will build a major logistics hub in Vavuniya to which the UN 
will deliver supplies and the GAs will send trucks to pick it 
up.  The UN asked for three weeks to implement this 
withdrawal; the Government of Sri Lanka did not agree to that 
but granted the UN more time.  The Ambassador said the INGOs 
would have an even more difficult time getting LTTE 
permission to remove their assets and urged the Government of 
Sri Lanka to be flexible, to which the Defense Secretary 
agreed.  Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa agreed 
to meet on a weekly basis with the 13 INGOs still in the 
Vanni and the Ambassador to review humanitarian issues.  The 
Ambassador and USAID will attend the first meeting on Friday. 
 The Government of Sri Lanka is confident the GAs will be 
able to handle this increased work; the UN and INGOs are 
skeptical.  Ambassador told the CCHA that if the Government 
of Sri Lanka expects IDPs to move South into 
Government-controlled areas, it must do a much better job of 
reassuring them they will not be mistreated and left to 
languish in camps as many IDPs from Mannar still are.  Basil 
and Gotabhaya Rajapaksa took the point and agreed.  Basil 
Rajapaksa said a key part of resettling IDPs will be quick 
demining in the areas liberated from the LTTE.  He 
specifically requested U.S. and Japanese help and promised an 
assessment of the priority areas soon.  In a quick meeting 
after the CCHA, UN Resident Representative Buhne flagged to 
the Ambassador that with the departure of UN staff from the 
Vanni, the UN will no longer be able to monitor the 
distribution of food and other relief supplies from the US 
and other donors, some portion of which is likely to be 
stolen or diverted by the LTTE.  The GAs also are likely to 
rely on the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization for at least 
some help in distributing relief.  The US designated the TRO 
under E.O. 13224 on November 15, 2007 because of evidence it 
acts as a front for facilitating fundraising and procurement 
for the LTTE.  See action request paragraph 9 for USAID.  End 
Summary. 
 
All Expats Must Leave LTTE-Controlled Areas 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights 
Samarasinghe opened the CCHA by briefing on the Government's 
decision to ask expatriate staff of the UN and all 
international NGOs to relocate themselves and their equipment 
(vehicles, computers, etc.) out of LTTE-controlled areas 
effective immediately.  Samarasinghe said this decision was 
taken to ensure the security of UN and INGO expatriate staff. 
 (Note:  the ICRC will be allowed to remain.)  He also cited 
a GSL intelligence report that indicated the LTTE would soon 
ask all INGO staff to work for the LTTE.  Samarasinghe 
indicated that the Government would consider UN 
Representative Buhne's request that UN and ICRC be given 
three weeks to relocate their staff and equipment. 
Samarasinghe said that the GAs in the Vanni would immediately 
assume responsibility for distributing relief to IDPs in the 
Vanni.  He further indicated that the Government of Sri Lanka 
will establish a major hub in Vavuniya where UN and ICRC 
relief supplies will be delivered for pickup by trucks 
dispatched by the GAs.  He stated the Government of Sri 
Lanka's commitment to ensure the GAs have whatever they need 
to ensure their capacity to deliver needed assistance to 
IDPs.  He admitted that the Government can't force IDPs to 
move south into Government-controlled areas if the IDPs do 
not want to move.  He concluded by asking Sri Lanka's 
 
COLOMBO 00000849  002 OF 004 
 
 
international partners to continue their strong humanitarian 
support for IDPs in Sri Lanka. 
 
¶3. (SBU)   Ambassador took the opportunity to tell 
Samarasinghe, Defense Secretary Rajapaksa, and Presidential 
Advisor Basil Rajapaksa that the US Embassy had spoken 
earlier in the day with INGO representatives to get their 
reaction to the relocation order.  He said INGOs had two 
categories of concern.  First, they were worried about how 
food and other relief supplies would be delivered to IDPs 
without the assistance of the UN and the other international 
NGOs.  Second, they asked for flexibility in the timetable 
for evacuating their staff and assets since the LTTE would 
likely make it as difficult as possible for them to remove 
vehicles and other equipment.  The Ambassador noted that the 
first question had been answered to some extent by the 
Minister's presentation, but he requested flexibility on the 
timetable for the removal of INGO equipment.  Defense 
Secretary Rajapaksa acknowledged that the LTTE would put as 
many barriers as possible in front of moving equipment. 
Basil Rajapaksa said he would be chairing a meeting on 
Friday, September 12 with representatives of the 13 INGOs 
still in the Vanni to discuss modalities for their orderly 
departure.  He invited the Ambassador to attend that meeting. 
 
Safehavens and Humanitarian Corridor 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  A representative of the EC Humanitarian office 
asked whether the Government is considering the creation of 
safehavens for IDPs in the North and whether it plans to 
establish a humanitarian corridor to move relief supplies up 
to the North, if the main A9 road is closed due to 
hostilities.  The Defense Secretary responded that the 
Government of Sri Lanka plans to provide assistance to IDPs 
around the town of Puttukudiyiruppu (south-east of 
Killinocchi).  If the A9 is closed the Government will make 
use of roads to the East to deliver relief supplies.  Seeking 
to relieve what he sensed was anxiety and skepticism about 
whether the Government and the GAs could take on the full 
task of delivering humanitarian assistance to IDPs in the 
North, Rajapaksa said that the Government had done a good job 
of doing so after liberating the East, and it also managed 
capably relief operations for 400,000 who where displaced 
from Jaffna in the late 1990's (note: in fact the UN and 
international NGOs played a substantial role in providing 
relief after the liberation of the East). 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Japanese Ambassador, whom Samarasinghe has 
invited to participate in the CCHA (perhaps because the 
Government of Sri Lanka believes Japan will provide a 
friendly voice), asserted that the safety of IDPs is 
paramount and that the Sri Lankan military must take special 
precautions to ensure no civilian casualties.  The Defense 
Secretary responded that the Government of Sri Lanka takes 
great care to avoid civilian casualties.  He remarked that 
civilians are usually quick to move when military hostilities 
near their villages.  INGO and UN staff are less quick to 
move, perhaps understandably because they want to continue to 
provide relief assistance to those in need.  This is why the 
Government felt compelled to order the relocation of 
expatriate staff from the North, he said. 
 
Need To Reassure IDPs About the Treatment They Will Receive 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador pointed out that if the Government 
hopes to establish a major hub in Vavuniya for IDPs they hope 
will move South, the Government has to do a better job of 
reassuring IDPs about the treatment they will receive.  He 
said that reports from various sources in the North suggest 
that IDPs are reluctant to move South for three reasons: 
first, the LTTE goes to great lengths to prevent them from 
moving so they can be recruited for military or labor 
purposes; second, they want to remain close to their land and 
families, some of whom may be fighting for the LTTE; and 
 
COLOMBO 00000849  003 OF 004 
 
 
third, they genuinely fear the treatment they might receive 
at the hands of the Government of Sri Lanka, both in terms of 
possible human rights abuses and lengthy quasi-internment in 
IDP camps as has been the experience for IDPs from Mannar. 
The Defense Secretary and Basil Rajapaksa took the point that 
they needed to do a better job of explaining to IDPs they 
will not be mistreated and that a good step would be to 
resettle those in the Mannar camp.  Samarasinghe interjected 
that the reason many were still being held was to make sure 
they were not sleeper LTTE operatives. 
 
Demining Assistance to be Requested from US and Others 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Basil Rajapaksa said the Government already has 
plans underway to improve the road network, irrigation 
schemes, and other infrastructure in recently cleared areas, 
so that IDPs can be resettled as quickly as possible.  He 
indicated, however, that a first priority would be to demine 
all such areas.  He thanked the U.S. and Japanese Governments 
for the demining assistance they had provided in Jaffna and 
the East and said the Government of Sri Lanka is undertaking 
an assessment of demining needs in recently cleared areas in 
the north, after which the Government of Sri Lanka will 
request new demining assistance from the U.S., Japan and 
other countries. 
 
Risk of Diversion by TRO or LTTE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In a brief conversation after the CCHA, UN Resident 
Representative Buhne flagged to the Ambassador that with the 
departure of UN staff from the Vanni, the UN will no longer 
be able to monitor the distribution of food and other relief 
supplies from the US and other donors, some portion of which 
is likely to be stolen or diverted by the LTTE.  He said that 
after the UN itself, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization 
(TRO) has the most effective network for distribution of 
relief in the Vanni.  (Note: The US Treasury Department 
designated the TRO under E.O. 13224 on November 15, 2007 
because of evidence it acts as a front for facilitating 
fundraising and procurement for the LTTE.)  Buhne also said 
there is a risk that the LTTE could steal or otherwise 
impound UN-supplied relief for use by the LTTE.  Mission will 
look into this issue in more detail, assess how much relief 
is likely to be distributed by the TRO or diverted by the 
LTTE, and then prepare a cable with recommendations for 
Washington. 
 
Action Request 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. Action Request: Request that USAID Food for Peace, and 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provide on the ground 
support to the Embassy and USAID as soon as possible to 
manage and monitor policy and programmatic issues. 
 
Comment 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Government of Sri Lanka's decision to evacuate 
all expatriate staff from the Vanni is likely to 
significantly complicate and delay delivery of assistance to 
IDPs in the North.  As the Government of Sri Lanka military 
moves north, larger numbers of inhabitants will swell the 
estimated 65,000 to 85,000 who have already been displaced. 
The ability of the GAs to coordinate the massive logistical 
effort that will be needed is questionable at best.  Without 
the UN and INGOs in the Vanni to provide independent 
assessments of the humanitarian situation, the LTTE is likely 
to try to highlight and possibly exaggerate the humanitarian 
problems as much as possible to energize its fundraising 
efforts from the diaspora and cast the GSL in the worst light 
possible.  The GSL now has to defend itself from such charges 
without help from the UN.  On a positive note, Basil 
Rajapaksa acceded to our request to have a weekly meeting to 
 
COLOMBO 00000849  004 OF 004 
 
 
review the humanitarian situation and assess needs and 
responses. 
BLAKE