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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001266 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2018 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PREF BR BO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL FOREIGN MINISTRY ON BOLIVIA SITUATION 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 99473 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1253 (NOTAL) 
     ¶C. LA PAZ 2036 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
¶1. (C) PolCounselor delivered ref A demarche on September 22 
to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry South America 1 Division 
(Mercosul countries) Chief, Minister Joao Luis Pereira Pinto, 
who is handling all of South America in the absence of his 
counterpart who handles the Andes and Under Secretary for 
South America Enio Cordeiro. (Note: Per ref B, PolCounselor 
had previously delivered the demarche to the presidency on 
September 19.)  Pinto thanked PolCounselor for the 
information on the expulsions and indicated that he thought 
the U.S. response was entirely appropriate. 
 
¶2. (C) Despite local press reports that negotiations between 
the Bolivian government and opposition were stalled, Pereira 
Pinto said that the press was overstating the problems. 
Although the talks were difficult and patience would be 
required,  he said that it was essential to keep the parties 
at the negotiating table.  Pereira Pinto thought that the 
Catholic Church had the most credibility with both sides and 
would therefore have a key role in keeping negotiations 
moving.  He confirmed that Ambassador Macedo Soares, a former 
Under Secretary for South America, was leading Brazil's 
delegation to observe the talks.  Pereira Pinto also said 
that, as head of the UNASUL "logistics" committee (one of 
three created at the September 15 emergency meeting), 
Brazilin Defense Minister Nelson Jobim would host the 
Bolivian Defense Minister on September 25.  The goal is to 
see what type of material support the GOB needs, and to pass 
these requests along to other UNASUL countries. 
 
¶3. (SBU) PolCouns asked about the number of people coming 
across the border into Brazil as a result of the instability. 
 Pereira Pinto said that there are no hotels rooms left in 
Brasileia, the border town in the Brazilian state of Acre 
across from Bolivia's Pando Department, but described this as 
an indication that most of those crossing were middle class 
or above and able to care for themselves.  He indicated that 
the numbers of those seeking shelter in Brazil--including 
both Bolivians and Brazilian farmers--were small enough that 
it was not a problem.  Pereira Pinto confirmed that Bolivians 
enjoy de facto access to Brazilian social services even 
though an agreement providing legal access has not yet been 
signed.  Asked about any official requests for asylum or 
refugee status, Pereira Pinto said he was not aware of any. 
He added that there was no truth to news reports that the 
Bolivian Government had requested the Brazilian government 
return Bolivian citizens allegedly involved in 
anti-government violence in Pando. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment: The GOB is eager to promote a peaceful 
resolution to the Bolivia crisis and help restore stability. 
Nonetheless, the GOB is walking a difficult line.  Sensitive 
to protect what it sees as the overriding principles of 
non-interference and sanctity of borders, the GOB is 
supporting the "constitutional government" in Bolivia and 
insisting that the Bolivian government should determine how 
the international community plays a role.  Although the GOB 
sees this as the best way to keep a lid on the crisis and 
encourage Evo Morales to stay at the negotiating table, the 
GOB's support for the Bolivian government, particularly if it 
extends to material support, may undermine its credibility 
with the opposition as a neutral partner.  At the same time, 
Brazilians in states bordering Bolivia strongly support the 
Bolivian opposition, Brazilian commercial interests remain at 
risk from violence, and the GOB has already taken criticism 
domestically for its previous "appeasement" of Morales.  For 
the GOB, the safest route is support for dialogue in Bolivia, 
in its capacity as a member of UNASUL.  Even should talks 
break down and violence increase, however, the GOB is likely 
to maintain its support for the "constitutional government," 
absent egregious, public, and continuing violations of human 
rights. 
KUBISKE